This volume aims to operationalize General John R. Galvin's call for a new paradigm to fight the most prevalent form of conflict in the world today-insurgency. It contributes to the understanding needed to formulate and implement efforts in the contemporary international security arena.
Introduction, method, and lessons from the Portuguese Coup of 1974 -- Stability-or not : lessons from Italy (1968-1983) and Western Sahara (1975-present) -- Stability and security : lessons that should have been learned in Somalia (1992-1998) and the British and American experience in Bosnia (1992-1998) -- Stability and development : lessons from Argentina (1960-present) and Mexico (1999-present)--attacking the state from within -- Development and governance : lessons from Vietnam, 1959-1975; and Algeria, 1954-1962 re creating the conditions that lead to the moral right to take control of government -- Governance and sovereignty : the British experience in Malaya, 1948-1960; and some contrasting lessons from El Salvador, 1979-1992 -- From sovereignty back to security--or not : lessons from Venezuela, 1998-date; and Uruguay, 1962-2005 -- Toward a paradigm for foreign policy and power asset management-or not : the proxy war against the Soviet 40th army in Afghanistan, 1979-1989 -- Key points and lessons. : what high mucky-mucks and the enlightened electorate should know about conflict and security in the contemporary global security arena.
This book addresses the challenge of international narcotics control by applying "the Manwaring paradigm." The paradigm is the basis for an improved strategy and theory of engagement for weak governments of the developing world, built around the concept of the "gray area phenomenon."
This anthology argues that facing the diverse threats in the 'new world disorder' requires a new look and new approaches. The requirement is to establish that contemporary deterrence demands replacing the old 'nuclear theology' with new policy and strategy to deal with the myriad state, non-state, and trans-national nuclear and non-nuclear menaces that have heretofore been ignored or wished away.