Suchergebnisse

This paper investigates whether significant qualitative differences exist in consumer goods produced pre- and post liberalization in India by focusing on the changes in the quality of three goods in particular -- telephone services, televisions, and watches. It thus attempts to till the gap in the literature on India's growth experience; that is, it investigates if differing improvements in economic well-being were hidden behind the high growth rates recorded during the two periods. The paper focuses on several key characteristics of goods that together serve as a proxy for quality. Using primary as well as secondary data, the author studies the technology gap between goods in India and the world market at that time, the prevalence of defects or faults in the goods produced, the waiting time required to obtain a good, and the extent of product differentiation and variety. Adapted from the source document.

While India remained under colonial rule during the first forty-seven years of the twentieth century, its national income grew at the low rate of 1.3 percent per annum. From 1900 to 1914, the growth rate was 1.45 percent, and income per capita grew by 1 percent per annum. Economic performance worsened between 1914 and 1947. The national income grew at an average rate of 1.08 percent per annum, and income per capita was essentially stagnant, recording a growth rate of 0.06 percent per annum (Roy 2006, 78).[l] In stark contrast, the growth rates of gross domestic product (GDP) recorded for independent India during the first fifteen years of central planning were much higher. India's GDP growth rate was nearly 4 percent per annum during the first two Five-Year Plans (FYPs), spanning the years 1951-56 and 1956-61, respectively, and it was 4.5 percent per annum during the first four years of the Third FYP, from 1961 to 1965 (Panagariya 2008,23).[2]. Adapted from the source document.

"Capitalism and Inequality rejects the popular view that attributes the recent surge in inequality to a failure of market institutions. Bringing together new and original research from established scholars, it analyses the inequality inherent in a free market from an economic and historical perspective. In the process, the question of whether the recent increase in inequality is the result of crony capitalism and government intervention is explored in depth. The book features sections on theoretical perspectives on inequality, the political economy of inequality, and the measurement of inequality. Chapters explore several key questions such as the difference between the effects of market-driven inequality and the inequality caused by government intervention; how the inequality created by regulation affects those who are less well-off; and whether the economic growth that accompanies market-driven inequality always benefits an elite minority while leaving the vast majority behind. The main policy conclusions that emerge from this analysis depart from those that are currently popular. The authors in this book argue that increasing the role of markets and reducing the extent of regulation is the best way to lower inequality while ensuring greater material well- being for all sections of society. This key text makes an invaluable contribution to the literature on inequality and markets, and is essential reading for students, scholars, and policy makers. G.P. Manish is an Associate Professor of Economics at Troy University, USA, and the BB&T Professor of Economic Freedom at the Manuel H. Johnson Center for Political Economy, Troy University, USA. Stephen C. Miller is an Associate Professor of Economics at Troy University, USA, and the Adams-Bibby Chair of Free Enterprise at the Manuel H. Johnson Center for Political Economy, Troy University, USA."

AbstractThe implications of Knightian uncertainty are frequently discussed in the context of market-based institutional settings. Given money prices, entrepreneurs can engage in calculative action, in conjunction with 'judgment', to guide decision-making and bring about a coordination of production plans with consumer preferences. However, if the existence of Knightian uncertainty isubiquitous and applies to all human action, then what are its implications in non-market institutional settings? This paper explores questions related to the implications of Knightian uncertainty for two important non-market institutional settings: democratic government and the nonprofit or philanthropic sector, where there is an explicit lack of monetary calculation, yet nonprofit and political entrepreneurs still must use 'judgment' to deal with Knightian uncertainty. For instance, what are the implications of private property and privatized cost in the case of nonprofitsversusthe absence of private property and socialized cost in the case of democracy, in the presence of Knightian uncertainty? Which group of 'consumers' is likely to have their preferences satisfied when it comes to nonprofits (benefactors or beneficiaries) and democratic government (voters or lobbyists)? The paper, thus, points to the importance of further research on the implications of Knightian uncertainty in the hard case of non-market institutional settings.