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In an era of heightened concern about injustice in relations of identity and difference, political theorists often prescribe equal recognition as a remedy for the ills of subordination. Drawing on the philosophy of Hegel, they envision a system of reciprocal knowledge and esteem, in which the affirming glance of others lets everyone be who they really are. This book challenges the equation of recognition with justice. Patchen Markell mines neglected strands of the concept's genealogy and reconstructs an unorthodox interpretation of Hegel, who, in the unexpected company of Sophocles, Aristotle

Abstract
Is Hannah Arendt's political thought relevant to the contemporary planetary situation? This article draws on The Human Condition and some of Arendt's ancient and modern sources to answer this question, using a phenomenological distinction between outdoors and indoors to make sense of three likely types of artificial adaptation to a warming planet. Arendt's account of the importance of the "body-bound senses" of an "earth-bound creature" need not result in the problematic fetishization of immediate rather than mediated knowledge, or of an "earthly nature" supposedly prior to and independent of the human artifice, but can draw attention to the narrowing of human beings' "angle of receptivity" to a surprising and unpredictable reality. This perspective, however, also discloses the limits of Arendt's work in the face of ecological transformations that are simultaneously planetary in scale and highly unequal in their consequences.

Hannah Arendt's essay on Bertolt Brecht has often been understood as an indictment of Brecht's postwar accommodation with the Stalinist regime in East Germany, in line with Arendt's supposed commitment to a firm separation between poetry and politics. Offering the first full reconstruction of the transnational history of Arendt's writing on Brecht, this article shows instead that Arendt's essay was a defense of Brecht against the polemics it is often taken to exemplify. Joining poetry to politics by holding both at a distance from philosophy, Arendt assigned poetry the vocation of disruptive faithfulness to factual reality, which allowed her to praise Brecht on political grounds and to leverage forbearance for his political "sins." Indeed, by narrating Brecht's "sins" and "punishment" against the grain of Cold War discourse about the poet, Arendt's essay emulated aspects of the poetic practice she admired in Brecht's writing.

Hannah Arendt's political theory is often understood to rest on a celebration of action, the memorable words and deeds of named individuals, over against the anonymous processes constitutive of 'labor' and 'society'. Yet at key moments in The Human Condition and The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt seems to signal a different relationship between political action and anonymity; and she does so in part via citations of the novels of William Faulkner. Using the apparently contradictory notion of 'anonymous glory' as a heuristic, this essay reconsiders Arendt's political thought through readings of the novels she cites, A Fable and Intruder in the Dust. The essay argues that, for Arendt, a conception of action adequate to the scale of modern social power must somehow be both indelibly tied to individual deeds and immersed in a processual field that is indifferent to the needs for meaning or purpose or satisfaction that individuals bring to what they do; and that Arendt's engagement with this problem both complicates the relation of action to its supposed opposites, and makes it more difficult to conceive of action's recovery as a reliable source of theoretical or political redemption.

This essay argues that the neo-Roman republican principle of "non-domination," as developed in the recent work of Philip Pettit, cannot serve as a single over-arching political ideal, because it responds to only one of two important dimensions of concern about human agency. Through critical engagements with several aspects of Pettit's work, ranging from his philosophical account of freedom as "discursive control" to his appropriation of the distinction between dominium and imperium, the essay argues that the idea of domination, which responds to concerns about "control," needs to be supplemented by the idea of usurpation, which responds to questions about "involvement"; and it shows how attention to both domination and usurpation (and to the interaction between them) can shed light on such phenomena as imperialism, slavery, and democracy.