Suchergebnisse

Ligesom i verdens fleste lande reagerede Indiens og pakistans regeringer med nedlukninger på spredning af COVID-19 virus som i princippet skulle også inkludere religiøse institutioner og ritualer. I Pakistan blev de sunnitiske moskeer dog åbne fordi regeringen havde ingen hjemmel for at gennemtvinge nedluk-ningen imod de autonome religiøse organisationer. I Indien ful-gte de muslimiske organisationer dog, og forsøgte at vise sig som det "ansvarlige mindretal" grundet spændinger med den hind-unationalistiske regering og også fordi en forsamling af Tablīghī Jamā'at havde bidraget betydeligt til spredning a smittet i landet og udenfor. I Pakistan var det derimod shiiterne som spillede rolle som det "ansvarlige mindretal" ved at lukke moskeerne. I det hele set viste muslimiske organisationer og ledere ingen stor interesse i tage til sygdommen, dem som ytrer sig på internettet henvender sig i forvejen til et højere uddannet publikum og er mere positivt indstillet over for nedlukninger ; India's and Pakistan's governments, like most of the world's governments, responded to the spread of the COVID-19 virus with lockdowns, which in principle also affected religious institutions and rituals. However, Sunni mosques in Pakistan were not closed, as the government has no authority over autonomous religious organizations. In contrast, the Islamic organizations and institutions in India complied with government orders, and tried to present themselves as a "responsible minority" during a period when relations with the Hindu nationalist government were strained, and because a convention of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat had contributed considerably to the spread of the disease in the country and abroad. In Pakistan, the role of the "responsible minority" was played by the Shiites, who closed their mosques. On the whole, Muslim religious leaders and organizations showed little interest in taking a stand on the pandemic. Those few who make extensive use of the internet tend to address the better-educated social strata, and tend view pandemic-related restrictions more favorably.

How did Great Britain and France, the largest imperial powers of the early twentieth century, cope with mounting anticolonial nationalism in the Arab world? What linked domestic opponents and foreign challengers in the Middle East and North Africa-Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Egypt-as inhabitants attempted to overthrow the European colonial order? What strategies did the British and French adopt in the face of these threats? Empires of Intelligence, the first study of colonial intelligence services to use recently declassified reports, argues that colonial control in the British and French empires depended on an elaborate security apparatus. Martin Thomas shows for the first time the crucial role of intelligence gathering in maintaining imperial control in the years before decolonization

AbstractThis study offers new insights into the largest threats to natural and mixed World Heritage sites in developed countries as considered by their management. In addition to this, the capacity of the management to deal with threats is examined. An Ordered Probit model is used that distinguishes three groups of threats and four categories of adaptive capacity of the management. Data originate from the 2014 UNESCO Periodic Report II for sites in economically advanced countries (Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea) linked to the World Heritage Site database. Estimation results reveal that the probability of a major threat to World Heritage sites is perceived to be highest in the category of climate change and extreme weather events, followed by local conditions affecting the physical structure (temperature, rain, dust). Sites in tropical climates are perceived as significantly more threatened, as are those earlier listed as in danger. The likelihood of perceiving a major threat is highest in Turkey, Italy, Norway and North America. Threats related to climate change are those the management has the lowest capacity to deal with when other important aspects are controlled for. Large and natural areas have a higher perceived administrative capacity to deal with threats than others.

AbstractThis study estimates factors of importance for the carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) emissions generated by travellers flying for different reasons based on representative Austrian micro data for the period 2014–2016. The annual average number of flights taken by adults vary between 0.1 (visiting friends) and 0.8 (going on holiday), and the amount of CO2e emissions generated by each return flight is approximately 1100 kg. This leads to a total of 6 million tonnes CO2e emissions per year. Results of the Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimations reveal that the amount of CO2e emissions created is related to socio-demographic, locational and seasonal factors, although mainly for the largest group of travellers: the holiday makers. In this group, individuals with university degrees, young persons (16–24 years) and capital city residents generate the largest amounts of emissions, as opposed to persons with children and large households. Residents of the capital region each quarter cause 64 kg more CO2e emissions than inhabitants of rural areas, persons with university degrees create 74 kg larger emissions than those without degrees and young adults instigate 90 kg more emissions than middle-aged persons. CO2e emissions of holiday flights are highest in the first quarter of the year. The importance of education is also pronounced for CO2e emissions related to business travel, as is gender.

This article estimates a count-data model on the flight behaviour of Austrian holiday-makers based on information from a large representative quarterly survey spanning the years 2014-2016. On average, the number of holiday flights ranges between 0.6 and 1.2 per year for residents in the least populated region and the capital, respectively. Results of the estimations reveal that the number of holiday flights is highest for persons with tertiary degrees, of a young age (16-24 years) and capital city residents, while it is lowest for individuals with children and large households. Residents of the capital city fly 78 percent more often in a given quarter than those living in Carinthia, the most rural region. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition analysis reveals that the difference is rather related to location than to variations in individual characteristics. Socio-demographic aspects such as age, household size and travelling with children are of no relevance for the holiday flying behaviour of capital residents.

Abstract: Migrant farmworkers provide an essential service and perform jobs that many Americans are unwilling to do. Immigration practices and policies dictate the extent to which undocumented migrant farmworkers have access to governmental health and social services, and are ever-changing based on the political climate. This paper reviews historical and contemporary United States government policies relevant to migrant farmworkers. It refutes some of the common myths regarding documented and undocumented immigrants and migrant farmworkers, such as "U.S. public health insurance programs are overburdened with immigrants," "undocumented immigrants are taking advantage of the American system by 'free riding' and are a 'drain on the economy,'" and "undocumented immigrants take American jobs." Even though their jobs involve significant occupational hazards, undocumented migrant farmworkers are ineligible for government services, and employers generally do not provide these workers with health insurance. Migrant farmworkers also face food insecurity, poor housing conditions, impaired access to education for their children, and even human rights violations. These conditions, as well as the nature of their work, affect the health of undocumented migrant farmworkers and their children. This paper analyzes these inequities and calls for a more just and equitable system that treats migrant farmworkers fairly and provides them and their families with social services and health care.

Empires, until recently, were everywhere. They shaped borders, stirred conflicts, and set the terms of international politics. With the collapse of empire came a fundamental reorganization of our world. Decolonization unfolded across territories as well as within them. Its struggles became internationalized and transnational, as much global campaigns of moral disarmament against colonial injustice as local contests of arms. In this expansive history, Martin Thomas tells the story of decolonization and its intrinsic link to globalization. He traces the connections between these two transformative processes: the end of formal empire and the acceleration of global integration, market reorganization, cultural exchange, and migration. The End of Empires and a World Remade shows how profoundly decolonization shaped the process of globalization in the wake of empire collapse. In the second half of the twentieth century, decolonization catalyzed new international coalitions; it triggered partitions and wars; and it reshaped North-South dynamics. Globalization promised the decolonized greater access to essential resources, to wider networks of influence, and to worldwide audiences, but its neoliberal variant has reinforced economic inequalities and imperial forms of political and cultural influences. In surveying these two codependent histories across the world, from Latin America to Asia, Thomas explains why the deck was so heavily stacked against newly independent nations. Decolonization stands alongside the great world wars as the most transformative event of twentieth-century history. In The End of Empires and a World Remade, Thomas offers a masterful analysis of the greatest process of state-making (and empire-unmaking) in modern history.