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Neo-classical economic theory shows that managed trade or protectionism is (almost) always welfare decreasing. However, measurements of the welfare costs of protectionism based on neo-classical models seem to suggest that these costs are quite small. We discuss general new insights and developments in the theory, policy and empiricism of international trade. The observation that intra-industry trade and the services sector are important has led to a shift in theory away from constant returns to scale and perfect competition towards economies of scale and scope, externalities, market imperfections, and imperfect competition. Although this, in principle, opens the door to beneficial government intervention in the economic process, we emphasize that the true costs of protection can potentially be much higher than is generally acknowledged as a result of the above mentioned shift.

We investigate the effects of (i) profit distribution to either laborers or capital-owners, (ii) sector-specific or efficient rationing schemes, and (iii) government consumption in a two-sector disequilibrium growth model with sluggish real wage rate adjustment (which affects capital accumulation).

Analyzing an overlapping generations model with growing endowments and a government sector that is permitted to have a budget deficit forces the real interest factor to deviate from Samuelson's biological interest factor. Fiscal policies then affect the real interest factor, which in turn has consequences both for the direction and the effectiveness of those fiscal policies. These consequences depend upon the borrowing position of the young.

Economists disagree on the influence of time on the probability of success of economic sanctions. Some argue that it takes time to convince the sanction target. Others stress that economic adjustment will reduce incentives to comply. We seek to reconcile these different literatures, modelling the target's decision to comply as a function of both (anticipatory) economic adjustment and Bayesian learning. We show that sanctions which do not work instantaneously (ie there is neither political compliance nor economic adjustment) can work in the long run, but only if the learning effect dominates the adjustment effect. A sufficient condition for ultimate compliance is that (potential) sanction damage that cannot be avoided by adjustment in the long run exceeds the yield of misconduct.

It is widely believed that globalization, through increased factor mobility, will exert a downward pressure on tax rates and hence on public expenditures. Recent advances in the new economic geography (NEG) literature have, however, shown that such a 'race to the bottom' is not inevitable. Even with perfect factor mobility, a positive tax differential between core and peripheral countries can persist as long as the agglomeration rent, that is associated with being located in the agglomeration, exceeds the tax gap. In these NEG models the relevance of government spending as a determinant of agglomeration is, however, unduly neglected. The focus is on tax rates only and on the stability of core-periphery equilibria. Using a NEG model where the provision of public goods is allowed to influence the location choices of economic agents and starting intially from a spreading instead of a core-periphery equilibrium, we show that governments can affect the spatial equilibrium through their provision of public goods. Our main finding is that the introduction of public goods fosters agglomeration in the sense that it makes the spreading equilibrium unstable.

A key issue in development economics is the explanation of core-periphery patterns around the world. Combining this issue with that of analyzing unilateral transfers (e.g. foreign aid) points in the direction of the use of New Economic Geography (NEG) models which, so far, has not been done explicitly. This paper tries to fill this gap in the literature by studying the (possibly 'catastrophic') effects of aid around the so-called break-points and sustain-points in a NEG model. We also analyze the effects of a "bystander", that is a country which is not directly involved in the transfer. In the traditional transfer literature a bystander is known to potentially cause transfer paradoxes. Our findings in this NEG setting are as follows. First, direct transfer paradoxes are not possible in a symmetric setting even if a bystander is present. Second, the effects of foreign aid depend on the level of economic integration between donor and recipient. Third, if the equilibrium from which aid is given is stable, aid only has a temporary effect (even if there is a bystander present). Fourth, if the donor is relatively large, not only the recipient but also the bystander benefits from foreign aid.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the current phase of globalization is the increased importance of foreign direct investment (FDI). This is not only true at the global level but also at the regional level. It is clear that the process of economic integration in the European Union has boosted FDI for the EU countries. In the field of international economics, the modeling of FDI has been high on the research agenda in recent years and clear progress has been made in understanding the determinants and effects of FDI (see for instance Barba-Navaretti and Venables (2004) for an overview). The new theoretical insights are, however, not always in line with the facts. One important puzzle in this respect is precisely the fact that economic integration or, in modeling terms, a fall in trade costs has been accompanied by an increase in FDI. From the data we know that so-called horizontal FDI, that is FDI undertaken for market size considerations, is the dominant form of FDI, but theory tells us that a fall in trade costs should go along with a decrease in horizontal FDI. Lower trade costs, ceteris paribus, make it more profitable for firms to serve foreign markets via exports instead of setting up their own production in these markets.

With the completion of EMU, tax competition and, more in general, locational competition is high on the EU policy agenda. In contrast to the standard neo-classical reasoning, recent advances in the theory of trade and location have shown that tax competition does not necessarily lead to a "race to the bottom". In these recent discussions the relevance of government spending as an instrument for locational competition is unduly neglected. We therefore introduce a more elaborate government sector in a geographical economics model by analyzing government spending and government production. By changing the relative size, direction or efficiency of the production of public goods, our simulation results show that governments can change the equilibrium between agglomerating and spreading forces. In addition, we show analytically that the introduction of public goods fosters agglomeration. Ultimately, our paper shows that by restricting attention to taxes, one ignores that government spending also determines the attractiveness of a country as a location for the mobile factors of production.

Recentiy, the importance of environmental and economic "win-win" situations has been stressed, indicating that care of the environment requires economic growth, while economic growth in turn cannot take place without taking proper care of the environment. We generalize a popular endogenous growth model with constant returns to scale in a broad measure of the capital stock, by making consumers care not only about current and future consumption levels, but also about the current and future quali'y of the environment, to see under what circumstances "win-win" situations can arise. The capital stock is decomposed into private capital and productive government spending. Production of goods and services causes pollution which is detrimental to the environment. The government can invest in abatement processes to clean up the environment and in productive government spending by taxing production (= income). There is, therefore, both an environmental externality and a public good, i.e. productive government spending. This brings us within the realms of second-best economics. We investigate the decentralized market economy as well as the command economy. Two approaches to model the environment can be distinguished in the literature: the stock approach and the flow approach. The flow approach assumes that the level of environmental quality changes instantaneously if the production level changes or if the level of abatement changes and is particularly relevant for analysing the environmental externality associated with noise. The stock approach, on the other hand, assumes that pollution and abatement indirectly influence the environment by affecting the rate of change of the environment over time and is more relevant for analyzing the problems of acid rain.