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Among scholars who focus on the politics of natural resources, conventional wisdom asserts that resource-scarce states have the strongest interest in securing control over resources. Counterintuitively, however, in Perils of Plenty, Jonathan N. Markowitz finds that the opposite is true. In actuality, what states make influences what they want to take. Specifically, Markowitz argues that the more economically dependent states are on resource extraction rents for income, the stronger their preferences will be to secure control over resources. He tests the theory with a set of case studies that analyze how states reacted to the 2007 exogenous climate shock that exposed energy resources in the Arctic. Given the dangerous potential for conflict escalation in the Middle East and the South China Sea and the continued shrinkage of the polar ice cap, this book speaks to a genuinely important development in world politics that will have implications for understanding the political effects of climate change for many years to come.

Why do some states project military force to seek control of resources, while others do not? Conventional wisdom asserts that resource-scarce states should have the strongest interest in securing control over resources. Counter-intuitively, I argue that, under existing conditions, the opposite is true. It is not resource-scarce states that will be more interested in militarily seeking additional resources, but rather states that are resource-abundant and dependent on income from extracting those resources. I test this proposition by leveraging a natural experiment that analyzes how states reacted to an exogenous shock that exposed resources in the Arctic in 2007. I employ original data that measures the change in states' Arctic military presence before and after the shock. I find that dependence, not scarcity, explains how states responded to the shock. The findings enhance our understanding of the causes of resource competition and the geopolitical implications of climate change.

Why do some states project military force to seek control of resources, while others do not? Conventional wisdom asserts that resource-scarce states should have the strongest interest in securing control over resources. Counter-intuitively, I argue that, under existing conditions, the opposite is true. It is not resource-scarce states that will be more interested in militarily seeking additional resources, but rather states that are resource-abundant and dependent on income from extracting those resources. I test this proposition by leveraging a natural experiment that analyzes how states reacted to an exogenous shock that exposed resources in the Arctic in 2007. I employ original data that measures the change in states' Arctic military presence before and after the shock. I find that dependence, not scarcity, explains how states responded to the shock. The findings enhance our understanding of the causes of resource competition and the geopolitical implications of climate change.

AbstractFor many centuries, conquest was commonplace, and its attractiveness was central to the character of international politics. Why has it declined? Existing theories cannot explain why powerful countries no longer conquer states with easily extractable wealth. We develop an explanation based on the relationship between a potential conqueror's economic productivity and its ability to profit from conquest. Productivity has opposing effects on conquest's profitability: it raises the opportunity cost of each asset diverted to conquest, but also reduces the quantity of assets required for conquest. The net effect is determined by the composition of investment in innovation. We document that since at least 1950 investment has been predominantly aimed at civilian, not military innovations, so that rising productivity should reduce conquest's net profitability. Using cost analyses of comparable wars, we estimate bounds on the profitability of conquering the oil and gas reserves of the Persian Gulf, a very tempting target, for the United States and Iraq, two potential conquerors of widely differing productivity. Though both mechanisms operate, we find that the net effect of higher productivity is to reduce the profits from conquest. Moreover, this net effect is large enough to render conquest generally unprofitable for contemporary high-productivity states.

Why do only some powerful states choose to develop power projection capabilities? To answer this question, we test the proposition that states choose to develop power projection capabilities when they face a competitive geopolitical environment. This proposition is derived from our theory, which is used to construct a new measure of the level of geopolitical competition that every state in the system faces. This measure incorporates each state's relative geographic position to every other state in the international system, the relative amount of economic power of those other states, and the degree to which their interests are compatible. We then apply this unique country-year measure to test the proposition that competitive environments are associated with the development of power projection capabilities, as measured by the tonnage of naval ships maintained by each country in each year. We demonstrate that our measure helps explain the degree to which states choose to invest in power projection capabilities. This provides an explanation for why the world has been economically multipolar, but military unipolar, for the past quarter century, and why this might change in the future, as rising powers with incompatible interests are increasing their investment in power projection capabilities.

Why do only some powerful states choose to develop power projection capabilities? To answer this question, we test the proposition that states choose to develop power projection capabilities when they face a competitive geopolitical environment. This proposition is derived from our theory, which is used to construct a new measure of the level of geopolitical competition that every state in the system faces. This measure incorporates each state's relative geographic position to every other state in the international system, the relative amount of economic power of those other states, and the degree to which their interests are compatible. We then apply this unique country-year measure to test the proposition that competitive environments are associated with the development of power projection capabilities, as measured by the tonnage of naval ships maintained by each country in each year. We demonstrate that our measure helps explain the degree to which states choose to invest in power projection capabilities. This provides an explanation for why the world has been economically multipolar, but military unipolar, for the past quarter century, and why this might change in the future, as rising powers with incompatible interests are increasing their investment in power projection capabilities.

