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Although the concept of "reason" acquired a precise meaning and clearly defined field of validity only in Kant's critical philosophy, the term has a long genesis in European intellectual history. The roots of the concept lie in the Greek concept of the logos and may be reduced to six basic meanings. The earliest Greek thinkers used the word logos to denote the logical structure of the human thought and the rational structure of the world. Anaxagoras considered the all-embracing spiritual principle of the nous the source of overall rationality. In the philosophy of the Stoa the term - logos spermaticos is the active principle acting on passive matter in order to create the world. For the Stoics, the concept of logos is the fundamental principle of entire morality. In Christian theology, the God is logos, Holy Spirit - pneuma the soul. In modern philosophy the basic meanings of the Greek logos were taken over by Latin terms "intellectus" and "ratio". These concepts chart quite clearly two basic lines of European thought, one characterized by immediate and the other by mediated discursive understanding of the truth. Kant was the first in the history of philosophy to introduce the essential distinction between understanding and reason (Verstand and Vernunft). According to this distinction, understanding is analytical and abstract, while reason is the source of apriori principles connecting and grounding the whole of our knowledge and volition. Therefore Kant distinguishes theoretical from practical reason. Though practical reason applies the concepts and principles of theoretical reason, it has priority over the latter because it bestows practical reality also on what is theoretically unknowable (freedom, God, immortality of the soul). The primacy of practical reason was especially emphasized by Fichte in his Doctrine of Science. Reason is for him a purely purposeful activity. The idea of reason attains full articulation in Hegel's philosophy of the absolute spirit. For Hegel, reason is first of all a world principle rather than a human capacity. Unlike Kant, whose reason is basically static, a substantial novelty of Hegel's conception of the objective reason is its dynamism, enabling it to reach an increasing awareness "of itself" in its dialectical development. By including the idea of progress in his conception of reason, Hegel introduced an evaluative element in the concept of rationality and thus enabled a connection between reason and ethos in the era of modernity. The deepest cleavage between reason and ethos was opened by the modern science. On one hand, it improved human life by its discoveries and new knowledge, liberating man from religious superstition and other forms of subordination, but on the other it displayed a restrictive attitude not only toward all sorts of value judgments but also toward many dimensions of reason. The positive knowledge of modern science with no ethos lacks any critical self-awareness of the purpose of knowledge, of how it can be used to the benefit of mankind or abused. Thus for establishing a humanistic scientific culture the connection between reason and ethos must be reaffirmed in modern science.

The political future of Eastern Europe is discussed in the context of the failure of real socialism (RS), which is characterized by one-party leadership, state domination, & a culture based on official ideology, having little in common with Karl Marx's basic theoretical ideas. It is suggested that the failure of real socialism does not necessarily mean the end of the Marxist project. Economic & political options for Eastern Europe & the USSR are discussed, & it is maintained that the main choice is between democratic socialism & traditional market-oriented approaches that embrace many of the ideas of nineteenth-century liberalism; the historical conditions of each country will determine which of these options is utilized. It is concluded that intellectuals will play a key role in the sociopolitical transformation of Eastern Europe. W. Howard

The struggle for autonomy in the Yugoslavian province of Kosovo is examined from national, political, socioeconomic, & ideological viewpoints. A discussion of the causes of the conflicts, which began in 1989, reveals that: (1) Albania on ethnic grounds, & Serbia on historical & cultural grounds, both claim Kosovo; (2) although the political system of Yugoslavia is able to accommodate autonomy for the Albanian minority, Albanians demand the status of a repulblic; (3) Kosovo is the least developed Yugoslav province, suffering from poverty & mass unemployment; & (4) developments in the late 1930s & the early years of WWII created an ideological situation in Kosovo marked by asymmetry. Historical forces & particular interests that have been central in the conflict are explored, & possible outcomes for resolution & potential obstacles in this path examined. D. Dennis

Georgy (or Georg) Lukacs, is described as a creative & original thinker, who was authentically Marxist because he was praxis-orientated. The historical conditions of his work are analyzed & compared to those of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, V. I. Lenin, & others. Lukacs tragic personality & dualistic position are discussed in tracing the development of his work. The characteristic limitations of his critical thought are analyzed & contrasted with those of Ernst Bloch. Lukacs's deterministic view of history, in spite of his continuing concern for the "ought," is compared with Bloch's treatment of "possibility" as the basic modal category of philosophy of history. Lukacs's critique of utopian consciousness & his tendency to reduce theory to knowledge is contrasted with Bloch's principle of hope. Explanations made by Lukacs for his loyalty to the Hungarian Communist Party in view of the problems he experienced are discussed. Bloch's sense of human dignity is contrasted with Lukacs's actual experience of repression & ideological abuse. The failure of Lukacs to live according to the ethical demands implicit in his theoretical projects is seen as self-destructive; it is in this that his thought is seen to have failed. F. Rasmussen

The conception & function of critique in social sciences is discussed, based on the contention that social inquiry cannot & should not be divorced from critique, & that it is a necessary element of explanation, understanding, & is implicit in all valid analysis & interpretation. The idea of critique developed is aimed against "value free" social science & against research that is intended only to deal with what exists, rather than discover possibilities for optimal social change. It is noted that both perception & choices regarding research direction are never disinterested. The role of critique in the interpretation of subjective action is explored, & its dimension in the thought of Karl Marx is considered, including two problematic aspects of Marx's conception of critique. Finally, it is asserted that the problem of contemporary social science is not an excess of utopianism, but a deficit of critical consciousness & a willingness to serve the interests of the status quo. J. Weber.

It is held that sci & technology themselves have become problematic. Sci'ts can either continue to insist on a narrow professional division of work & escape their responsibilities by pretending that sci'fic objectivity has nothing to do with commitment, or change their fundamental assumptions about the nature of their task & replace previously dominant ideas of positive sci with the conception of a critical sci & its methodology. In the latter case, their traditional detachment & aloofness must give way to a very serious concern about all misuses of sci'fic findings for non-humane purposes. Past trends aimed at eliminating from sci all value judgments & reduced soc inquiry to the description & explication of factual situations. The dominant philosophies in the 1930's & 1940's construed all value statements as mere expressions of emotion without any cognitive meaning. But the very concept of value-free sci'fic inquiry is misleading. Certain values & norms are always present in any soc res. Cognitive & non-cognitive values are invariably implicit in the theoretical & methodological presuppositions of soc sci'ts, no matter how neutral they pretend to be. Functionalists assume that society is a stable system with well integrated parts, definite functions, & the goal of conserving that system. Certain ethical values are implicit in the very concepts of objectivity & rationality on which the sci'fic method is based. An objective & rational sci can serve inhumane purposes. But recently a new internat'l solidarity of intellectuals has begun to emerge & a critical consciousness is developing which tends to transcend the limitations of nation, race, class, or religion & assume a humanist position. An active commitment against the abuse of knowledge is seen as part of such a humanist orientation. M. Maxfield.