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Contents -- Introduction -- References -- 1 The Law, The Economy, The Polity Jürgen Backhaus, A Thinker Outside the Box -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Political Economy and the Pure Science of Economics -- 3 Continental European Economic Thought Restored -- 4 Economics Is Law and Economics -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- 2 Economic Efficiency and the Law: Distinguishing Form from Substance -- 1 A Quick Review of Some Efficiency Claims -- 2 Common Law Efficiency: Science or Metaphysics? -- 3 Paretian Derivations and Efficiency Claims -- 4 Institutional Arrangements: Generics Versus Specifics

Constitutional Mythologies addresses common societal beliefs that declare constitutions as binding social contracts, economic documents and legal documents. Examples from the US, Canada and Europe illustrate a multi-layered approach to understanding constitutions and their implications for social and political influence.

International audience ; Written by James Buchanan in the early 1970s, "The Samaritan's Dilemma" is a pessimistic essay, marked by his author's negative views about the situation in Western societies at that time. Yet, the situation described in this essay also fits into Buchanan's approach of cooperation and free-riding. Put differently, it is perfectly with Buchanan's views in public economics. This is what we aim at showing in this short article. Our demonstration develops in two parts. First, we show that Buchanan's main argument about cooperation in the provision of public goods or removal of externalities necessarily leads to situations such as the one described in the Samaritan's dilemma. Second, we show that Buchanan did not take the situation seriously until the end of the 1960s, a few years before he wrote his essay on the dilemma.

International audience ; Written by James Buchanan in the early 1970s, "The Samaritan's Dilemma" is a pessimistic essay, marked by his author's negative views about the situation in Western societies at that time. Yet, the situation described in this essay also fits into Buchanan's approach of cooperation and free-riding. Put differently, it is perfectly with Buchanan's views in public economics. This is what we aim at showing in this short article. Our demonstration develops in two parts. First, we show that Buchanan's main argument about cooperation in the provision of public goods or removal of externalities necessarily leads to situations such as the one described in the Samaritan's dilemma. Second, we show that Buchanan did not take the situation seriously until the end of the 1960s, a few years before he wrote his essay on the dilemma.