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"In Law and the Visual, leading legal theorists, art historians, and critics come together to present new work examining the intersection between legal and visual discourses. Proceeding chronologically, the volume offers leading analyses of the juncture between legal and visual culture as witnessed from the fifteenth to the twenty-first centuries. Editor Desmond Manderson provides a contextual introduction that draws out and articulates three central themes: visual representations of the law, visual technologies in the law, and aesthetic critiques of law. A ground breaking contribution to an increasingly vibrant field of inquiry, Law and the Visual will inform the debate on the relationship between legal and visual culture for years to come."--

Proximity, Levinas, and the Soul of Law links the controversial ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas to the common law legal tradition that has recently invigorated the idea of "the duty of care." Desmond Manderson argues that the ethicist and lawyer struggle with the same basic questions of why we should care for others and what responsibility really demands of us when we use the language of care, neighbourhood, and proximity.

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of Figures -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Irony of Law and Literature -- The mimetic fallacy -- The romantic fantasy -- Letting modernism happen - at last -- 3 1922 -- Modernism and the crisis of modernity -- The romantic turn -- Carl Schmitt and the death of the rule of law -- 4 Enter the Kangaroo -- Origin and reception -- Introducing Kangaroo -- 5 The Rule of Law and the Legacy of Modernism -- Troubling the rule of law -- Two ways to forget history -- 6 How Kangaroo Rewrote Lawrence -- Bakhtin and Lawrence on the ethics of the novel -- Text -- Texture -- 7 Reality and Therapy in the Novel -- Context: Lawrence's nightmare and the recovery of memory -- Sub-text: The novel as a therapeutic genre -- 8 Polarity -- Antecedents -- Analogues -- Descendents -- 9 Thirroul of Law -- Narrativity and performativity -- Polarity, publicity, and the rule of law -- A triangulation -- 10 Littoral Readings -- On the road -- On the beach -- Bibliography -- Index.

1. Introduction -- 2. The irony of law and literature -- 3. 1922 -- 4. Enter the kangaroo -- 5. The rule of law and the legacy of modernism -- 6. How Kangaroo rewrote Lawrence -- 7. Reality and therapy in the novel -- 8. Polarity -- 9. Thirroul of law -- 10. Littoral readings.

""Contents ""; ""Acknowledgements ""; ""Introduction: Tales from the Crypt -- A Metaphor, An Image, A Story ""; ""ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ""; ""NOTES ""; ""Part One. In Extremis""; ""1. Death as the Horizon of the Law ""; ""INTRODUCTION: LIMITING THE LAW ""; ""SCENES FROM THE EXECUTION ""; ""DEATH AND THE DECOMPOSITION OF JUDICIAL DISCOURSE ""; ""CONCLUSION: THE LIMITLESS LIMIT ""; ""ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ""; ""NOTES ""; ""2. Et Lex Perpetua: Dying Declarations and the Terror of SÃ?ssmayr ""; ""INTRODUCTION ""; ""A ""; ""I ""; ""II ""; ""B ""; ""I ""; ""II ""; ""C ""; ""I ""; ""II ""; ""CONCLUSION

In this pathbreaking and provocative analysis of the aesthetics of law, the historian, legal theorist, and musician Desmond Manderson argues that by treating a text, legal or otherwise, as if it were merely a sequence of logical propositions, readers miss its formal and symbolic meanings

In this essay the author responds to a special journal issue devoted to his latest book, Danse Macabre: Temporalities of Law and the Visual Arts. Critics have drawn attention to ways in which the interdisciplinary theories and methods developed by Manderson can be extended into new lines of inquiry including in relation to gender, Indigenous, and contemporary art. The author embraces these suggestions with specific reference to the political and neo-colonial implications of his discussion of the murals of Rafael Cauduro.

