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In line with the concept of politics developed by ancient Greeks, the political sphere is identified with transparency and overtness. However, it has always been hiding secret actions, conspiracies and collusions. The emergence of the modern model of the state, along with the rationalisation of its structures, enabled the secret equivalents of authority to transform into organisations, i.e. institutions alternative to official organisations, established by law and having specific powers. Rather than talking about actual organisations, the author discusses the process whereby these secret, underground structures turn into organisations that influence the sphere of overt politics. She tries to show that this is a specific kind of game between what is explicit and public and what is concealed and secret. This game is constantly present in political activities, although we seldom realise it.

In this paper, the concept of political culture is considered in reference to the notions of G.A. Almond, S. Verba and J. Rawls. It is defined as a specific educational project, which is linked to the idea of a fair, democratic and constitutional system. The author also points to potential contemporary obstacles to implementation of this project. Deepening inequalities arising from personal culture are the first threat to liberal civic education. The second threat is associated with the development of new media and the related changes in the public sphere, including various forms of political and civic activity.

As a starting point for considerations the author accepts that the concept of revolution has changed historically in a similar way as the concept of democracy. Initially democracy was limited to a certain reality and political system, but over time the concept has become synonymous with common good. It can be claimed that similar changes in meaning can be observed in the concept of revolution. However, as the trouble with its use in the media shows, the universal dimension of the concept of revolution does not apply to axiological and ideological layers. Therefore, it should be sought for elsewhere. The author suggests focusing on the technical side of the revolution rather than political ideas and values, as every revolution makes use of a specific technique for taking over power and establishing its own new form.

What is the philosophy of politics in contemporary times and how can the need for its presence be justified? The philosophy of politics is no longer needed by politicians themselves, primarily because it cannot be applied to an electoral campaign and will thus not ensure them an electoral victory. Public opinion probably feels no such a need either, bearing in mind that what it expects is more along the lines of new episodes of a political serial rather than a holistic philosophical interpretation of political reality. Public opinion might begin to feel such a need if it were to prove possible to restore, partly at least, its civic awareness, which is to say, the awareness that emerges on becoming conscious of the necessity for political freedom, for there is no politics without citizens; there is, at most, social policy and its clientele. Without a community of the free and equal, which may consist of citizens alone, there will be no philosophy itself, including that of politics. Philosophy should not treat politics as a certain, particular field or a distinct area of study, It has to learn to recognise in it the basis of this particular form of being, a community of 'good life' which is also its own fount.

What is the political meaning of justice combined with aletheia, that is, the truth understood as revealing, disclosing, and unconcealment? On the basis of an immanent analysis of certain excerpts from Plato's work we could find the answer. First of all, in Plato the question of justice is not a technical issue, a question of good or bad ruling over the polis, a good or bad law. It concerns matters of much greater significance: existential issues. That is why justice is more important than wealth, both to a man and to a political community. Only through other people, in a political community, is man capable of acquiring an identity, a unity between what he is by nature and what he becomes through education, during the process of adapting to a community to which he belongs. If we succeed in creating such a structure (system) of a political community in which people recognize their proper place and can identify with it, then they will be able to identify with the whole political community. Only a political community thus united can be true, that is, just. Internal unity, which is an expression of justice, is the source of a political community's power, it is the basis for coexistence and cooperation. When there is no justice, bonds among people die out. Through injustice they become above all incapable of cooperating.

The placing of the concept citizen in the context of globalisation makes it possible to approach it using the category of cosmopolitism and the related dispute between the advocates of pluralism and those of hegemony. In the debates on cosmopolitism, the transition from the classic concept of 'citizen' to that of 'citizen of the world', or cosmopolite, is generally regarded as something obvious, just as is its territorial extension. The concept of the citizen thus becomes transcendental and virtual. Usually its Greek roots are pointed to, as cosmo-polites is derived from the word cosmos, an ordered world, the universe and polites, a citizen. The historians of concepts are, however, right to point out that in its original form, that is, among the cynics and the stoics, the word cosmopolites was understood in a philosophical and moral rather than in a political sense. It was a deliberate rejection of polis as a specific place and a specific political order, in favour of a universal space and natural law. Humans, as inhabitants of the universe, are subject only to the authority of the world-penetrating logos, the principles and laws with which they were able to become acquainted by applying their own rationality; this very capability was an obligation to observe those principles and laws and to comply with them. Because of its very nature, the concept of a cosmopolite is thus apolitical, or, in other word, not uncitizen-like.