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This article examines the specifics of the income inequality structure in modern Russian society, as well as the tendencies for its change during the country's post-Soviet period of development. It is shown that, compared to other countries, the traditional economic indexes which measure income inequality (decile ratio, Gini coefficient) position the Russian Federation as a country with a high degree of inequality within the mass layers of the population, especially when compared to Europe, albeit the level of inequality is slightly lower compared to BRICS member states. When using equivalence scales, which adjust the people's income after factoring in economies of scale in consumption, Russia's inequality figures improve even more. Based on quintile income distribution and the concentration of income within the highest quintile, Russia also occupies an intermediate position, surpassing most European countries, though not BRICS member states. However, the highest quintile is characterized by a high degree of differentiation. When transitioning from the wealthiest 20% of the population to the 1–5%, Russia's place among other countries of the world changes significantly: when it comes to the gap between the "upper crust" and the masses, Russia can be considered one of the leading countries in the world.

It has also been revealed that on the other end of the income distribution spectrum, at the population's lower strata, there has been a noticeable "rise" of low-income groups in the last few years, with them somewhat approaching the middle. It was manifested in a more rapid increase in prosperity among the lower 40% of the population when compared to the population in general, as well as in a noticeable decrease in poverty levels during the 2000's. Those citizens who were left in the lower strata of income distribution created a clearer image of poverty, which differs from the "average Russian" and emphasizes the importance of gauging not only low income level, but also an array of non-monetary inequality dimensions. Such a process of "homogenization" has lead to an increase in the size of groups with median and average income, with them being the most numerous groups in the current structure of Russian society. However, the increase in the number of people in said groups was not only caused by their shifts from low-income groups of the population, but also because of some members from the more prosperous strata experiencing an "averaging" of their level of income as well.

This paper provides empirical analysis of income stratification in contemporary Russian society and its dynamics in recent decades. The paper analyses in detail different approaches (absolute and relative) to defining income groups. It is shown that the most widely used thresholds of the absolute approach cannot be efficiently applied to contemporary Russian society, as they fail to define the subgroups within the population, while relative approach, based on the median income as the social standard of living, appears more effective for income stratification in Russia. A specific income stratification scale is suggested. Its application shows that middle-income groups currently dominate in income structure, however, the incomes of their representatives are not high in absolute terms and their living standards are quite modest. Income stratification in Russia has been noticeably transformed over the last 20 years - the middle-income group has been growing while the low income and high-income groups' shares have been declining. The proposed scale implies possibilities for structural adjustments such as regional- and settlement-specific disparities in income distribution; it can be easily replicated and allows broad potential for future research, including international comparisons of income stratification in societies undergoing transitional processes.

The article uses statistical data and all-Russian sociological surveys conducted in 2003–2013 to analyze changes in poverty in Russian society.1 It is shown that, on the one hand, the scope of poverty in Russia decreased before the ongoing economic crisis started in 2014; on the other hand, those who remained poor have become the base for the formation of a "new periphery" which is significantly different from the rest of the population. The "new periphery" formation zone in 2013 covered about 30% of the population, and this group consisted of the poor identified using both absolute and relative approaches to poverty that complement rather than duplicate each other in conditions of Russian social reality. Factors that account for becoming part of the "new periphery" are analyzed, the key one being the position on the labor market; its qualitative features are demonstrated, including living standards of its representatives, and the population's perceptions of the causes of poverty are described.

Based on the data of all-Russian representative studies conducted within the framework of the international ISSP program in 1992-2019, as well as the 2020 study of the Federal Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the article examines the perception of social inequality by the population, its dynamics, and the role of social mobility as a factor in its differentiation. The authors show that, in terms of the perception of income inequality by the population, the situation resembles the one seen in the 1990s, during a completely different stage of the country's development. The overwhelming majority of Russians today consider income inequality to be unnecessarily high and unfair. Such perceptions and the associated high demand for redistribution do not differ across socio-demographic and socio-economic groups. The experience of social mobility also does not lead to significant differentiation in this respect, and the expected mobility in the medium term is characterized by a weak influence. Only short-term expectations work relatively noticeably in this regard: if they are positive, they reduce the negative perception of income inequality and the demand for redistribution. As for the perception of non-monetary inequalities, normative ideas about their minimization aimed at achieving social justice turn out to be similar in groups with different directions of expected or already completed mobility. Thereby, the perception of both monetary and non-monetary inequalities, as well as requests for their reduction, are formed to a greater extent on the basis of normative ideas about the "proper" structure of society and an assessment of its compliance with the observed reality than on the characteristics of an individual situation, including expected or actual mobility.

This study explores the roots and details of the Russian population's demand for broad state interventions in three areas: labour market, social investment, and material support. Demands in labour market policy are the most frequent among the Russian population and stem from the need to eliminate inequalities in access to 'good' jobs and ensure fair remuneration of skilled labour. In Russia, unlike in Europe, needs in social investment policy do not stem from individualistic interests and the imperative to compensate for market failure. Instead, they result from state failure, leading in particular to growing inequality of life chances in healthcare and worsening health of the broader society. These impacts are perceived as a fundamental adverse effect of unsuccessful social policy changes, and this type of demand for state support is growing alongside household income. At the same time, wealthy Russians also hardly believe in state efficiency in the labour market, show less demand for employment policy interventions, and generally prefer 'state escapism'. The study argues that an individualistic mindset per se is a cornerstone of the absence of request for state support in any form. These findings support the concept of bottom-up sociocultural modernisation while helping explain state escapism in post-communist welfare regimes. In general, the study provides empirical contributions to the literature on diversity of statist expectations in post-communist welfare regimes.