Suchergebnisse

— Panel 5F: Affektivität der demokratischen Regression — Wer über den Zustand politischer Ordnungen spricht, soll über die Befindlichkeit ihrer Bevölkerungen nicht schweigen. Aus ihren Gefühlslagen lassen sich nicht nur konjunkturelle Trends herauslesen. Eine gegenseitige Beeinflussung ist möglich, indem das Auf und Ab politischer Ordnungen Zuversicht, Sorgen, Ängste und Freuden hervorruft und gleichzeitig durch solche […]

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1 The Politicization of Economic Activity -- 2 Towards a Micropolitical Approach to Economic Life -- 3 The Marketplace as a Site of Politics -- 4 Work and the World of Micropolitics -- 5 Shopping for Change? -- 6 Political (By-)Products of Economic Production -- 7 Entrepreneurial Space Production -- 8 Faraway, So Close -- References -- Index.

In recent years, economic life has become increasingly politicized: now, every company has a 'philosophy', promising its customers some ethical surplus in return for buying their products; consumers shop for change; workers engage in individualized forms of employee activism such as whistleblowing; and governments contribute to the re-configuration of the economic sphere as a site of political contestation by reminding corporate and private economic actors of their duty to 'do their bit'. The Politics of Economic Life addresses this trend by exploring the ways in which practices of consumption, work, production, and entrepreneurship are imbued with political strategy and ideology, and assesses the potentials and perils of the politicization of economic activity for democracy in the 21st century.--

ZusammenfassungMontesquieus politische Klimatheorie findet in der Politikwissenschaft wenig Anerkennung. Sie gilt als abwegig. Wenn sie nicht ins Lächerliche gezogen wird, dann vor allem deshalb, weil sie in einer Tradition eurozentrischer und rassistischer Stereotypisierung und Rechtfertigung kolonialer Ungerechtigkeit zu stehen scheint. Eine Neubetrachtung Montesquieus Klimatheorie ist jedoch mindestens aus drei Gründen geboten. Erstens ist die Theorie komplexer und zweitens plausibler als gemeinhin angenommen wird. Drittens wirft sie interessante Fragen über die integrationswissenschaftlichen Herausforderungen politikwissenschaftlicher Forschung sowie den Umgang mit dem anthropogenen Klimawandel auf.

To assess the merits and demerits of the content of Culp's educational programme, the paper does three things: First, it discusses whether Culp's defence against conceivable objections manages to effectively dispel the charge of cosmopolitan arrogance. Second, it spells out one implication of epistemic modesty, which Culp considers a core competence to be imparted by citizenship education. Third, it reflects upon the tricky task of motivating individuals to comply with the demands of justice. Taken together, the paper argues that Culp's case is impressively strong but nevertheless tends to suffer from a rationalist constriction. It does not leave sufficient room for tradition in private life and public reasoning. This rationalist constriction is problematic from a normative philosophical, and especially a practice-oriented viewpoint.

Starting with Popper, social theorists across the board have acknowledged that traditions serve socially valuable functions. However, while traditions are usually understood as 'living' entities that come in overlapping varieties and evolve over time, the socially valuable functions attributed to tradition tend to presuppose invariability in ways of thinking and acting. Addressing this tension, this article provides a detailed analysis of the concept of tradition, and directs special attention to conceivable criteria for the authentic continuation of a tradition. It is argued that the ways of thinking and acting that constitute the material of a tradition must – among faithful members of that tradition – stand in a relation of equivalence – not identity or similarity. The implications of this account concern our ability to decide (normatively) conflicts over authenticity among rival tradition branches as well as the role that traditions play in policy-making.

Is there any reason to discriminate among the rival claims self-proclaimed conservatives make for being truly conservative? This article argues that at least some of these claims can legitimately be dismissed by an independent third. Drawing on and critically interrogating the theories of conservatism provided by Huntington, Oakeshott, as well as Brennan and Hamlin, this article argues that many characterizations of conservatism mistake contingent circumstances explaining why people historically were or conceivably might be reluctant to promote social change for a fully formed conservative ideology. Not least, risk- and uncertainty-centered accounts, which have gained in popularity as of recently, constitute no viable basis for plausible claims to being truly conservative. Rather than specifying what it takes to be a true conservative, these accounts provide a formalized description of one kind of contingent circumstances that may lead a principled non-conservative to adopt conservative political attitudes.

Abstract
On reflecting about the prospects of advancing the egalitarian cause in the United States, John Roemer makes the case for more traditional strategies than the coupon socialism model he advocated in earlier work. First of all, he suggests, an ethos of solidarity must be developed and the super-rich be subjected to higher taxation. This comment assesses this proposal. On the one hand it is discussed whether the ethos of solidarity Roemer calls for in order to counteract the culture of greed among American elites requires nurturing an undesirable culture of envy among the rest of the population. On the other hand it is considered whether the neoclassical principal-agent model - that Roemer believes must be contested in order to popularize a steep progressive income tax - might be one of the more promising tools to restructure the incentives of economic elites and curb casino capitalism.