Suchergebnisse

Review of: New Zealand Politics and Social Patterns: Selected Works by Robert Chapman. Elizabeth McLeay (ed), Victoria University Press, 1999.

Review of: New Zealand Politics and Social Patterns: Selected Works by Robert Chapman. Elizabeth McLeay (ed), Victoria University Press, 1999.

Review of: The Constitutional Implications of MMP. Alan Simpson (ed), School of Political Science and International Relations, VUW (Dunmore Press), 1998. $29.95.

Review of: The Constitutional Implications of MMP. Alan Simpson (ed), School of Political Science and International Relations, VUW (Dunmore Press), 1998. $29.95.

Review of: The Mother of All Departments: The History of the Department of Internal Affairs, Michael Bassett, Auckland University Press, 1997, pp.312.

One of the basics of strategy is understanding the foe and the type of war in which a nation is involved. Perhaps even more basic than that is the seemingly simple requirement to understand that the nation is at war. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) does not fit easily into the mold of war, but that is because of too much comparison with conventional wars; the Cold War may provide a better model. The United States--especially the government, but also the people--need to focus more fully on prosecuting the GWOT, but there is no requirement for the full mobilization seen in World War II. This report chronicles the panels and resulting papers from the Seventeenth Annual U.S. Army War College Strategy Conference, held at Carlisle Barracks, PA, in April 2006. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1024/thumbnail.jpg

One of the basics of strategy is understanding the foe and the type of war in which a nation is involved. Perhaps even more basic than that is the seemingly simple requirement to understand that the nation is at war. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) does not fit easily into the mold of war, but that is because of too much comparison with conventional wars; the Cold War may provide a better model. The United States--especially the government, but also the people--need to focus more fully on prosecuting the GWOT, but there is no requirement for the full mobilization seen in World War II. This report chronicles the panels and resulting papers from the Seventeenth Annual U.S. Army War College Strategy Conference, held at Carlisle Barracks, PA, in April 2006. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1074/thumbnail.jpg

Within only a few days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Army War College initiated a series of short studies addressing strategic issues in the war on terrorism. This collection of essays analyzes a broad array of subjects of great strategic importance. This volume provides historical documentation of some of the advice given the military leadership in the early days of the war, but it also continues to be a source of solid strategic analysis as the war lengthens and perhaps broadens. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1046/thumbnail.jpg

Within only a few days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Army War College initiated a series of short studies addressing strategic issues in the war on terrorism. This collection of essays analyzes a broad array of subjects of great strategic importance. This volume provides historical documentation of some of the advice given the military leadership in the early days of the war, but it also continues to be a source of solid strategic analysis as the war lengthens and perhaps broadens. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1096/thumbnail.jpg

In 1946, General Walter Bedell Smith wrote a series of articles describing six great decisions made in World War II by General Dwight David Eisenhower Writing so soon after the war, General Smith could not hope to produce a definitive history, but felt that writing then would document an important viewpoint of one of the major participants in Eisenhower's many significant decisions. With this initial volume of their Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Key Decisions Monograph Series, the Strategic Studies Institute also attempts to write about key decisions while they are still fresh in the memories of the participants. This series will not produce a definitive history, however, it will make a major contribution to understanding decisions made by senior military and civilian leaders during the several years thus far of the war in Iraq. Looking more at the how and why of certain decisions than at the results of those same decisions, this series will be particularly useful to senior leaders--both uniformed and civilian--as they reflect on how decisions were made in Iraq and how better decisions might be made in future conflicts. As General James Mattis at Joint Forces Command recently said, the challenges of operating in a counterinsurgency can be greater than in large-scale conventional combat, "since the adversary has more flexibility to determine how, when, where, and whether to fight." This, plus the fact that irregular combat is the more likely challenge of the future operating environment, makes it even more important to examine the key decisions of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM as soon as possible. One of the greatest strengths of our Army over the centuries has been its ability to look critically at itself and to devise ways to improve its ability to prosecute the Nation's wars. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1607/thumbnail.jpg

One of the defining characteristics of strategy making in the Bush administration was the treatment of any decision involving transnational terrorism as a crisis with a limited slate of participants and a minimal role for professional expertise except on operational and technical considerations. When the administration broke from its predecessors and chose to approach the Iraq issue as part of the war on terrorism rather than as simply an element of regional stability, it shifted to a crisis decision mode. This was unusual since the Iraq conflict did not meet the usual requirements for a crisis: a very high threat and limited decision time. This initial volume provides a review of decisions made by senior military and civilian leaders during the several years thus far of the war in Iraq, and focuses on the how and why certain decisions were made. ; "February 2010." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 54-67). ; Introduction -- Decisionmakers -- Defining the issue -- Decision shapers -- Political and strategic context -- An iterative decision -- Facts -- Assumptions -- Options -- The decisionmaking process -- Analysis and conclusions. ; One of the defining characteristics of strategy making in the Bush administration was the treatment of any decision involving transnational terrorism as a crisis with a limited slate of participants and a minimal role for professional expertise except on operational and technical considerations. When the administration broke from its predecessors and chose to approach the Iraq issue as part of the war on terrorism rather than as simply an element of regional stability, it shifted to a crisis decision mode. This was unusual since the Iraq conflict did not meet the usual requirements for a crisis: a very high threat and limited decision time. This initial volume provides a review of decisions made by senior military and civilian leaders during the several years thus far of the war in Iraq, and focuses on the how and why certain decisions were made. ; Mode of access: Internet.