Suchergebnisse

Analysing the administrative case law of the Belgian Supreme Court between 1890 and 1910, this chapter shows that the Supreme Court applied the main features of a positivist legal thought (based on the assumption of clarity, coherence, and completeness of the formal law) to administrative action and its legality. It equipped the central and local institutions of the State with functioning powers, allowing an operational state to develop despite social unrest. As the social and technological context changed at the end of the nineteenth century, the statute book became more confused, however. This gave the Supreme Court ample room to interpret the law creatively and pragmatically. The 'administrative miracle' in Belgium is that the Supreme Court did not shackle social forces and unbridle the administration so much that the very course it wanted to avert actually happened. This may be down to the creative judicial genius that the Belgian judiciary developed a formal approach whilst deciding pragmatically on the substance of cases. ; SCOPUS: ch.b ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

States of emergency test the limits of constitutionalism and our commitment to the rule of law (Dyzenhaus 2012). They tell us something about the ultimate power in a society and the very nature of state powers. French constitutions have a long history of arising from crises, revolutions and overthrows. The current political regime was born in 1958 at the time of the Algerian war of independence. More recently, the French have lived under a sustained period of emergency regulations following the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015. Now that a state of health emergency has been declared and extended it is possible to reflect on how key principles relating to the rule of law, such as legality and judicial control, are being re-shaped. This helps us to reflect on how the state seeks to command compliance from its citizens and how a balance is struck between necessity and legality. Key stages can be identified: a first stage when (judicial) control is muted and a second stage when judges re-assert their role once the risks linked to the pandemic have been curbed. This differentiation both confirms the risk of normalising an executive state of emergency (at the time of the peak) and the possibility of a judicial state of emergency emerging (once the first wave is over) (Ginsburg and Versteeg 2020). This brings into question how the next steps in the health emergency can be made subject to robust scrutiny and accountability mechanisms as necessity evolves.

This contribution examines how checks and balances can be organised so that the individual freedom of users in the digital space is protected from the encroachment of platforms. Indeed, platforms are quasi-states which enjoy legislative, judiciary and executive powers. This merging of functions in the hands of one single entity illustrates the failure of the liberal attempt to set up a cyberspace free of sovereign power: Platforms are the new sovereign. Modern thinkers like Foucault and Habermas have examined how sovereigns in the past have seen their powers curtailed and the role that the birth of two distinct spheres, one public and one private, has played in this process. Traditional public economic law builds on this public-private dichotomy, leaving little room to conceptualize hybrids. Yet this paper shows that platforms are such hybrids. Building on an analysis of the activities taking place on platforms, as well as the rights at stake in platform governance, it finds that platforms' immaterial locus is both political and economic, bundling public and private powers. Hence, this paper puts forward the idea that public economic law should seek to develop mirroring hybrid counter-powers. Civil society especially should be conceptualized in the digital space, with its rights, duties and responsibilities, to foster balanced relationships between the various actors present on platforms.

This contribution examines how checks and balances can be organised so that the individual freedom of users in the digital space is protected from the encroachment of platforms. Indeed, platforms are quasi-states which enjoy legislative, judiciary and executive powers. This merging of functions in the hands of one single entity illustrates the failure of the liberal attempt to set up a cyberspace free of sovereign power: Platforms are the new sovereign. Modern thinkers like Foucault and Habermas have examined how sovereigns in the past have seen their powers curtailed and the role that the birth of two distinct spheres, one public and one private, has played in this process. Traditional public economic law builds on this public-private dichotomy, leaving little room to conceptualize hybrids. Yet this paper shows that platforms are such hybrids. Building on an analysis of the activities taking place on platforms, as well as the rights at stake in platform governance, it finds that platforms' immaterial locus is both political and economic, bundling public and private powers. Hence, this paper puts forward the idea that public economic law should seek to develop mirroring hybrid counter-powers. Civil society especially should be conceptualized in the digital space, with its rights, duties and responsibilities, to foster balanced relationships between the various actors present on platforms.

