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Ch. 1. Introduction -- Ch. 2. The Distribution of Wars Over Time: A Basic Empirical Analysis -- Ch. 3. The Distribution of Power and the Onset of War -- Ch. 4. International Trade and the Onset of War -- Ch. 5. The Effects of Power and War on Trade -- Ch. 6. The Determinants and Dynamics of Concentration -- Ch. 7. Conclusions.

Abstract
Despite longstanding scholarly interest in international institutions, remarkably little research has been conducted in variation in performance across organizations. In this essay, I review Ranjit Lall's book, which aims to fill that gap. Lall argues that the chief impediment to high-functioning international organizations (IOs) are member-states with particularistic interests that attempt to capture the institutions. The solution, he maintains, is to bolster the de facto autonomy of the bureaucrats who staff these institutions by forging operational alliances with nonstate stakeholders and mandating that they perform functions that are difficult for members to monitor. I evaluate Lall's argument and evidence. I then discuss a set of additional issues that are related to the performance of international institutions. First, why do stakeholders often continue to support those organizations that perform poorly? Second, what mechanisms exist for improving the performance of ailing IOs? Third, how does the widely documented backlash against globalization that has transpired during the past few decades bear on IOs? Fourth, Lall and others tout the benefits of well-performing IOs, but such institutions, nonetheless, can have costly and unanticipated side effects that merit greater scrutiny. Finally, formal international institutions have been key features of world politics. However, additional research is needed on whether and, if so, why they have become less important aspects of global governance.

This article examines some international factors contributing to the recent spread of preferential trading arrangements (PTAs). PTAs help states to ensure against future disruptions of commerce with key trade partners. When stress is placed on the international trading system, the threat of such disruptions rises. Both hegemonic decline and global recessions raise the specter of commercial closure, and therefore each factor may stimulate the proliferation of PTAs. Furthermore, strategic interaction among both PTAs and countries is likely to guide the growth of preferential arrangements. As PTAs become increasingly pervasive, states that are not covered by one have strong incentives to enter such an arrangement. Doing so reduces the prospect that their access to important markets will be curtailed and that their competitiveness abroad will be undermined. The findings of this article conform with these arguments. In general, eroding hegemony, global recessions, and strategic interdependence have accelerated the pace of commercial regionalism since World War II.

Economic sanctions have long occupied the attention of both scholars and policy makers. Despite the widespread use of sanctions, many observers have concluded that the inherent problems associated with imposing sanctions involving multiple senders substantially limit their effectiveness. This article reviews two books that analyze the factors that influence cooperation among senders of multilateral sanctions. These books indicate that international institutions can do much to promote cooperation of this sort. However, this essay argues that the extent to which international institutions facilitate cooperation among senders of sanctions is likely to depend on the domestic politics of members, the type of institution being used for this purpose, the nature of the strategy being pursued, and the distribution of power among members. Although these books make significant contributions to our understanding of the factors that promote cooperation among senders of multilateral sanctions, they examine the factors that promote the effectiveness of sanctions in only a peripheral manner. One potential influence on the effectiveness of sanctions that are organized by an international institution, however, is the likelihood that the institution will be captured by member states or by interest groups within them. Additional research that investigates the conditions under which international institutions are likely to be captured and the implications of institutional capture for their performance may therefore prove useful to scholars of international relations and economic statecraft.

Recent empirical research has produced no consensus on what (if any) relationship exists between the concentration of capabilities and the onset of war. The results of this article indicate that concentration is related to the frequency of war, but that rather than the monotonic relationship predicted by both balance of power and power preponderance theories, the relationship appears to have an inverted U-shape. We also show that concentration can be disaggregated into: (1) the number of major powers, and (2) the inequality of capabilities among the major powers. Our analysis shows that both components influence war, but that the effect on war of each component of concentration depends on the level of the other.