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The polarization of political parties in the United States is a well-documented phenomenon. This paper considers polarization of the judicial branch and relates it to the evolution of the parties. In this paper we define polarization specifically as movement from a modal distribution (of votes, attitudes, or decisions) to a bimodal distribution along a liberal-conservative spectrum over time. Using data compiled from 90,000 United States District Court decisions published in the Federal Supplement between 1934 and 2008, we find that the judiciary began to polarize in the 1960s and has remained polarized. We consider a number of competing explanations for the polarization of the district courts, including a top-down view that emphasizes presidential power and a bottom-up view that focuses on the sorting of elites that form the pool of potential judges.

Objective. Drawing upon research that suggests that race and gender may shape judicial views about legal issues pertaining to these attributes, this study conducts an investigation of the influence of age on judicial decision making in age discrimination cases.Methods. This research analyzed 544 age bias rulings and 1,592 decisions in racial and gender discrimination cases handed down in the federal district courts from 1984 to 1995. Descriptive statistics incorporating cross‐product ratios were analyzed, and logit models were developed. Predicted probabilities were utilized to isolate differences in predicted decision‐making patterns for different age cohorts.Results. The youngest judges were least sympathetic to those who alleged that they were victims of age discrimination while the oldest judges were the most sympathetic to age discrimination claimants. This study also identified a generally more conservative decision‐making pattern in age cases compared to cases dealing with racial and gender discrimination.Conclusions. The data support the hypothesis that increased age corresponds with increased pro‐elderly decision making in age bias cases, though the effects appear at the age extremes among the very oldest and youngest judges. These results provide new evidence to support the social attribute model of judicial decision making, with a clear suggestion that some socioeconomic variables may affect judges' decision making differently over time.

A reply to Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin's comment on the authors' "Does Age Matter? Judicial Decision Making in Age Discrimination Cases" (both, 2004) takes issue with many of their assertions. It is argued that there is no theoretical justification for most of the cohorts that Epstein & Martin test & that the majority of them are not plausible. Further, inconsistencies in the model outcomes in race & gender cases raise questions as to the utility of age cohort as a predictor in such cases. While Epstein & Martin raise some interesting points regarding data grouping, & while acknowledging the possibility of debate over age cutoff points, the authors maintain that their findings are theoretically interesting & robust enough to evoke more extensive studies to determine the validity of their conclusions. 1 Table. Adapted from the source document.

Objective. Drawing upon research that suggests that race & gender may shape judicial views about legal issues pertaining to these attributes, this study conducts an investigation of the influence of age on judicial decision making in age discrimination cases. Methods. This research analyzed 544 age bias rulings & 1,592 decisions in racial & gender discrimination cases handed down in the federal district courts from 1984 to 1995. Descriptive statistics incorporating cross-product ratios were analyzed, & logit models were developed. Predicted probabilities were utilized to isolate differences in predicted decision-making patterns for different age cohorts. Results. The youngest judges were least sympathetic to those who alleged that they were victims of age discrimination while the oldest judges were the most sympathetic to age discrimination claimants. This study also identified a generally more conservative decision-making pattern in age cases compared to cases dealing with racial & gender discrimination. Conclusions. The data support the hypothesis that increased age corresponds with increased pro-elderly decision making in age bias cases, though the effects appear at the age extremes among the very oldest & youngest judges. These results provide new evidence to support the social attribute model of judicial decision making, with a clear suggestion that some socioeconomic variables may affect judges' decision making differently over time. 5 Tables, 3 Figures, 34 References. Adapted from the source document.

Drawing on research that suggests that race and gender may shape judicial views about legal issues pertaining to these attributes, conducts an investigation of the influence of age on judicial decision making in age discrimination cases. From an analysis of 544 age bias rulings and 1592 decisions in racial and gender discrimination cases handed down in the federal district courts from 1984 to 1995, concludes that increased age corresponds with increased pro-elderly decision making in age bias cases, though the effects appear at the age extremes among the very oldest and youngest judges. Results provide new evidence to support the social attribute model of judicial decision making, with a clear suggestion that some socioeconomic variables may affect judges' decision making differently over time. Includes a comment by Lee Epstein and Andrew D. Martin and a reply by the authors. (Original abstract - amended)

"Known for shedding light on the link between the courts, public policy, and the political environment, the 12th edition of Judicial Process in America will provide a comprehensive overview of the American judiciary. Considering the courts from every level, the authors thoroughly cover judges, lawyers, litigants, and the variables at play in judicial decision making"--

We address an important aspect of judicial careers: the elevation of judges from the U.S. District Courts to the Courts of Appeals. We argue that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of informational cues and signals regarding the nature of the judge and the judge's compatibility with presidential preferences. We also expect norms involving the intersection between geography and Senate politics to affect a judge's elevation chances. Using data on district court judges appointed between 1946 and 1995, we find that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of the judge's ideological compatibility with the president, the judge's previous ABA rating, and Senate norms involving state "ownership" of appeals court seats. Blunt indicators of policy preferences trump direct signals when presidents decide whom to elevate, leaving judges little control over their career prospects and thus less incentive to slant their decisions in the direction of the president's preferences.