Suchergebnisse

The evaluation of liberty and equality from the point of view of justice and at the same time the problem of this work arises from the gaps in the political philosophy of liberalism. Given that liberalism is perceived as a political system that prioritizes individual liberty, the question can be asked whether the same philosophical tradition can offer solutions to the problems posed by that liberty? Liberal theorists have not fully explained how a just society can be created without ensuring certain conditions of equality in its basic structure. The aim of this thesis is to answer the question, can justice really be understood as the compatibility of the principles of liberty and equality? To achieve this goal, the following tasks were set: first, to single out the arguments for the compatibility of liberty and equality by analyzing the texts of political philosophy. Second, to highlight the critical arguments regarding the concept of compatibility of liberty and equality. Third, compare the arguments set out in the first two tasks, thus distinguishing between the strengths and weaknesses of the concept of justice as a compatibility between liberty and equality. The aim was achieved by the method of theoretical analysis of the works of political philosophers John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Finally, it is concluded that the two principles of justice proposed by Rawls can help to undo some of the decisive inequitable distribution of resources in the past by ensuring that both the principles of liberty and equality function in society. It is argued that the idea of the need for equality, in accordance with the principle of liberty, can be rejected only by formulating and presenting a very clear, well-founded and developed moral theory of property rectification (correction of injustice), which Nozick failed to formulate.

The evaluation of liberty and equality from the point of view of justice and at the same time the problem of this work arises from the gaps in the political philosophy of liberalism. Given that liberalism is perceived as a political system that prioritizes individual liberty, the question can be asked whether the same philosophical tradition can offer solutions to the problems posed by that liberty? Liberal theorists have not fully explained how a just society can be created without ensuring certain conditions of equality in its basic structure. The aim of this thesis is to answer the question, can justice really be understood as the compatibility of the principles of liberty and equality? To achieve this goal, the following tasks were set: first, to single out the arguments for the compatibility of liberty and equality by analyzing the texts of political philosophy. Second, to highlight the critical arguments regarding the concept of compatibility of liberty and equality. Third, compare the arguments set out in the first two tasks, thus distinguishing between the strengths and weaknesses of the concept of justice as a compatibility between liberty and equality. The aim was achieved by the method of theoretical analysis of the works of political philosophers John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Finally, it is concluded that the two principles of justice proposed by Rawls can help to undo some of the decisive inequitable distribution of resources in the past by ensuring that both the principles of liberty and equality function in society. It is argued that the idea of the need for equality, in accordance with the principle of liberty, can be rejected only by formulating and presenting a very clear, well-founded and developed moral theory of property rectification (correction of injustice), which Nozick failed to formulate.