This article offers a substantial new interpretation of Aeschylus' Oresteia, one of the most important literary texts to deal with the question of the rule of law, and one of Western jurisprudence's founding documents. Perhaps in part because of it has fallen under the shadow of Antigone, the play has tended to suffer from a reductionist reading in which legal reason triumphs over the passions. The present article rereads the text drawing on recent scholarship on Aeschylus' work. It argues that the central figure of the Furies has been misunderstood: they are not simply expressions of violence and passion; on the contrary, they are the most legalistic of all the figures in the play. The model of judgment introduced by Athena in the resolution of Oresteia does not pit law against emotion, or feud against process, but judgment against law. The trilogy begins by presenting the uncertainty of language as law's curse, and the certain application of the law its cure; it concludes by radically reframing the question. Now the illusory certainty of law is the curse – and the uncertainty of language its cure. Athena's way positions legal judgment as something more than the mere following of rules. The article then goes on to show that this approach not only casts a new light on orthodox jurisprudence. It is of profound relevance to the work of Giorgio Agamben and the theory of sovereignty he has famously expounded in Homo Sacer. What ultimately separates Athena's rule of law from mere decisionism or Agamben's executive and unlimited sovereignty are the external constraints to which she purposely submits herself. Athena demonstrates a vision of judgment as a participatory and transformative process. Above all, she insists on the essential role of public legal argument and public accountability in a discourse of legal legitimacy, which is not simply limited to judges or particular legal decisions. On the contrary, Athena connects the rule of law to a continuing discussion of legal values and judgments which is never finally settled, and in which all of us, as citizens of Athens, are participants.

This essay develops an extended analysis of Gustav Klimt's lost masterpiece, Jurisprudence, bringing it into a richer dialogue with its social and legal context. Jurisprudence, a suffering naked man surrounded by eyes, eerily captures the relationship between 'sovereignty and bare life' that Agamben argues was re-forged and refined across the 20th century. Klimt's image might perhaps be regarded as the very first, and perhaps still the most comprehensive, representation of this profoundly important figure of legal modernity. But Klimt does not merely exemplify Agamben's force field of jurisprudential violence; he also complicates and interrogates it. Drawing on two of the most important cultural events to take place in Vienna at the time—the first performance of Aeschylus' Oresteia and the first publication of Sigmund Freud's Interpretation of Dreams—the essay develops three distinct readings of the painting's relationship between man, law, and sovereignty. Like an optical illusion, Klimt's painting hovers uncertainly between three different but equally necessary perspectives: law as it is (the social); law as we imagine it (the philosophical); and law as it might be (the political). The proper name for the highly charged study of their relationship is jurisprudence.

This essay deploys three modes of reading the relationship of visual art to law. In the first or objective mode of representation, we are attentive to the external referents of the artwork. In the second or subjective mode, we turn our attention to the internal or constitutive effects of the artwork – the way such depictions constitute affective relationships to legal and political power. In the third or critical mode, the ambivalence between "subject" and "object" effects unleashes the critical potential of the artwork. These three modes are each connected to different ways of understanding ideas of sentiment, sensibility, and sympathy. Analyzing J. M. W. Turner's The Slave Ship, I show how the three modes of reading interpret the painting differently and position the viewer differently in relation to it. But the representation of drowning bodies in the water is not merely an historical phenomenon. On the contrary, the ideological construction of images of drowning is an important issue around the world – most notably in relation to the figure of the asylum-seeker or refugee. Here too it is argued that the potential exists to develop a critical mode of reading these images, and to engage with them in ways that reorient our affective response from pity to responsibility, from mercy to justice, and from common sense to uncommon sensibility.

The rule of law is in peril. Some say it is imperiled by reactionary politics. Some say it is imperiled by radical theory. Some say that these two dimensions are complicit: by working so avidly to undermine the integrity of texts and institutions, key movements in contemporary legal theory and philosophy are often said to weaken the bulwark of the rule of law just when it is most needed. The question for this Article is the following: is this true, and if it is, what can we do about it? Powerful critiques of rules, language, objectivity and meaning in law have been accumulating for a long time now and cannot just be wished away, regardless of our political preferences. The challenge is to address more seriously what this means for the rule of law. But it is a challenge confronted. Those interested in the rule of law tend to trivialize the critique; those interested in the critique tend to ignore the rule of law. In this Article, I attempt to get past this willful blindness and engage the issue. The critique of positivism does indeed have serious implications for the rule of law. But by paying attention to the historical moment when these two traditions most dramatically collided, there is much we can learn. Not only does the historical context sharpen and intensify the issues at stake, but it also reveals a third alternative that ignores�neither�the critique of positivism nor the rule of law. In this Article, I will call this alternative polarity, and I want to show where and why it arises from the historical context of modernism and what implications it might have for a post-positivist rule of law. History therefore teaches us not only why the problems with the rule of law have been so long-lasting, but what we might do about it. Perhaps, after all, the peril to the rule of law might be averted not by ignoring the critique of positivism but by embracing it.