Search results

"Since the advent of the Second Republic in Italy in the mid-1990s, a new generation of politicians has announced a shift in the system toward greater governmental leadership, policy innovation, government accountability and responsiveness to the citizens. Yet in recent years government has experienced frequent crises and deadlocks, policy blockades and undisciplined parliamentary majorities. Has the attempt to change the nature of the Italian government totally failed? This book addresses this question by empirically assessing and theoretically evaluating the outcomes of the new system. It asks whether there has really been a shift toward a more majoritarian democracy and examines why alternation in power has failed to produce a more efficient and responsive government. It evaluates the connections between cabinet, parliament, parties and citizens, and in doing so, brings together diverse areas of inquiry such as government, legislative, party and public opinion studies. Drawing from comparative theory but also considering the impact of country-specific determinants, it explains the very nature of the Italian government from the point of view of its achievements and its failures. This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of government, comparative and Italian politics, and more broadly those with an interest in government, democracy and Italy"--

Italy is an interesting case to be included in a comparative analysis of the effects determined by the recent financial crisis on the European political systems, because of the distinctiveness characterising the recent development of this parliamentary democracy. The processes of making and breaking governments, in particular, have been particularly unusual: the end of the governmental experience of Silvio Berlusconi and the formation of the technical government led by Mario Monti have been strongly influenced by external factors, as well as the recent formation of the government guided by Enrico Letta, supported by a broad coalition including the former competing centre-right and centre-left cartels. The paper focuses on the practices of executive-legislative relationships in Italy between 2008 and the 2013 elections. Its basic puzzle is to understand the effective impact determined by the economic crisis over the core mechanisms of parliamentary democracy. Comparing the impact of the governmental policy agenda set by the technocratic cabinet vis-a-vis the previous 'political' executives, and measuring the reactions of the different parliamentary actors, it is possible to test a number of empirical propositions concerning the transformation of the adversarial mode that emerged in past years into a more or less consensual parliamentary atmosphere. Adapted from the source document.