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In this paper, we reflect on our experience as science and technology studies (STS) researchers who were members of the working group that produced A Synthetic Biology Roadmap for the UK in 2012. We explore how this initiative sought to govern an uncertain future and describe how it was successfully used to mobilize public funds for synthetic biology from the UK government. We discuss our attempts to incorporate the insights and sensibilities of STS into the policy process and why we chose to use the concept of responsible research and innovation to do so. We analyze how the roadmapping process, and the final report, narrowed and transformed our contributions to the roadmap. We show how difficult it is for STS researchers to influence policy when our ideas challenge deeply entrenched pervasive assumptions, framings, and narratives about how technological innovation necessarily leads to economic progress, about public reticence as a roadblock to that progress, and about the supposed separation between science and society. We end by reflecting on the constraints under which we were operating from the outset and on the challenges for STS in policy.

This Perspective is part of the Public Engagement in Science series. --- The use of new technologies to bring back extinct species has recently become a topic widely discussed in the media, partly as the result of a TEDx programme on de-extinction [1] at the National Geographic Headquarters, timed to coincide with a National Geographic cover story in April 2013. Two weeks earlier, Stuart Brand, a key proponent of de-extinction, gave his own TED talk [2]. These public events were followed by high-profile conferences at Cambridge (UK) and Stanford Universities [3],[4]. These events have begun to shape the contours of 'de-extinction,' by defining the relevant techniques (cloning, genome editing, back breeding, stem cell manipulation) and also the actors that can legitimately participate. Thus, de-extinction is currently crystalizing into a field that includes not only bioscientists but also, to varying degrees, the popular press, bioethicists, conservationists, and scientists from other fields (for example, synthetic biologists). De-extinction has raised a number of ethical and political questions: Will it divert resources from other tried-and-tested measures for conservation? Will the resurrected animals be classified as members of the extinct species? Are conservationists too pessimistic and sceptical about cutting-edge science to embrace its potential? How will we ethically care for the animals used in and produced by these techniques? Are there hidden commercial interests at stake? What is striking, from our perspective, is that many of these debates have been held before: the tropes regarding de-extinction are remarkably similar to those used in debates regarding cloning endangered animals. In this paper, we explore the relevance of previous debates and argue that important insights can be gleaned from them as de-extinction moves forward, and that there is another set of questions that has not yet been adequately addressed. In line with the arguments of Marris and Rose [5] in the opening editorial for this series "Opening Engagement: Exploring Public Participation in the Biosciences," we examine how, in the field of cloning endangered animals, the concerns of conservationists have in some cases been the basis for reformulating scientific practices in a way that can be interpreted as a form of 'upstream' public engagement. We argue that de-extinction could learn valuable lessons from these earlier projects regarding how to incorporate contributions from various publics; and demonstrate what a sociological approach can add to the exploration of these questions, in ways that traditional bioethics and ELSI (Ethical, Legal and Social Implications) approaches cannot.

Cultural Theory, as developed by Mary Douglas, argues that differing risk perceptions can be explained by reference to four distinct cultural biases: hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism, and fatalism. This paper presents empirical results from a quantitative survey based on a questionnaire devised by Karl Dake to measure these cultural biases. A large representative sample (N = 1022) was used to test this instrument in the French social context. Correlations between cultural biases and perceptions of 20 social and environmental risks were examined. These correlations were very weak, but were statistically significant: cultural biases explained 6%, at most, of the variance in risk perceptions. Standard sociodemographic variables were also weakly related to risk perceptions (especially gender, social class, and education), and cultural biases and sociodemographic variables were themselves inter correlated (especially with age, social class, and political outlook). The authors compare these results with surveys conducted in other countries using the same instrument and conclude that new methods, more qualitative and contextual, still need to be developed to investigate the cultural dimensions of risk perceptions. The paper also discusses relationships between perceptions of personal and residual risk, and between perceived risk and demand for additional safety measures. These three dimensions were generally closely related, but interesting differences were observed for some risk issues.

Participatory Technology Assessment (pTA) initiatives have usually been analyzed as if they existed in a social and political vacuum. This article analyzes the linkages that occur, in both directions, between the microcosm set up by a pTA exercise and the real world outside. This dual-dynamics perspective leads to a new way of understanding the function and significance of pTA initiatives. Rather than viewing them as a means to create the ideal conditions for real public debate, they are viewed here as an additional public arena in which sociotechnical controversies are played out. This perspective is developed from the analysis of an interactive technology assessment exercise conducted by the French National Institute for Agricultural Research, on the topic of genetically modified vines.

