Suchergebnisse

Cet article présente une comparaison de l'endettement de l'ensemble des administrations publiques (incluant une part de la dette fédérale) dans les provinces canadiennes et dans les États des États-Unis pendant la période 2000–2007. L'étude a permis de classer ces 60 entités fédérées, selon 5 concepts de dette publique, de la plus endettée à la moins endettée. Parmi les provinces canadiennes, le Québec (rang moyen le plus bas) et l'Alberta (rang moyen le plus élevé) présentent le bilan le plus stable d'un classement à l'autre; toutes les autres provinces montrent des fluctuations importantes selon les classements. La répartition de la dette fédérale entre les provinces (au Canada) et les États (aux États-Unis), ainsi que les concepts de dette utilisés influencent donc significativement, et dans certains cas de façon très importante, le classement.

Canada's equalization program is supposed to ensure that provinces that lack the same ability to raise revenue as other provinces, due to economic differences, are still able to provide their residents with roughly similar levels of public service. The equalization program itself is ostensibly based on a formulaic approach, with automatic equalization payments kicking in where and when they are needed, while federal social transfers to the provinces are, at least by name, purportedly intended to support the social spending needs of those provinces. This is how things are supposed to work, anyway. But both equalization payments and social transfers are, inevitably, arranged by federal politicians, and politicians have a natural tendency to behave politically. An analysis shows that, in many cases, the amount of money a province receives in federal transfers is correlated with the way that province voted during federal elections. In other words, when a province exhibited dominant support for the national party that controls the federal purse strings, that province often received a greater share of federal transfers. Where provinces were largely unsupportive in a federal election for the victorious party, they were more likely to see their share of federal transfers shrink. This dynamic ultimately defeats the real purpose of federal transfers, which are intended to assist based on need, not based on political support. When transfer programs are modified for reasons other than need, one might rightly worry about suboptimal use of scarce public resources, while publicly undermining the legitimacy of what may be, in principle, worthy federal programs. Protecting against the influence of politics in such programs is vital to maximizing their efficiency and retaining their credibility. These programs can be redesigned in ways that safeguard against political interference. Appointing an independent body to manage fiscal transfer programs could be an important first step, as would putting constraints on the ability of the federal government to impose sudden floors and ceilings on transfers, or to cut special side deals with individual provinces or regions. Politicians will always behave politically; it is important to find ways to keep them from letting politics distort the principles of federal-provincial transfers.

Canada's equalization program is supposed to ensure that provinces that lack the same ability to raise revenue as other provinces, due to economic differences, are still able to provide their residents with roughly similar levels of public service. The equalization program itself is ostensibly based on a formulaic approach, with automatic equalization payments kicking in where and when they are needed, while federal social transfers to the provinces are, at least by name, purportedly intended to support the social spending needs of those provinces. This is how things are supposed to work, anyway. But both equalization payments and social transfers are, inevitably, arranged by federal politicians, and politicians have a natural tendency to behave politically. An analysis shows that, in many cases, the amount of money a province receives in federal transfers is correlated with the way that province voted during federal elections. In other words, when a province exhibited dominant support for the national party that controls the federal purse strings, that province often received a greater share of federal transfers. Where provinces were largely unsupportive in a federal election for the victorious party, they were more likely to see their share of federal transfers shrink. This dynamic ultimately defeats the real purpose of federal transfers, which are intended to assist based on need, not based on political support. When transfer programs are modified for reasons other than need, one might rightly worry about suboptimal use of scarce public resources, while publicly undermining the legitimacy of what may be, in principle, worthy federal programs. Protecting against the influence of politics in such programs is vital to maximizing their efficiency and retaining their credibility. These programs can be redesigned in ways that safeguard against political interference. Appointing an independent body to manage fiscal transfer programs could be an important first step, as would putting constraints on the ability of the federal government to impose sudden floors and ceilings on transfers, or to cut special side deals with individual provinces or regions. Politicians will always behave politically; it is important to find ways to keep them from letting politics distort the principles of federal-provincial transfers.

Although local electoral accountability should be stronger when responsibilities are clearly assigned to local governments, the involvement of higher tiers of government is often associated with policies specifically designed to improve local accountability. This article investigates the impact of centralization on local electoral accountability in the context of California's school finance system. Results show that voters are responsive to differences in dropout rates and pupil–teacher ratios, at least in some contexts, and that local electoral accountability is affected by a district's degree of centralization. Dropout rate regressions reveal that the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 appears to have sharpened local electoral accountability.