Suchergebnisse

Esse artigo busca aplicar a filosofia de John Rawls sobre um tema contemporâneo de que ele não tratou diretamente: a política de estabilização de preços. Partindo do caso brasileiro, estuda-se a aplicação de juros de curto prazo, pelo Banco Central do Brasil (BCB), como instrumento para estabilizar os preços. Argumenta-se que tal intervenção gera uma redistribuição desigual de recursos, o que motiva a julgá-la à luz de um dos critérios rawlsianos de justiça, segundo o qual, uma instituição é justa se suas desigualdades são justificáveis em virtude dos benefícios que trazem aos grupos menos favorecidos. Mediante a estimação de um modelo de vetores autorregressivos, explora-se a suposição de que tal política esteja, de fato, associada ao benefício coletivo que prevê (a saber, estabilidade de preços). Finalmente, a discussão teórica e empírica constata a pertinência da teoria de Rawls sobre esse objeto, e conclui que a política do BCB não é justa.

Este artigo busca descrever a distribuição de eleitores ideológicos no Brasil e os determinantes individuais da posse de sistemas de crenças ideologicamente consistentes. As hipóteses testadas foram que apenas uma minoria dos eleitores é ideologicamente consistente e que escolaridade, interesse por política e identificação partidária estão positivamente relacionadas com essa característica. Com base no Lapop 2017, a metodologia consistiu na criação de um indicador de estruturação ideológica das crenças, baseado na coerência entre as posições políticas e a autolocalização ideológica. Com esse, então, descrevemos o tamanho e os determinantes individuais da posse de sistemas de crenças ideologicamente estruturados. Nossos resultados confirmam que há poucos eleitores ideologicamente consistentes, que há maior inconsistência entre os eleitores autolocalizados à direita e que a consistência está parcialmente relacionada à maior escolaridade, interesse por política e identificação partidária.

In this paper I explain how the now-called asymmetry is about this broader tension between law and morality. The hypothesis laid out in this paper is that what lies at the core of their troubled relationship has to do with a conflict of natural rights which has never been settled in the histories of both legal and political philosophy. My starting point is that while migration rights - namely the right to leave and the right to enter a state - have been theorised in the history of international law and political thought in light of a cosmopolitan (human and natural) right to mobility across the globe, the rights of states to bar immigration is instead seen as a positive artifice, and unnatural manmade creation that violates what would otherwise be the natural state of affairs. This paper historicises this division between a natural right of free movement - on which the so-called 'asymmetry thesis' rests - and the supposedly positive right to rule of sovereign states. But as in most cases of intellectual history, the history of philosophy is on its own also a type of philosophical argument. Hence, my historical overview highlights the notions of 'right' being employed by authors in their discussion of migration rights, as they seem to inform their views on migration law more generally - especially regarding the question as to whether the correlativity is a legal, a moral or a political problem. Different accounts and usages of rights provide for different theories of migration rights. They make all the difference for thescope and reach of both exit and entry rights in each author or theory, and this paper concludes that the categorisation of the problem as an 'asymmetry' has so far only made its way in moral theory, not in legal scholarship.

Many historians have highlighted the religious and social meaning of the right to freedom of conscience as well as the political role it played throughout the history of the religious wars of the late medieval period and their troubled and long appeasement in the peace settlements of Augsburg and Westphalia. The object of such right consisted, as we know, in the individual freedom to practice religion and in the corresponding negative duty of princes not to interfere with it. However, some historians also claim that this was no simple right: its relevance resided in its internal constitution as a 'cluster of rights', that is, a set of rights that depended on each other and operated together so as to make 'freedom of conscience' possible from both a de iure and a de facto point of view. Among them was the ius emigrandi, the right of members of religious groups to leave the realm, lest they be discriminated on the basis of their religious belief. This right hence correlated with the overall right of religious freedom of which it was an integral and essential part. 'Letting people go' hence played a stabilising role both in terms of civil peace but also among the sovereign states that were now the new makers of international order. This hidden aspect of the history of individual rights is of direct import to contemporary discussions on rights and their nature as well as to one of the most crucial aspects of current rights theories, that is, the issue of correlativity. The nature of the ius emigrandi thus sheds light on the potential set of relations that obtain with state duties but also with other rights, suggesting that its emergence as the first individual right in modern international law was not without geopolitical significance. It is in that context that I claim that the right of emigration started to be portrayed as a natural right by late medieval thinkers - following premodern reflections on a natural right to free movement but also on a natural right to life in early modern political and legal thought. This is was because the codification of emigration as a 'legal right' constituted an unprecedented challenge to political allegiance, and hence confronted what had also started to be characterised, under the theory of the divine right of kings, as the natural right to rule. What was at stake therefore was a conflict of natural rights. We must therefore revisit the philosophical grounds upon which certain rights were deemed as natural over others.

