Suchergebnisse

The Royal Society of London held a scientific meeting in September 2000 focusing on two theories of the origin of AIDS: one, that it occurred through "natural transfer" of immunodeficiency virus from monkeys or chimpanzees to humans; and the other, that it occurred through iatrogenic transfer via contaminated polio vaccines used in Africa in the late 1950s. This meeting was the culmination of years of public contention over the polio-vaccine theory. Several dimensions of the politics of science are revealed by analysis of this issue, including the power of scientific editors, the use of the mass media, decisions regarding selection of speakers and organization of the meeting, and epistemological assumptions made by participants.

Social defence - namely, nonviolent community resistance to aggression as an alternative to military defence - requires the development of strategy, as does military defence. The role of technology in social defence strategy has never received much attention. Of the various perspectives on technology, perhaps the most useful for the purposes of social defence is that artefacts, by embodying social relationships, influence but do not determine their uses. In practical terms, it is fruitful to survey different types of technology to see which ones are most supportive of strategic goals. Studies of social defence have dealt with operational and social dimensions of strategy and, to a lesser extent, the logistical dimension. In contrast, the technological dimension of social defence strategy has been almost entirely neglected. Technology can play a crucial role in social defence in direct defence against attack and, more importantly, in supporting operational, logistical and social dimensions of strategy. For example, decentralized media are valuable for social defence operations, and systems for self-reliance in food and energy are valuable for social defence logistics. To illustrate technology assessment for social defence, a hypothetical example of Czechoslovakian social defence planning, drawing on experience from the 1968 invasion, is outlined.

Whistleblowing and nonviolent action have a number of similarities and connections, yet seldom have they been discussed together. There are a number of lessons for whistleblowing from nonviolence, and vice versa. These are raised through a series of points about whistleblowing: that isolated resistance is ruthlessly crushed, that preparation is essential, that formal channels seldom work, that the strategy of mobilization can be powerful, and that whistleblowers seldom bring about change.