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This report draws together information and analyses from the preceding eight reports of IECEU Work Package 3 that examine the effectiveness of EU civilian crisis management operations in Libya, South Sudan, CAR and DR. Congo. The four cases are examined in separate sections. The following is based on the findings in the eight previous deliverables, and pools together the conclusions from these previous eight deliverables in WP3. ; This report draws together information and analyses from the preceding eight reports of IECEU Work Package 3 that examine the effectiveness of EU civilian crisis management operations in Libya, South Sudan, CAR and DR. Congo. The four cases are examined in separate sections. The following is based on the findings in the eight previous deliverables, and pools together the conclusions from these previous eight deliverables in WP3.

One round-table event was organised within the framework of Work Package III, part of the IECEU project. The events focused on the WP3's four case studies: Libya, CAR, South Sudan and DRC. This report provides information on the round-table event and presents the main points of discussion that emerged during it. The round-table discussion and the subsequent seminar on the Effectiveness of International Assistance and Local Ownership in the four case studies was organised by the Royal Danish Defence College on 31 October-1. November 2016. The round-table participants included experts on Africa in general, sub-matter experts, experts on peace and conflict studies, and practitioners in crisis management. A total of eighteen speakers explored the effectiveness of international assistance to the four African examples from different perspectives, drawing a rather pessimistic picture of the current situation in the four countries in question, but also highlighting the difficulties for the EU in working as a conflict manager in this context. Libya is plagued by international strife to such an extent that the EU had to withdraw from that mission. South Sudan has returned to civil war, and while the technical impact of the small EU airport mission is not in doubt, the larger strategic and medium to long-term impacts are not visible. In CAR the EU force managed to stabilise a critical security situation, thus allowing international humanitarian action and political dialogue to take place. The EU force took the form of a robust bridging mission that was replaced by a UN force, and it largely managed to fulfil its mandate. However, the EU force mission also highlights a number of internal EU challenges that need to be addressed, as well as the medium to long-term impact of this type of military intervention. In the case of the DRC, four cases were debated. The first was Operation Artemis, the EU-led military intervention in the town of Bunia, to stop and pre-empt an unfolding ethnic conflict. The operation was limited in size and time, and it managed to achieve its objectives, but it did not prevent the conflict flaring up after it had left. The significance of Artemis was that it was the first ESDP mission, a trendsetter for the more independent role for the EU that some member states wanted in the future. In 2006 the EU again deployed a robust military force primarily to Kinshasa, mandated to assist the UN force MONUC in securing the DRC elections in that year. Again the EU force deployment was limited in size and time, and managed to achieve its mandate. However, the deployment highlighted a number of lessons for the EU in future operations, especially around national caveats in operations and logistics, but also the different priorities of member states in EU-led military operations, compared, for instance, to NATO operations. This was very visible in the later CAR deployment, for which it was difficult to get EU members to commit and deploy forces. The two other EU missions in the DRC were the EUPOL and the EUSEC missions, which focused on helping implement the SSR program, which constituted a central element of the peace agreement. Even though the EU was involved for many years and introduced a whole range of new initiatives, the missions did not manage to achieve their medium to long-term objectives. The study shows that there was a discrepancy between project formulation and ambitions, as well as between the available budget and reality. The EUPOL and EUSEC missions were plagued by being over-ambitious and by not taking the DRC context into consideration. Furthermore the study shows that there is a slippage between what happens in Brussels and what happens on the ground in the DRC, as well as an urgent need to secure better communications and cooperation between the two levels.

This IECEU project deliverable 3.1, The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Review, assesses the existing literature and academic and policy research on the contemporary security situation in the DRC, as well as the responses to this situation. Deliverable 3.1 therefore functions as a foundation for the analysis in deliverable 3.5. to arrive at a better assessment of the internal and external impact on the EU's CSDP and ESDP missions to the overall security of the DRC. The first EU mission, Operation Artemis, was deployed in the Ituri provincial capital of Bunia in 2003 with the aim of stabilizing a deteriorating security situation. The force was deployed parallel to the existing UN PSO mission in the DRC, and after six months became part of the international community's overall assistance to the country. In 2005 the EU launched both a EUPOL and a EUSEC mission, which were supposed to help train the Congolese police and military institutions as part of the SSR and state-building project initiated after the signing of the two peace agreements. The EUPOL project was ended in 2014, EUSEC in 2016. The EU has therefore been involved in a wide range of post-conflict state-building initiatives as part of larger efforts to address the vast range of causes of conflict in the DRC. As documented in the review, conflict and wars in the DRC go back beyond1996, have had different expressions, been internationalized and linked to regional security dynamics, and exemplify the debate on the role and importance of natural resources in conflict and the impact of international responses to this type of conflict. The security situation in the DRC is better today than it was five years ago, though in North Kivu alone there are still more than twenty non-state armed groups, and the debate over political secession surrounding President Kabila has moved conflict in the country into a new and potentially very dangerous phase. ; This IECEU project deliverable 3.5, The DR Congo Field Trip report, assesses the contributions of the EU CSDP missions Operation Artemis, EUFOR RDC, EUPOL and EUSEC to the overall security of the state of the DR Congo, in particular by taking into consideration the perspectives of mission personnel, representatives of the Congolese authorities, NGOs and other IOs. EU involvement started with the deployment of Artemis in 2003, and the study ends with the closure of EUSEC in July 2016. All EU missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been part of EU support for the transition and implementation of the 2002 Peace Agreement in the country. A key challenge was that the sheer size of the DRC, the lack of infrastructure and the non-permissive environment made it a very difficult and complex undertaking. The Congolese partner has been resistant to reform, and the EU has found it difficult to undertake its SSR (security-sector reform) initiatives successfully. Some informants even called the EU project generally a failure. Applying the methodology of the IECEU project, in particular DL 1.4. and DL 1.5, the success of the mission will be examined by describing the main capabilities deployed. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the mission will be analysed by looking at the attainment of both internal and external goals and their appropriateness. This combines both the findings of the field trip and the conducted interviews, as well as comprehensive desktop research. The findings were tested and refined at an expert round table held in Copenhagen on 31 October 2016 with relevant experts.

