The United States appears to be embarking on a transition on two major fronts: its own economy, both financial and real; and its relations with the rest of the world. There is some relation between these two transitions. Some of these changes will depend on the outcome of the U.S. national election in November, and some will not. This paper will present a brief overview of current trends, with some attention given to U.S. foreign policy in Latin America, as well as other areas.
This paper looks at some of the most important impacts of the economic sanctions imposed on Venezuela by the US government since August of 2017. It finds that most of the impact of these sanctions has not been on the government but on the civilian population.The sanctions reduced the public's caloric intake, increased disease and mortality (for both adults and infants), and displaced millions of Venezuelans who fled the country as a result of the worsening economic depression and hyperinflation. They exacerbated Venezuela's economic crisis and made it nearly impossible to stabilize the economy, contributing further to excess deaths. All of these impacts disproportionately harmed the poorest and most vulnerable Venezuelans.Even more severe and destructive than the broad economic sanctions of August 2017 were the sanctions imposed by executive order on January 28, 2019 and subsequent executive orders this year; and the recognition of a parallel government, which as shown below, created a whole new set of financial and trade sanctions that are even more constricting than the executive orders themselves.We find that the sanctions have inflicted, and increasingly inflict, very serious harm to human life and health, including an estimated more than 40,000 deaths from 2017–2018; and that these sanctions would fit the definition of collective punishment of the civilian population as described in both the Geneva and Hague international conventions, to which the US is a signatory. They are also illegal under international law and treaties which the US has signed, and would appear to violate US law as well.
Despite high levels of employment after eight and a half years of economic growth, the UK economy is facing some serious economic challenges: long-term rising inequality, real wages that are still below their 2009 peak, a collapse of productivity growth, and the worst level of regional inequality in the European Union. The unusual uncertainties surrounding Brexit also pose a serious threat that has been much discussed. However, the government's macroeconomic policies may also compound the risks associated with Brexit and make it more difficult to solve the economy's long-term problems. This paper looks at some of the details of the above challenges, with a focus on macroeconomic policy.
Since July of 2018, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has disbursed more than $20 billion of a $56.3 billion loan package to Argentina. The Argentine government is now the largest holder of the IMF's General Resources Account (GRA) funds. This paper looks at how the policies that the Fund and the Argentine government have agreed upon in their June Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) are expected to lead to an economic recovery; and whether they are likely to succeed.
This paper examines some of the economic issues that could be relevant to Mexico's July 1st presidential election. These include the short-term impact of the 2008-2009 recession and recovery; the longer-term record of Mexico's economy since the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) party took power nearly 12 years ago; and the longer-term trends of economic growth during the last decades of Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) rule.
This week the Greek government reached agreement with the European authorities and the IMF for 130 billion euros in lending, as part of a new adjustment package to replace the current IMF program that began in May of 2010. Although the agreement should allow the government to avoid default in March, there are grave doubts as to whether the agreed upon program will lead the country to a point where it returns to growth, has a sustainable debt burden, and can borrow from private markets.
Advocates of an economic strategy of "internal devaluation" have recently pointed to Latvia as an example of successful macroeconomic policy. The Latvian economy is projected to grow by four percent in 2011. They argue that the Latvian government, along with the European authorities (including the International Monetary Fund -- IMF), pursued the correct macroeconomic policies by maintaining Latvia's fixed exchange rate and implementing pro-cyclical fiscal policies (that shrunk the economy further) and sometimes pro-cyclical monetary policies. They argue that these were the best policies (as opposed to counter-cyclical, expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, accompanied by devaluation) designed to promote a rapid economic recovery.The data, however, contradict the notion that Latvia's experience provides an example of successful internal devaluation. This paper looks at the Latvian case and provides further evidence that this can be a very costly strategy and one that does not work. The social and economic costs in Latvia were enormous, and the loss of income much greater than most countries that had crisis-driven devaluations. Countries with crisis-driven devaluations also recovered vastly faster, on average, than did Latvia. Furthermore, net exports contributed little or nothing to Latvia's recovery, which seems to have been facilitated instead by the abandonment of pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies. This case study is relevant to the eurozone because current policies there rely at least partly on "internal devaluation" in the weaker eurozone economies for recovery. The risks in the eurozone are even greater because of the financial crisis that has resulted from these pro-cyclical policies.
It is commonly reported in the international press, and widely believed, that the government of President Hugo Chavez controls the media in Venezuela.For example, writing about Venezuela's September elections for the National Assembly, the Washington Post's deputy editorial page editor and columnist, Jackson Diehl, referred to the Chavez "regime's domination of the media."In an interview on CNN, Lucy Morillon of Reporters Without Borders stated, "President Chavez controls most of the TV stations." And on PBS in November 2010, former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega stated that the Venezuelan media is "virtually under the control of Chavez." Such statements are made regularly in the major media and almost never challenged. However, it is clear from the data in this issue brief, based on household surveys over a 10-year period, that statements about the Venezuelan government "controlling" or "dominating" the media are not only exaggerated, but simply false.
Why did the Eurozone end up with an unemployment rate more than twice than that of the United States and six years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers? Was crisis in the Eurozone inevitable? What caused the prolonged economic failure experienced by the majority of the world's low- and middle-income countries at the end of the 20th century? This book analyses and ties together some of the most important economic developments of recent years with the common theme that they have been widely misunderstood and in some cases almost completely ignored
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