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The most recent explanations for the existence of committee systems in legislative chambers have posited that committees are the agents of one of three very different principal actors: (1) individual members (distributive theory), (2) the full chamber (informational theory), or (3) the major political party (partisan theory). In addition to defining and operationalizing the concept of institutional committee system autonomy, I put forth and test several hypotheses linking these three explanations to committee system autonomy. In the end, the results show empirical support for the informational theory over the distributive and partisan theories.

AbstractWhat is the role of political parties in the development of legislative institutions? Recent studies have explored the expansion and contraction of minority party procedural rights in the United States Congress (Binder 1997; Dion 1997), but these studies reach contradictory conclusions. Binder, emphasizing reciprocity norms, argues that minority party procedural rights expand as the majority party loses strength, while Dion, emphasizing the notion that small majorities are cohesive, asserts that these rights contract under these conditions. I apply Binder's and Dion's arguments to state legislative lower houses and test them with a dataset of 336 state legislative sessions in 23 states. The relevant variation among state legislatures provides the leverage necessary to understand better the relationship between partisan politics and legislative rule adoption more generally. I conclude that in state legislatures, minority party procedural rights expand as the minority party shrinks in size.

What is the role of political parties in the development of legislative institutions? Recent studies have explored the expansion & contraction of minority party procedural rights in the US Congress (Binder 1997; Dion 1997), but these studies reach contradictory conclusions. Binder, emphasizing reciprocity norms, argues that minority party procedural rights expand as the majority party loses strength; while Dion, emphasizing the notion that small majorities are cohesive, asserts that these rights contract under these conditions. I apply Binder's & Dion's arguments to state legislative lower houses & test them with a dataset of 336 state legislative sessions in 23 states. The relevant variation among state legislatures provides the leverage necessary to understand better the relationship between partisan politics & legislative rule adoption more generally. I conclude that in state legislatures, minority party procedural rights expand as the minority party shrinks in size. 1 Table, 2 Appendixes, 42 References. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractCommittees became a vital component of the decisionmaking process in most legislative bodies around the world during the 20th century. However, very little is known about how their status evolved. In particular, the complexity of, and variation among, committee systems have made it difficult for researchers to assess fully their role in lawmaking. We present a way to measure the structural nature of committee power in state legislatures in the United States, providing data rating 33 upper and lower chambers on six dimensions of committee power based on various legislative documents for 10 legislative sessions during the 20th century. Our method of measurement and these data should help researchers to better understand the evolution of legislative committee systems.

Committees became a vital component of the decisionmaking process in most legislative bodies around the world during the 20th century. However, very little is known about how their status evolved. In particular, the complexity of, & variation among, committee systems have made it difficult for researchers to assess fully their role in lawmaking. We present a way to measure the structural nature of committee power in state legislatures in the United States, providing data rating 33 upper & lower chambers on six dimensions of committee power based on various legislative documents for 10 legislative sessions during the 20th century. Our method of measurement & these data should help researchers to better understand the evolution of legislative committee systems. Tables, Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.

The rediscovery of rules & procedures as an important element for understanding legislative decision making has become very apparent in recent summaries of research on Congress & European Parliaments. Institutional factors are now seen as critical factors that structure & restrict how individual legislators can go about their decision-making responsibilities. The goal of this article is to provide a landscape of the evolution of committee system structure in US state legislatures so that future research will be able to test current theories of institutional change. The major conclusion of this research is that US state legislatures have formalized the structure of their committee systems over the course of the twentieth century & that many similarities & few differences exist in committee system structure between US state legislative upper & lower chambers. Further, this article discovers that four distinct dimensions -- property rights, codification of basic structure, internal democracy & minority party rights -- of committee system structures exist in US state legislative chambers. 1 Table, 6 Figures, 1 Appendix. Adapted from the source document.

One aspect of the partisan model for legislative committee development that is rarely studied is the degree to which the majority party seeks to control legislative committees—and, thereby, chamber decisions—via numerically "overproportional" majority party representation on standing committees. This form of "party stacking" is often mentioned in the literature but has received little systematic examination and hypothesis testing. Using data from state legislative committees for all 49 partisan legislatures in the 2003–04 and 2005–06 sessions, we found support for the partisan model: majority party stacking is associated with a slim majority party advantage in a state legislative chamber.