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The political acceptability of climate policies is undermined by job-killing arguments, especially for the least-skilled workers. However, evidence of the distributional impacts for different workers remains scant. We examine the associations between climate policies, proxied by energy prices, and workforce skills for 14 European countries and 15 industrial sectors over the period 1995–2011. Using a shift-share instrumental variable estimator and controlling for the influence of automation and globalization, we find that climate policies have been skill biased against manual workers and have favoured technicians. The long-term change in energy prices accounted for between 9.2% and 17.5% (resp. 4.2% and 8.0%) of the increase (resp. decrease) in the share of technicians (resp. manual workers).

The political acceptability of climate policies is undermined by job-killing arguments, especially for the least-skilled workers. However, evidence of the distributional impacts for different workers remains scant. We examine the associations between climate policies, proxied by energy prices, and workforce skills for 14 European countries and 15 industrial sectors over the period 1995–2011. Using a shift-share instrumental variable estimator and controlling for the influence of automation and globalization, we find that climate policies have been skill biased against manual workers and have favoured technicians. The long-term change in energy prices accounted for between 9.2% and 17.5% (resp. 4.2% and 8.0%) of the increase (resp. decrease) in the share of technicians (resp. manual workers).

The political acceptability of climate policies is undermined by job-killing arguments, especially for the least-skilled workers. However, evidence for distributional impacts for different workers remains scant. We examine the associations between climate policies, proxied by energy prices and a stringency index, and workforce skills for 14 European countries and 15 industrial sectors over the period of 1995-2011. We find that, while the long-term decline in employment in most carbon-intensive sectors is unrelated to policy stringency, climate policies have been skill biased against manual workers and have favoured technicians and professionals. This skill bias is confirmed using a shift-share instrumental variable estimator

The political acceptability of climate policies is undermined by job-killing arguments, especially for the least-skilled workers. However, evidence for distributional impacts for different workers remains scant. We examine the associations between climate policies, proxied by energy prices and a stringency index, and workforce skills for 14 European countries and 15 industrial sectors over the period of 1995-2011. We find that, while the long-term decline in employment in most carbon-intensive sectors is unrelated to policy stringency, climate policies have been skill biased against manual workers and have favoured technicians and professionals. This skill bias is confirmed using a shift-share instrumental variable estimator

This paper evaluates the historical influence of energy prices on a series of measures of environmental and economic performance for a panel of French manufacturing establishments over the period 1997-2010. The focus on energy prices is motivated by the fact that changes in environmental and energy policies have been dominated by substantial reductions in discounts for large consumers, making the evaluation of each policy in isolation exceedingly difficult. To identify price effects, we construct a shift-share instrument that captures only the exogenous variation in establishmentspecific energy prices. Our results highlight a trade-off between environmental and economic goals: although a 10 percent increase in energy prices brings about a 6 percent reduction in energy consumption and to a 11 percent reduction in CO2 emissions, such an increase also has a modestly negative impact on employment (-2.6 percent) and very small impact on wages and productivity. The negative employment effects are mostly concentrated in energyintensive and trade-exposed sectors. Simulating the effect of a carbon tax, we show that job losses for the most exposed sectors can be quite large. However, these effects are upper bounds and we show that they are significantly mitigated in multi-plant firms by labor reallocation across establishments.

This paper evaluates the historical influence of energy prices on a series of measures of environmental and economic performance for a panel of French manufacturing establishments over the period 1997-2010. The focus on energy prices is motivated by the fact that changes in environmental and energy policies have been dominated by substantial reductions in discounts for large consumers, making the evaluation of each policy in isolation exceedingly difficult. To identify price effects, we construct a shift-share instrument that captures only the exogenous variation in establishmentspecific energy prices. Our results highlight a trade-off between environmental and economic goals: although a 10 percent increase in energy prices brings about a 6 percent reduction in energy consumption and to a 11 percent reduction in CO2 emissions, such an increase also has a modestly negative impact on employment (-2.6 percent) and very small impact on wages and productivity. The negative employment effects are mostly concentrated in energyintensive and trade-exposed sectors. Simulating the effect of a carbon tax, we show that job losses for the most exposed sectors can be quite large. However, these effects are upper bounds and we show that they are significantly mitigated in multi-plant firms by labor reallocation across establishments.

The US financial sector has become a magnet for the brightest graduates in the science, technology, engineeringand mathematical fields (STEM). We provide quantitative bases for this well-known fact and illustrate itsconsequences for the productivity growth in other sectors over the period 1980-2014. First, we find that the shareof STEM talents grew significantly faster in finance than in other key STEM sectors such as high-tech, and thisdivergent pattern has been more evident for STEM than for general skills and more pronounced for investmentbanking. Second, this trend did not reverse after the Great Recession, and a persistent wage premium is found forSTEM graduates working in finance and especially in typical financial jobs at the top of the wage distribution. Third,the brain drain of STEM talents into finance has been associated with a cumulative loss of labor productivity growthof 6.6% in the manufacturing sectors. Our results suggest that increasing the number of STEM graduates may notbe enough to reignite sluggish economic growth without making their employment in finance more costly.

The US financial sector has become a magnet for the brightest graduates in the science, technology, engineeringand mathematical fields (STEM). We provide quantitative bases for this well-known fact and illustrate itsconsequences for the productivity growth in other sectors over the period 1980-2014. First, we find that the shareof STEM talents grew significantly faster in finance than in other key STEM sectors such as high-tech, and thisdivergent pattern has been more evident for STEM than for general skills and more pronounced for investmentbanking. Second, this trend did not reverse after the Great Recession, and a persistent wage premium is found forSTEM graduates working in finance and especially in typical financial jobs at the top of the wage distribution. Third,the brain drain of STEM talents into finance has been associated with a cumulative loss of labor productivity growthof 6.6% in the manufacturing sectors. Our results suggest that increasing the number of STEM graduates may notbe enough to reignite sluggish economic growth without making their employment in finance more costly.