Suchergebnisse

One of the classic questions in political psychology has been whether feelings of self‐worth are relevant for politics. In this review, we summarize seven decades of research attempting to address this question, focusing on three sets of political outcomes: (1) political ideology, (2) political interest and engagement, and (3) intergroup relations. We rely on the distinction between self‐esteem (feelings of adequacy and satisfaction with oneself) and narcissism (feelings of entitled self‐importance and superiority over others). We argue that this distinction allows us to integrate the literature and explain the mixed effects observed in past research on self‐evaluation and politics. Our review points to a key role of narcissistic status pursuit and psychological defensiveness in predicting potentially problematic political attitudes and behaviors. We discuss practical implications these associations might have for democratic functioning and for understanding political leaders. We conclude by identifying outstanding questions and promising new research directions.

Narcissism—a conviction about one's superiority and entitlement to special treatment—is a robust predictor of belief in conspiracy theories. Recent developments in the study of narcissism suggest that it has three components: antagonism, agentic extraversion, and neuroticism. We argue that each of these components of narcissism might predispose people to endorse conspiracy theories due to different psychological processes. Specifically, we discuss the role of paranoia, gullibility, and the needs for dominance, control, and uniqueness. We also review parallel findings for narcissistic beliefs about one's social groups. We consider the wider implications this research might have, especially for political leadership. We conclude by discussing outstanding questions about sharing conspiracy theories and other forms of misinformation.

Two nationwide representative studies (N = 653 adolescents; N = 1007 adults) investigated the psychological correlates of the intention to penalize public expressions of prejudice in the form of support for hate‐speech prohibition. We presented participants with preselected examples of hate speech from the Internet and other mass media and assessed their willingness to support the prohibition of public expressions of such remarks. Both studies found that social dominance orientation and right‐wing authoritarianism are positively correlated with outgroup prejudice, but they have differential effects on hate‐speech prohibition. Social dominance orientation was positively related to the acceptance of hate speech, whereas right‐wing authoritarianism was positively related to hate‐speech prohibition. In discussing this counterintuitive finding, we suggest that right‐wing authoritarians are particularly vigilant toward norm violations—and this makes them more punitive toward counternormative expressions of prejudice, such as hate speech.

This research aimed to provide a more nuanced understanding of the relations between social norms, right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA), outgroup‐directed prejudice, and hostile behavioral intentions toward outgroups. Three correlational studies, conducted in two countries and three different intergroup contexts (n1 = 997; n2 = 1011; n3 = 1992), investigated the moderating role of social norms (both positive and negative) on the relation between RWA and expression of prejudice as well as behavioral intentions toward outgroups. We found that in the presence of positive (i.e., tolerant) social norms, the previously well‐established positive relation between RWA and prejudice is reduced or even reversed, whereas in the presence of negative (i.e., intolerant) social norms, this relation is strengthened. Additionally, the lower (vs. higher) prejudice of high‐RWA individuals in the presence of positive (vs. negative) social norms mediated the link between RWA and behavioral intentions toward outgroups. The present research constitutes the first comprehensive demonstration of authoritarians' potential to be less prejudiced in response to prevailing tolerant social norms.

This chapter explores abusive language's role when employed by a group with a lower social status whose rights are threatened by political authorities. We focus on the language of protest that emerged during the 2020 All-Poland Women's Strike, following a court ruling that almost totally banned legal abortions in Poland. Since some slogans used by these protesters could be interpreted as expressions of abusive language, we decided to analyze their meaning in a wider socio-political context. We show that women's use of vulgarisms and offensive language can serve as a tool of social and political change and that it may lead to empowerment. Moreover, given the cultural underpinnings of Polish society's gender-based social norms, we show that the use of abusive language may symbolize the process of redefining the traditional gender contract in Poland.