Suchergebnisse

European Union (EU) Horizon 2020 program, action ERC-2014-STG, Project HUCO, grant number 636746

Parce que les revues préfèrent des résultats clairs, les chercheurs peuvent être tentés de s'engager dans des pratiques non éthiques, allant de la collecte de données supplémentaires pour atteindre un seuil de significativité jusqu'à la création de fausses données. Pour redresser les incitations des chercheurs, nous proposons un mécanisme par lequel les soumissions sont proposées sous enveloppe scellée. Les évaluations des éditeurs et des rapporteurs ne sont fondées que sur l'intérêt de la question de recherche et la méthode empirique proposée. Nous soutenons que les chercheurs honnêtes ne seront pas lésés par ce mécanisme, mais seront plutôt aidés par une meilleure protection. JEL Codes: A19, B49

This paper summarizes the results from public goods experiments investigating the effect of nonbinding agreements on cooperation. Unlike previous studies, this experimental study was conducted among members of forest user groups in Ethiopia and Nepal with long histories of social interdependence. These countries are also characterized by a high degree of collectivism. Overall, the results show a weak effect of nonbinding agreements on cooperation in the two locations. The main reason for this is that the cooperation level is relatively high even without an agreement and only a small proportion of subjects change their behavior when the agreement option is introduced. Nonetheless, the research indicates that the willingness to enter an agreement varies between subjects and strongly correlates with their cooperativeness.

AbstractReal-life risk decisions are taken in a social context. However, we still know little about how that affects risk decisions. We have experimentally investigated the effect of social comparison on risk taking. We designed an experiment that allows us to isolate social comparison from other channels whereby the social context can affect risk decisions. The design also allows us to find impacts of the social reference point both if the individual cares about the distance to the social reference point and if she cares about her rank. Thus, we compare risk-taking in isolation to risk-taking with various exogenously imposed social reference points. We find that risk-taking is affected by the desire to get ahead of others, both when the social reference point is within reach (rank can be affected) and when it is out of reach (rank cannot be affected). Our results suggest that people do not only care about rank but also care about the distance to the social reference point.