Suchergebnisse

Originally published in 2005. The Rules Committee in the US House of Representatives is one of the most powerful institutions in Congress. It takes centre stage in determining procedures that will shape the bills enacted by the House. Its central role gives it broad influence over national policy on issues from Social Security and taxes to civil rights and the federal deficit. This study develops a principal-agent theory to analyze how changes in procedures and the role of the House Rules Committee have affected policy making in Congress over the past three decades. The book's main themes relate to a broader literature that explains the strengthening of party leadership organizations within Congress and their significance for understanding congressional politics. The volume is ideally suited for courses on the US Congress and American Politics more generally.

"Congress and Foreign Policy" published on by Oxford University Press.

The rapidity, duration, and intensity of it all caught me by surprise. Nearly at a full run, I dashed through a corridor and down a winding staircase to my first morning meeting. I took a place along a wall with a few other staff, but my eyes were fixed upon the principals. Gathered around a vast table were the chairs, the majority leader, and my boss—the house majority whip. The discourse was mostly heavy—President Obama's historic election, the burden of leadership, and the daunting task to balance politics and policy in order to deliver on the promises and hopes of the people who sent them. The immediate business was expanding children's health insurance and a stimulus package to turn around an economy teetering on the brink. The majority leader was resolute. Congress would need to deliver bold actions in order to overcome the deep anxiety of the times and to build confidence for the long struggle ahead. The whip was equally resolute as he summoned back hard lessons from lost eras—Roosevelt's New Deal and Truman's Fair Deal. Congress could not allow mistakes of the past to be repeated. With a clear appreciation of history, the whip made the case for a 21st Century New Deal that ensured the poor and most vulnerable would not be left behind. No sooner did I try to reflect upon this special moment and it was time to rush off once again.

One of the central questions in legislative politics is whether rules are used to achieve non‐median policy outcomes (Dion and Huber 1996: Krehbiel 1991; Sinclair 1999). This study does not measure outcomes directly. Rather, the analysis assesses expectations from theories of legislative organization regarding both congressional process and behavior. Restrictive procedures are associated with policies that tend to have important collective consequences for the political parties. The analysis also demonstrates that voting on amendments allowed under the rules disproportionately favor the majority party. Finally, a comparison of voting behavior on final passage of legislation highlights House and Senate differences in leadership powers to control the agenda. The findings are consistent with a partisan rationale and reflect the significance of House special rules in limiting minority influence on the legislative agenda.

Objective This analysis focuses on institutional reform and the House foreign policy committees to assess the resurgent‐Congress explanation of presidential success in international affairs between 1953–1998.Method Logit models are used to determine the changing effects on presidential success resulting from the support of chairmen and the president's co‐partisans on the foreign policy committees due to the 1970s congressional reforms.Results The analysis illustrates differences in the effects of committee leaders and committee co‐partisans on roll‐call success before and after the reforms. Also, contrasts are found in the effects of the foreign policy panels that differentially influence presidential success.Conclusion The article offers evidence that the institutional reforms that changed the House policy process from one dominated by committee chairs to one responsive to political parties significantly altered presidential success. These findings emphasize the importance of the changing congressional environment in explaining presidential success in foreign policy.

This analysis focuses on institutional reform & the House foreign policy committees to assess the resurgent-Congress explanation of presidential success in international affairs between 1953-1998. Logit models are used to determine the changing effects on presidential success resulting from the support of chairmen & the president's co-partisans on the foreign policy committees due to the 1970s congressional reforms. The analysis illustrates differences in the effects of committee leaders & committee co-partisans on roll-call success before & after the reforms. Also, contrasts are found in the effects of the foreign policy panels that differentially influence presidential success. The article offers evidence that the institutional reforms that changed the House policy process from one dominated by committee chairs to one responsive to political parties significantly altered presidential success. These findings emphasize the importance of the changing congressional environment in explaining presidential success in foreign policy. 2 Tables, 1 Figure, 29 References. Adapted from the source document.