Suchergebnisse

This study examines the decision-making process of the George W. Bush administration which led to the decision in late 2006 to order the Iraq troop surge. The study analyzes whether the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision making can accurately explain the events of the case. The study seeks to further test the explanatory power and descriptive accuracy of the bureaucratic politics model, while also attaining a more textured, academic understanding of the decision-making process leading to the Iraq troop surge. The decision to order the troop surge in Iraq is one of the more important decisions in post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy and continues to impact U.S. strategy in Iraq, Afghanistan, and overall military doctrine. Finally, the author endeavors to contribute to the further development and refinement of the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision making. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society/Sage Publications Inc.]

This study examines the decision-making process of the George W. Bush administration which led to the decision in late 2006 to order the Iraq troop surge. The study analyzes whether the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision making can accurately explain the events of the case. The study seeks to further test the explanatory power and descriptive accuracy of the bureaucratic politics model, while also attaining a more textured, academic understanding of the decision-making process leading to the Iraq troop surge. The decision to order the troop surge in Iraq is one of the more important decisions in post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy and continues to impact U.S. strategy in Iraq, Afghanistan, and overall military doctrine. Finally, the author endeavors to contribute to the further development and refinement of the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision making.

The bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision making is predicated in large part by Miles' Law, which states that "where you stand depends upon where you sit." That is, an actor's policy preferences can be predicted from his or her governmental position or role within the bureaucracy. Consequently, secretaries of state in the U.S. foreign policy decision-making process are then presumed to favor policy options emphasizing diplomacy and civilian efforts. However, Hillary Clinton has proved to be a consistent hawk during her tenure as secretary of state. Specifically, she was one of the strongest advocates of the use of military force in both Afghanistan and Libya. This paper examines Clinton's policy preferences in the context of the Afghanistan troop surge and the U.S. role in the international military operation in Libya to probe whether the secretary's failure to conform to Miles' Law is an anomaly or presents important questions regarding the possible disjunction between institutional and individual interests and their respective influences on actors' policy preferences.