The paper investigates how field experimentation of genetically modified crops became central to the French controversy on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in recent years. Initially constructed in the 1980s as a cognitive endeavor to be preserved from lay interference, field trials of genetically modified crops were reconceived as "an intrusion in the social space," which had to be negotiated with actors from that space. In order to analyze this transformation, the authors suggest that it is necessary to develop an interpretive framework that combines theoretical perspectives from science and technology studies and the sociology of social problems, and emphasizes the importance of the way in which actors compete in a heterogeneous public space, to put forward alternative framings of problems. The authors present a detailed analysis of the interactions and conflicts between actors in diverse social arenas in order to better understand the dynamics of this sociotechnical controversy.

This paper seeks to compare two frameworks which have been proposed to explain risk perceptions, namely, cultural theory and the psychometric paradigm. A structured questionnaire which incorporated elements from both approaches was administered to 129 residents of Norwich, England. The qualitative risk characteristics generated by the psychometric paradigm explained a far greater proportion of the variance in risk perceptions than cultural biases, though it should be borne in mind that the qualitative characteristics refer directly to risks whereas cultural biases are much more distant variables. Correlations between cultural biases and risk perceptions were very low, but the key point was that each cultural bias was associated with concern about distinct types of risks and that the pattern of responses was compatible with that predicted by cultural theory. The cultural approach also provided indicators for underlying beliefs regarding trust and the environment; beliefs which were consistent within each world view but divergent between them. An important drawback, however, was that the psychometric questionnaire could only allocate 32% of the respondents unequivocally to one of the four cultural types. The rest of the sample expressed several cultural biases simultaneously, or none at all. Cultural biases are therefore probably best interpreted as four extreme world views, and a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research methodologies would generate better insights into who might defend these views in what circumstances, whether there are only four mutually exclusive world views or not, and how these views are related to patterns of social solidarity, and judgments on institutional trust.

Decision-makers often despair at what they regard as fickle and unpredictable public attitudes toward environmental risks. Research has shown, however, that public perceptions of risk are not irrational. Psychologists have developed the so-called 'psychometric paradigm', which indicates that laypeople approach the meaning of 'risk' using a more political framework than that used by experts. This includes factors such as whether or not they have control over their exposure to risk, whether the effect will be immediate or delayed, and whether future generations will be affected. Sociologists have proposed a 'cultural theory of risk', which argues that alternative views about risks are inextricably inter-linked with the ways in which social order is perceived and experienced. Both these theories have been developed and promoted largely within disciplinary boundaries and in isolation from each other. This report argues that both perspectives play important roles in shaping, maintaining, and changing views about risks, and that these two components are inter-related in complex but predictable ways. Thus, the aim of this research was to advance our understanding of risk perceptions by integrating the 'psychometric paradigm' and 'cultural theory' approaches. This paper reports the detailed results from a questionnaire survey (N=201) conducted in Norfolk (UK). Four distinct worldviews were identified, namely: fatalist , or phlegmatic over influence on outcomes; individualistic , or a preference for competitive procedures; hierarchist , or a belief in order and rules to guide decisions; and egalitarian , or an emphasis on fairness through justice. Each of these worldviews was associated with a specific pattern of risk perceptions in a manner which was consistent with cultural theory. Cultural theory, however, was only able to explain 14% at most, of the variance in risk perceptions, whereas the 'psychometric paradigm' explained as much as 50% in some cases. The authors argue that the two methodologies explained importantly different dimensions of risk perceptions, and that deeper insights into the underlying rationales are obtained by using the two approaches in a complementary manner. Thus, the combined methodology provided insights into underlying social issues of trust and accountability which play an important role in shaping risk perceptions. This research suggests that social and political frameworks which influence the way environmental threats are interpreted can be identified and that a consistent theory of reactions to risk can be established.

The "psychometric paradigm" developed by Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein was a landmark in research about public attitudes toward risks. One problem with this work, however, was that (at least initially) it did not attempt to distinguish between individuals or groups of people, except "experts" vs. "lay people." This paradigm produced a "cognitive map" of hazards, and the assumption seemed to be that the characteristics identified were inherent attributes of risk. This paper examines the validity of this assumption. A questionnaire survey similar to those designed by Slovic et al. was conducted, but the data were analyzed at both the aggregate level, using mean scores, and at the level of individuals (N= 131 Norwich residents). The results reported here demonstrate that (1) individuals vary in their perception of the same risk issue; (2) individuals vary in their rating of the same risk characteristics on the same risk issue; and (3) some of the strong intercorrelations observed between risk characteristics at the aggregate level are not supported when the same data are analysed at the level of individuals. Despite these findings, the relationship between risk characteristics and risk perceptions inferred by the psychometric paradigm did hold true at the level of individuals, for most—but not all—of the characteristics. In particular, the relationship between "lack of knowledge to those exposed" and risk perceptions appears to be a complex one, a finding which has important implications for risk communication strategies.