Suchergebnisse

Russian-Israeli relations deteriorated sharply in the wake of the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Israeli intervention in Gaza. Yet Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has just asked Russian President Vladimir Putin to seek the release of Israeli hostages being held by Hamas in Gaza — and Putin has responded positively.Russian-Israeli cooperation had grown in a number of spheres after Putin first came to power at the turn of the century. One of the most spectacular examples has been the "secret" but well-known deconfliction agreement between Russia and Israel whereby Russian forces have largely turned a blind eye to Israeli attacks on Iranian and Hezbollah positions in Syria. Israeli commentators have pointed to Israel's need to preserve this agreement and desire to protect the remaining Jewish community inside Russia as reasons why Israel would not join America and the West in providing military assistance to Ukraine or sanctioning Russia.But while Israeli leaders went out of their way to avoid undertaking actions against Russia after Putin intervened in Ukraine beginning in February 2022, Russian leaders did not reciprocate when Israel intervened in Gaza beginning in October 2023. In addition to blaming the conflict on American foreign policy, Putin and other Russian leaders were highly critical of Israel's intervention, called for a ceasefire (something which Netanyahu is dead set against), and were slow to criticize Hamas's October 7 attack. Israeli officials and commentators have vociferously expressed their dissatisfaction with Moscow's position on the Gaza conflict.Nevertheless, some degree of Russian-Israeli cooperation continues. On December 24, Putin and Netanyahu held an hour-long telephone conversation. Netanyahu later said that he asked for Russian help in obtaining the release of Israeli hostages being held by Hamas in Gaza. And Putin responded positively, appointing Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov to work on this matter. Bogdanov has reportedly held phone calls with Hamas and other Palestinian leaders. He has also demanded the release of Israeli hostages.Considering both the extremely poor state of Russian-American relations, as well as President Biden's strong support for Israel throughout his career and especially since Hamas's October 7 attack, the Israeli leader's request for Russian support might appear to be slighting Biden. In fact, though, Netanyahu's turning to Putin for help getting hostages released may simply be pragmatic. Since Russia has good working relations with Hamas while the U.S. does not, then Netanyahu would understandably see Moscow as having a better chance of securing a hostage release than does Washington.For Putin to respond positively to Netanyahu's request is also highly pragmatic. While Russian-Israeli relations have deteriorated amid Russian criticism of Israel's intervention in Gaza, Moscow has no interest in seeing Israel end its policy of not joining the West in aiding Ukraine and sanctioning Russia. Whether successful or not, then, Russia's efforts to get Hamas to release Israeli hostages could help make sure that Israel does not alter its Ukraine-related policies. Putin might also see agreeing to help Netanyahu on the hostage situation as conveying an image of Russia as a more effective mediator than not just the U.S., but also China (to which Iran and Saudi Arabia turned, instead of Russia, to help restore their diplomatic relations earlier this year).It is not clear, of course, that Moscow can persuade Hamas to release any Israeli hostages. But even if it does, this is not going to bring about an end to the conflict — as Netanyahu and Putin are both undoubtedly aware. But if Russia is able to facilitate an agreement whereby Hamas releases Israeli hostages in exchange for Israel's releasing Palestinian prisoners, that would benefit the individuals exchanged and their families — and so is at least worth trying.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and other Russian officials have called for a ceasefire in the most recent outburst of Israeli-Palestinian conflict triggered by Hamas's recent surprise attacks on Israel.
Moscow has also warned that the conflict could spread and has criticized U.S. Navy deployments in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip.
Yet while the Russian government has adopted a "balanced" position with regard to the Israel-Hamas conflict, a number of prominent Russian commentators have issued statements that have been highly critical of Israel and sympathetic toward the Palestinians (if not toward Hamas itself). While these statements do not necessarily reflect Kremlin views, it is doubtful that these commentators would make them if the Kremlin strongly objected to them. What seems to bother these commentators is the continued closeness of Israeli-American relations, as well as the possibility that the West will somehow benefit from this situation (Russia also has its "worst case analysts").
As of this writing, according to the Washington Post on Tuesday, the Kremlin has not offered condolences to Israel nor has President Vladimir Putin called Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, even though the two have had a reportedly close relationship.
While Moscow has good relations with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, it has a strong incentive to maintain good relations with Israel. Although Russian-Israeli relations have become strained as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian war, as well as Moscow's reliance on Iran for armed drones for attacking Ukraine, Moscow has appreciated how Israel has resisted both American and Ukrainian pressure to supply Israeli weapons to Kyiv. If the Israeli government became convinced that Moscow supported the Hamas attack on Israel, then Israeli reticence about supporting Ukraine could suddenly end.
Of course, Israel is not going to be supplying weaponry to Ukraine so long as its conflict with Hamas is ongoing. Some, then, might see the Israeli-Hamas conflict as useful in preventing this or in America diverting weapons that it might have supplied Ukraine to Israel instead. Presumably, though, the hot phase of Israel's conflict with Hamas will require far fewer weapons, and much less time, than Ukraine's war with Russia, and so the diversionary potential of the Israel-Hamas conflict will not benefit Moscow for long, if at all.
Further, Moscow's warnings about conflict in the Middle East spreading are an indication that it fears its own interests would be harmed if this occurs. An all-out conflict between Israel and Hezbollah could result in Hezbollah's forces in Lebanon becoming so degraded that it will be forced to redeploy a substantial number of its fighters now in Syria back to Lebanon, thus destabilizing the Russian-backed Assad regime, which relies in part on Hezbollah's military prowess. Escalating conflict between Israel and Iranian forces in Syria could result in the Assad regime becoming vulnerable once again to its internal opponents.
Just as Russia being bogged down in Ukraine did not act to protect Armenia against Azerbaijan, the exigencies of Moscow's war against Kyiv might result in Moscow being unable to help Iranian or Hezbollah forces against Israel. The two situations are not directly comparable: Putin has been unhappy with what he perceives with the pro-Western government in Armenia while he has no such concerns about Iran or Hezbollah. But Putin simply might not be able to spare the resources needed to defend Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iranian forces in Syria against a determined Israeli assault supported by the U.S.
While many in the West seem to think that Russia somehow benefits whenever conflict erupts in the Middle East, this might be an occasion when it does not. Moscow may be calling for a ceasefire, then, because it sees this as the best way to protect its interests. The problem for Moscow, however, is that it is not in a strong position to either persuade or coerce Israel or Hamas to agree to one. Perhaps this is why Foreign Minister Lavrov indicated that President Putin would not be making calls to any other leaders about this.
The ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas is one which could affect Russian interests negatively, but which Russia has only limited ability to affect.

Putin's rule over Russia will come to an end at some point, but when it will end as well as what the policy preferences of his successors might be are uncertain. It would be in the interests of the United States and Europe to signal on what terms they would be willing to cooperate with a post-Russian leadership.

1. Prelude to the Brezhnev era -- 2. The early Brezhnev years : 1964-1968 -- 3. The middle Brezhnev years : 1969-1975 -- 4. The late Brezhnev years : 1976-1981 -- 5. Conclusion : the evolution of Soviet military thinking about conflict in the Third World.

First published in 1982, this study traces the development of Soviet military thinking on the Third World and assesses its importance for the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. Changes in Soviet military thought often reflect changes in Soviet attitudes towards and expectations from involvement in Third World conflicts. This work from Dr. Katz meditates upon the changing role of the USSR in post-war Third World conflicts, with particular emphasis upon the Brezhnev era and the way in which US setbacks in the Third World impacted upon Soviet foreign policy and changing attitudes to the Third Worl.