Suchergebnisse

The variables explaining party system fragmentation have been investigated extensively, but little is known about changes in the number of parties over time within countries. This article is an attempt to fill the gap by explaining the entry of new viable competitors in party systems after the founding election. Using empirical evidence from Spain, we show that when there is an electoral market failure and a high number of perfectly elastic voters, there is a high probability of new viable entrants. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

In this paper we study a coordination dilemma that appears in democracies where the Upper and Lower Houses are elected simultaneously using significantly different rules. How do party systems form when some parties are only viable in some districts of one of the chambers? Are party systems independent from one another, as Duvergerian theories expect, or dependent, as the literature on the interactive features of mixed electoral systems predict? Using the case of Spain, where all the possible incentive structures for electoral coordination are present, we test both theories. Our results point out that contamination effects matter, but they are not strong enough to make Duvergerian gravity disappear. Both effects are at play in Spanish elections. [Copyright 2006 Elsevier Ltd.]

In this article the campaigns effects in 1993 & 2000 elections in Spain are studied from a methodology based on a counterfactual simulation. Concretely, we wonder how the electoral results would have been without campaigns. Our empirical evidence suggests that campaigns play an important role in the activation as well as the conversion of voters. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.