The right to migrate - usually also referred to in the latin original ius migrandi - describes at once a right to emigrate and a right to immigrate. This project focuses on both ends of this right and queries about the correlativity of exit and entry from a philosophical-legal viewpoint. What sort of right is the right to migrate? Is the correlation necessary? Is it desirable for the right to migrate to be conceived as a perfect right - or should we be satisfied with its apparently 'imperfect' nature? The asymmetry which this project sets out to problematic is the following: no one can leave a country without entering another. In other words, one can be legally entitled to leave my country, but what sort of entitlement is that if it does not grant him the legal possibility of entering another? Hence, for a right to be able to protect such individual conduct it must not only ensure the exit movement; it must also consist of a right of entry. In taking the wider perspective of the international system of states we are confronting the moral and legal validity of a right which can never be merely dependent on its enforcement by one single legal system. This project further reflects on the historical backdrop and the legal and political implications that a fully-fledged right to migrate can bring upon international law, international relations theory and the world system of states. It further wonders about whether certain rights - so-called 'international special (human) rights' - can only become enforceable - and hence be properly called "rights" - with the advent of a world Leviathan.

The aim of this paper is to query about the extent to which the moral right to migrate can be considered a legal right. Described by many as a natural right, the fundamental assumptions about what a natural right is has changed significantly in history - especially in the history of political and legal ideas - and so has the very notion of 'nature' which sits at the heart of both classical and modern natural law traditions. Hence, this paper asks what is the notion of nature that is presumed in the moral claim that migration is a 'natural' right. In order to respond to this question, I explore the connection between the classical ius migrandi and the modern freedom of movement, or right to free mobility, as the most recent corollary of that ancient principle. Freedom of movement has been hailed as a key aspect of the various human rights regimes that have developed since the Second World War and, overall, as a key component of any understanding of individual freedom and collective emancipation.

O atingimento de metas estabelecidas para políticas públicas depende, dentre outros fatores, da adoção do instrumento adequado para a execução da política em tela. A política pública de controle da inflação no Brasil vem recorrendo a taxa de juros de curto prazo, a Selic, como um instrumento, dentre outros, para a manutenção da estabilidade de preços. Este instrumento de política pública perpassa governos de diferentes matizes ideológicas no país, mostrando-se uma estratégia consolidada de instrumento de política pública de estabilização. Mas, a política de juros básicos praticadas pelo Banco Central do Brasil tem efeitos sobre a taxa de inflação? Este artigo busca responder essa pergunta recorrendo à modelagem estatística de vetores autorregressivos (VAR), para uma série histórica que abarca o período de junho/1999 a dezembro/2019. Porém, não se encontra evidência empírica da efetividade da taxa Selic como instrumento de redução do nível geral de preços livres no Brasil. Adicionalmente, estimam-se modelos com as variáveis de inflação e taxa de câmbio no intuito de se entreter com a possibilidade de outras ferramentas de estabilização macroeconômica. Os resultados favorecem a tese de que o câmbio possa servir de estabilizador de preços.
Palavras-chave: Política Pública; Economia Política; Juros; Modelos de Vetores Autorregressivos.