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Competition in Crime Deterrence
In: The Canadian Journal of Economics, Band 30, Heft 4a, S. 844
Self-selection and violence in the market for crime
In: International review of law and economics, Band 17, Heft 2, S. 193-201
ISSN: 0144-8188
SSRN
Working paper
On the Early Holocene: Foraging to Early Agriculture
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 116, Heft 513, S. 751-772
ISSN: 1468-0297
Damage averaging and the formation of class action suits
In: International review of law and economics, Band 23, Heft 1, S. 63-74
ISSN: 0144-8188
Corporate Lobbying and Commitment Failure in Capital Taxation
In: American economic review, Band 93, Heft 1, S. 241-251
ISSN: 1944-7981
Dissuasion du crime et concurrence entre juridictions
In: Revue d'économie politique, Band 112, Heft 6, S. 905-919
ISSN: 2105-2883
Résumé Dans ce texte, nous étudions la concurrence que se livrent des juridictions dans la dissuasion du crime. Nous envisageons un monde dans lequel les criminels peuvent choisir la juridiction dans laquelle ils œuvreront. Chaque juridiction, afin de protéger sa dotation, investit en dissuasion, ce qui réduit le rendement net du crime sur son territoire et repousse potentiellement les criminels vers l'autre juridiction. Nous caractérisons les divers équilibres, symétrique et asymétrique, qui peuvent exister dans ce monde. Nous montrons qu'en l'absence de coordination entre les juridictions, les seuls équilibres qui puissent être efficaces sont asymétriques.
Corporate Lobbying and Commitment Failure in Capital Taxation
This paper investigates the effects of lobbying by corporations when investments are irreversible and government cannot commit to tax policies. We show that industries which rely more heavily on sunk capital lobby more vigorously and are generally more successful in obtaining tax breaks. Thus lobbying can mitigate the capital levy problem. Nevertheless, these industries invest less in long-run equilibrium than more flexible ones. We then consider the effects of relaxing legal restrictions on corporate lobbying. When the deadweight costs of lobbying fall, taxes on sunk capital tend to fall, but political contributions may rise, as lobbyists compete more intensively for political favors. On balance, a ban of lobbying may therefore cause investment to rise or fall.
BASE
The Redistributive Role of Minimum Wage Legislation and Unemployment Insurance
The use of unemployment insurance and minimum wages as instruments for redistributing income are analyzed. The government is assumed to be able to implement an optimal income tax in an economy consisting of two ability-types of persons. The effect of introducing a minimum wage which induces involuntary unemployment combined with unemployment insurance is considered. Social welfare can be improved despite the possible revenue costs to the government if the policy causes a self-selection constraint to be weakened by enough. Sufficiency conditions are derived for this to be the case.
BASE
Publicly Provided Unemployment Insurance and Commitment
A model is constructed in which, given the inability of implicit contracts to be self-enforcing, a minimum wage policy combined with unemployment insurance can be welfare-improving. Unemployment insurance can be decentralized to the private sector if the government can commit to a minimum wage. However, if it cannot , a government which acts in the interest of the workers will have an incentive to increase the minimum wage to exploit private insurers. The full commitment optimum can be achieved by publicly provided unemployment insurance.
BASE
Endogenous insecurity and economic development
In: Journal of development economics, Band 72, Heft 1, S. 1-29
ISSN: 0304-3878
Food Prices and the Timing of Welfare Payments: A Canadian Study
In: Canadian public policy: Analyse de politiques, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 145
ISSN: 1911-9917
Food Prices and the Timing of Welfare Payments: A Canadian Study
In: Canadian public policy: a journal for the discussion of social and economic policy in Canada = Analyse de politiques, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 145-160
ISSN: 0317-0861
Joint tax evasion
In: The Canadian journal of economics: the journal of the Canadian Economics Association = Revue canadienne d'économique, Band 35, Heft 3, S. 417-435
ISSN: 1540-5982
Tax evasion analysis typically assumes that evasion involves individual taxpayers responding to some given policies. However, evading taxes could require the collaboration of at least two taxpayers. Detection depends on the costly avoidance activities of both transacting partners. An increase in sanctions leads to a direct increase in the expected cost of a transaction in the illegal sector, but it may also increase the incentive for the partners to cooperate in avoiding detection. The total cost of transacting in the illegal sector can fall, and tax evasion may increase. The policy implications of this phenomenon are considered. JEL Classification: H26 L'évasion fiscale collective. Dans les analyses de l'évasion fiscale, on suppose habituellement que le payeur de taxe fait face à un ensemble donné de politiques auxquelles il réagit. Pourtant, dans le cas des transactions marchandes, l'évasion fiscale n'est possible que si plusieurs agents coopèrent ensemble. La probabilité que l'évasion soit détectée dépend alors des efforts que chacun fait pour la cacher. Dans un tel contexte, de plus lourdes sanctions accroissent le coût espéré des transactions illégales, mais peuvent aussi, indirectement, accroître l'incitation pour les partenaires à coopérer pour cacher leur activité illégale. Il en résulte que le coût total des transactions illégales peut diminuer et l'évasion fiscale augmenter. Nous étudions les implications de ce phénomène.