This paper asks which legal tools digital operators could use to manage colliding rights on their platforms in a digitalised and transnational space such as the Internet. This space can be understood as a "modern public square", bringing together actions in the digitalised world and their interactions with actual events in the physical world. It is then useful to provide this space with a discursive framework allowing for discussing and contesting actions happening on it. In particular, this paper suggests that two well-known legal concepts, proportionality and sanctions, can be helpfully articulated within that discursive framework. In a first step, proportionality, a justificatory tool, is often used to suggest a way for managing colliding rights. This paper argues that for proportionality to be useful in managing colliding rights on digital platforms, its role, scope and limits need to be better framed and supplemented by an overall digital environment which can feed into the proportionality test in an appropriate way. This can be provided, thanks to a second step, namely labelling in law the actions digital operators take as sanctions. Sanctions are the reactions organised by digital operators to bring back social order on the platforms. The labelling of these reactions under the legal category of "sanctions" offers a meaningful tool for thinking about what digital operators do when they manage colliding rights by blocking or withdrawing contents and/or accounts. As different types of sanctions can be distinguished, differentiated legal consequences, especially in relation to managing colliding rights, can be identified. Here the role played by the proportionality test can be distinguished depending on the type of sanctions. In any case, for sanctions and proportionality to help address colliding rights on the modern public square, a discursive framework needs to be developed, which depends on the existence of relevant meaningful communities engaging in reflecting on the use of sanctions and proportionality.

SOMMAIRE : Introduction / 1. Concurrence et politiques sociales : l'encadrement européen / 1.1. Marchés publics : libre concurrence versus considérations sociales / 1.2. sous-traitance, détachement de travailleurs et marchés publics / 1.3. substitution régulatoire au niveau européen ? / 2. Le système belge de lutte contre le dumping social dans la sous-traitance des marchés publics / 2.1. Historique du système / 2.2. cadre législatif et réglementaire actuel : le double paradigme de la concurrence "effective" et de la concurrence "loyale" / 2.2.1. Transparence de la chaîne de sous-traitance par l'identification des sous-traitants / 2.2.2. Vérification des motifs d'exclusion / 2.2.3. Exclusion de la sous-traitance totale et limitation de la chaîne de sous-traitance / 2.2.4. Agréation des sous-entrepreneurs dans les marchés de travaux / 2.3. Garantir l'effectivité du système : l'architecture administrative / 2.3.1. Les trois volets de l'architecture administrative / 2.3.1.1. Le volet pédagogique et informatif / 2.3.1.2. Le volet technique / 2.3.1.3. Le volet répressif / 2.3.2. Pistes d'évaluation / 2.4. Evaluation provisoire de La substitution régulatoire en Belgique / 3. Evaluation de la conformité du système belge au regard du droit européen : vers une possible juxtaposition des principes de concurrence "effective" et de concurrence "loyale" / 3.1. Jurisprudence européenne récente en matière de sous-traitance de marchés publics / 3.2. Au-delà du test de proportionnalité, la réalité concrète de La concurrence effective ? / 3.3. Les techniques belges de concurrence "loyale" en matière de sous-traitance de marchés publics : une nouvelle voie conforme au droit européen ? / 3.4. vers une substitution des instruments ou des priorités ? / Conclusion : de la substitution régulatoire à la juxtaposition des paradigmes ?

SOMMAIRE : Introduction / 1. Concurrence et politiques sociales : l'encadrement européen / 1.1. Marchés publics : libre concurrence versus considérations sociales / 1.2. sous-traitance, détachement de travailleurs et marchés publics / 1.3. substitution régulatoire au niveau européen ? / 2. Le système belge de lutte contre le dumping social dans la sous-traitance des marchés publics / 2.1. Historique du système / 2.2. cadre législatif et réglementaire actuel : le double paradigme de la concurrence "effective" et de la concurrence "loyale" / 2.2.1. Transparence de la chaîne de sous-traitance par l'identification des sous-traitants / 2.2.2. Vérification des motifs d'exclusion / 2.2.3. Exclusion de la sous-traitance totale et limitation de la chaîne de sous-traitance / 2.2.4. Agréation des sous-entrepreneurs dans les marchés de travaux / 2.3. Garantir l'effectivité du système : l'architecture administrative / 2.3.1. Les trois volets de l'architecture administrative / 2.3.1.1. Le volet pédagogique et informatif / 2.3.1.2. Le volet technique / 2.3.1.3. Le volet répressif / 2.3.2. Pistes d'évaluation / 2.4. Evaluation provisoire de La substitution régulatoire en Belgique / 3. Evaluation de la conformité du système belge au regard du droit européen : vers une possible juxtaposition des principes de concurrence "effective" et de concurrence "loyale" / 3.1. Jurisprudence européenne récente en matière de sous-traitance de marchés publics / 3.2. Au-delà du test de proportionnalité, la réalité concrète de La concurrence effective ? / 3.3. Les techniques belges de concurrence "loyale" en matière de sous-traitance de marchés publics : une nouvelle voie conforme au droit européen ? / 3.4. vers une substitution des instruments ou des priorités ? / Conclusion : de la substitution régulatoire à la juxtaposition des paradigmes ?