Suchergebnisse

Levine and Palfrey's QRE account of turnout in large elections raises the broader question of how much of a departure from standard rational choice theory is justified by the considerable repertoire of rational choice anomalies that has accumulated since Downs and Olson half a century ago. An alternative but more controversial unconventional view turns on what I call NSNX motivation to account for how agents seek a balance between self-interest and social motivation. NSNX agents have irreducibly dual utility functions. QRE agents have a standard utility function but they do not maximize it. I review the situation showing why in situations where NSNX effects could be expected, QRE might mirror those effects. I show how, by varying parameters of an experiment, I can cleanly distinguish between actual QRE effects, which should bring predictions closer to the data than Nash, and NSNX effects, which should do the same.

Levine and Palfrey's QRE account of turnout in large elections raises the broader question of how much of a departure from standard rational choice theory is justified by the considerable repertoire of rational choice anomalies that has accumulated since Downs and Olson half a century ago. An alternative but more controversial unconventional view turns on what I call NSNX motivation to account for how agents seek a balance between self-interest and social motivation. NSNX agents have irreducibly dual utility functions. QRE agents have a standard utility function but they do not maximize it. I review the situation showing why in situations where NSNX effects could be expected, QRE might mirror those effects. I show how, by varying parameters of an experiment, I can cleanly distinguish between actual QRE effects, which should bring predictions closer to the data than Nash, and NSNX effects, which should do the same. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2008.]

Dennis Chong proposes an account of how to forge a merger between rational choice and sociological explanations of the role of norms, values, and symbols in politics. The core idea is that norms and values (not just self-interest) are indeed essential for understanding political choice (as a sociologist would expect), but that norms and values have to develop. Those in place today change over time. And rational choice enters in guiding that evolution.

Recent work on game theory and juries reaches the startling result that making convictions easier (by easing the requirement for unanimity) would make false convictions rarer. Only the guilty would be put at increased risk. The note explains why the result is contingent on a quirk in the mathematical analysis.