The central purpose of this article is to establish the relationship. - between power projection, technology, and economic power.. - How economically powerful does a state need to be before it can. - afford the capital intensive technologies, foreign bases, and military. - and logistical forces associated with global power projection?. - The specific research question we focus on in this article is: What. - determines how far states send their military forces? We argue. - that as the costs associated with projecting power decrease or as. - the wealth necessary to project power increases, states will project. - power more frequently and at greater distances. We use a system. - level time series analysis from 1870-1936 and a dispute level analysis. - on all militarized international disputes from 1870-2000 to. - test these propositions. This article is the first to demonstrate empirically. - that the distance and frequency of power projection is a. - function of the cost of projecting power. We close with a discussion. - of contemporary states building power projection capabilities. - and how future research might build from our research to explain. - this behavior. (International Interactions (London)/ FUB)

AbstractScholars systematically mismeasure power resources and military burdens by using gross domestic product (GDP) as a proxy for the income states can devote to arming. The core problem is that GDP confounds two conceptually distinct forms of income into one additive indicator. Subsistence income represents resources needed to provide the "bread" necessary to cover the basic subsistence needs of the population. Surplus income represents the remaining resources that could be allocated to "guns" or "butter." Our new measure of surplus domestic product (SDP) corrects for this measurement error by decomposing subsistence income and surplus income from total GDP. Validation exercises demonstrate that SDP outperforms GDP at measuring the distribution of power resources. Though theoretically we expect states' decisions to arm are influenced by the distribution of power; empirical models using GDP find mixed support for this expectation. Strikingly, using SDP reveals strong support for this proposition.

Gross domestic product (GDP), GDP per capita, and population are central to the study of politics and economics broadly, and conflict processes in particular. Despite the prominence of these variables in empirical research, existing data lack historical coverage and are assumed to be measured without error. We develop a latent variable modeling framework that expands data coverage (1500 AD–2018 AD) and, by making use of multiple indicators for each variable, provides a principled framework to estimate uncertainty for values for all country-year variables relative to one another. Expanded temporal coverage of estimates provides new insights about the relationship between development and democracy, conflict, repression, and health. We also demonstrate how to incorporate uncertainty in observational models. Results show that the relationship between repression and development is weaker than models that do not incorporate uncertainty suggest. Future extensions of the latent variable model can address other forms of systematic measurement error with new data, new measurement theory, or both.

How does a state's source of wealth condition the domain in which it seeks to project influence? We argue that what a state makes conditions what they take. Specifically, the less states rely on land rents to acquire wealth, the less interested they will be in seeking control over territory and the more interested they will be in securing access to distant markets. We develop and test several observable implications that should follow whether this proposition is true. First, as states become less economically dependent on territory, they should be less likely to fight over territory; second, those states should be more likely to both invest in power projection capabilities and subsequently project power at greater distances. Our findings support our theory. These results are robust across a variety of model specifications that take into account potential confounds, such as regime type, economic development, threat, and geography.

Does withdrawing forward-deployed US troops increase instability? This question is at the heart of current grand strategy debates, yet endogeneity issues make this very difficult to answer. Put simply, stability may cause the United States to withdraw forces and lead one to incorrectly infer that withdrawals do not lead to greater instability. We suggest a research design to help alleviate this endogeneity problem. By utilizing exogenous crises that cause US troops to redeploy out of South Korea, we are able to estimate the causal effect of a withdrawal of US troops on the probability of instability. We examine several exogenous crises after the end of the Korean War that force US policymakers to rapidly redeploy US forces out of South Korea. We then examine the rate of conflict between South Korea and North Korea, and the United States and North Korea. We find that US troop withdrawals do not cause greater conflict, but withdrawals are at times associated with other behaviors, such as conventional arming, nuclear proliferation, and diplomatic initiatives that could affect the future likelihood of war.

Military spending data measure key international relations concepts such as balancing, arms races, the distribution of power, and the severity of military burdens. Unfortunately, missing values and measurement error threaten the validity of existing findings. Addressing this challenge, we introduce the Global Military Spending Dataset (GMSD). GMSD collates new and existing expenditure variables from a comprehensive collection of sources, expands data coverage, and employs a latent variable model to estimate missing values and quantify measurement error. We validate the data and present new findings. First, correlations between economic surplus and military spending are currently higher than at any point in the last two-hundred years. Second, updating DiGiuseppe and Poast's (2018) analysis, we find larger substantive effects. Specifically, we find that the (negative) effect of a democratic ally on military spending is three times larger, and the (positive) effect of an increase in GDP is five times larger than previously estimated.