Part of this IECEU project deliverable 3.5, The DR Congo Field Trip report, assesses the contributions of the EU CSDP missions Operation Artemis, EUFOR RDC, EUPOL and EUSEC to the overall security of the state of the DR Congo, in particular by taking into consideration the perspectives of mission personnel, representatives of the Congolese authorities, NGOs and other IOs. EU involvement started with the deployment of Artemis in 2003, and the study ends with the closure of EUSEC in July 2016. All EU missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been part of EU support for the transition and implementation of the 2002 Peace Agreement in the country. A key challenge was that the sheer size of the DRC, the lack of infrastructure and the non-permissive environment made it a very difficult and complex undertaking. The Congolese partner has been resistant to reform, and the EU has found it difficult to undertake its SSR (security-sector reform) initiatives successfully. Some informants even called the EU project generally a failure. Applying the methodology of the IECEU project, in particular DL 1.4. and DL 1.5, the success of the mission will be examined by describing the main capabilities deployed. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the mission will be analysed by looking at the attainment of both internal and external goals and their appropriateness. This combines both the findings of the field trip and the conducted interviews, as well as comprehensive desktop research. The findings were tested and refined at an expert round table held in Copenhagen on 31 October 2016 with relevant experts. ; Case study evaluating EU security management initiatives in DRC

The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.

The European Union's (EU) direct engagement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) dates back to 2002 and should be seen as part of an integrated and multifaceted engagement within the DRC. The European Commission has prioritised peace, security and stabilisation in relation to the DRC, and the EU has been, and continues to be, one of the most vital international donors in the DRC through its humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and capacity-building programmes. In recent years the EU has increased its support to the country in terms of European-driven initiatives, as well as in close cooperation with other donors such as the United Nations. In 2005 the EU deployed two different missions to the DRC, one aimed at assisting with training the Congolese police and military institutions as part of the Security Sector Reform (EUPOL), and the other as part of a state-building project initiated after the signing of two peace agreements (EUSEC). The EUPOL mission was terminated in 2014 and the EUSEC in 2016. Both missions were successful in some areas and failed in others. Despite their shortcomings, the EUPOL and EUSEC missions can provide valuable lessons for future EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations.

The grouping consisting of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) was initially meant to be nothing more than clever investment jargon referring to the largest and most attractive emerging economies. However, these countries identified with the BRIC concept, and started to meet annually as a group in 2008. At their fourth summit in 2011, they added South Africa to become the BRICS. By then the BRICS had fully morphed from investment jargon to a name for a new economic and political grouping that had the potential to challenge the unipolar hegemony of the United States and its Western allies. Th.

Since the Central African Republic (CAR) gained its independence from France in 1960, the country has been troubled with internal conflicts. The country's instability is characterised by post-colonial ethnic tensions, poverty, crime, military coups, government corruption and a weak security sector. Following an escalation of conflicts in 2013 international actors such as the European Union began focussing their efforts on stabilising and rehabilitating the country. In 2014 the EU deployed a military operation with the overall goal of contributing to a safe and secure environment and providing humanitarian aid to the population. The operation was terminated on March 15, 2015 after having fulfilled its mandate. However, the effort was small-scale and geared towards meeting a set end date instead of contributing to a significant improvement of the overall security situation on the ground in CAR. The objective of this brief is to analyse the contribution of the 2014-2015 EU CSDP mission, EUFOR RCA, to the overall security situation in CAR. Given this objective, the following question is raised: What were the successes and shortcomings of the EUFOR RCA operation, and could anything have been done differently to increase effectiveness?

1. Anna Leander, Introduction 1. - 2. Åse Gilje Østensen, Norway: Keeping Up Appearances 18 . - 3. Thomas Mandrup, Denmark: How not if to Outsource Military Services 39. - 4. Joakim Berndtsson and Maria Stern, Sweden: Public Servants from the Private Sector 58. - 5. Marcin Terlikowski, Marek Madej and Beata Górka-Winter, Poland: Indirect and Ad Hoc 79 . - 6. Krisztian Varga, Hungary: From Outsourcing to Insourcing 100. - 7. Liliana Pop, Romania: The High and Low Politics of Commercialization 121. - 8. Christian Olsson, France: Making Both Ends Meet? 141 . - 9. Elke Krahmann, Germany: Civilian Power Revisited 161. - 10. Stefano Ruzza, Italy: Keeping or Selling Stocks? 181. - 11. Anna Leander and Christopher Spearin, Conclusion 202