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This groundbreaking book is the first to look at administration and administrative law in the earliest days of the American republic. Contrary to conventional understandings, Mashaw demonstrates that from the very beginning Congress delegated vast discretion to administrative officials and armed them with extrajudicial adjudicatory, rulemaking, and enforcement authority. The legislative and administrative practices of the U.S. Constitution's first century created an administrative constitution hardly hinted at in its formal text. Beyond describing a history that has previously gone largely unexamined, this book, in the author's words, will "demonstrate that there has been no precipitous fall from a historical position of separation-of-powers grace to a position of compromise; there is not a new administrative constitution whose legitimacy should be understood as not only contestable but deeply problematic."

Public choice theory should be taken seriously-but not too seriously. In this thought-provoking book, Jerry Mashaw stakes out a middle ground between those who champion public choice theory (the application of the conventional methodology of economics to political science matters, also known as rational choice theory) and those who disparage it. He argues that in many cases public choice theory's reach has exceeded its grasp. In others, public choice insights have not been pursued far enough by those who are concerned with the operation and improvement of legal institutions.While Mashaw addresses perennial questions of constitutional law, legislative interpretation, administrative law, and the design of public institutions, he arrives at innovative conclusions. Countering the positions of key public choice theorists, Mashaw finds public choice approaches virtually useless as an aid to the interpretation of statutes, and he finds public choice arguments against delegating political decisions to administrators incoherent. But, using the tools of public choice analysts, he reverses the lawyers' conventional wisdom by arguing that substantive rationality review is not only legitimate but a lesser invasion of legislative prerogatives than much judicial interpretation of statutes. And, criticizing three decades of "law reform," Mashaw contends that pre-enforcement judicial review of agency rules has seriously undermined both governmental capacity and the rule of law

Public choice theory should be taken seriously - but not too seriously. In this thought-provoking book, Jerry Mashaw stakes out a middle ground between those who champion public choice theory (the application of the conventional methodology of economics to political science matters, also known as rational choice theory) and those who disparage it. He argues that in many cases public choice theory's reach has exceeded its grasp. In others, public choice insights have not been pursued far enough by those who are concerned with the operation and improvement of legal institutions.

L'émergence des véhicules autonomes (VA) et des véhicules hautement autonomes (VHA) pose de nombreux défis aux régulateurs fédéraux, étatiques et locaux aux États-Unis. Elle entraîne des développements véritablement perturbateurs qui laissent présager des gains sociaux élevés en regard de coûts sociaux incertains. Les défis analysés menacent également de brouiller les attributions historiques des autorités de régulation et de rendre les techniques de régulation traditionnelles anachroniques et dysfonctionnelles. Cet article cartographie le paysage des défis régulatoires présentés par ces nouvelles générations de véhicules et fournit une évaluation préliminaire de la voie à suivre.

The George W. Bush administration was more aggressive than most in asserting independent executive competence pursuant to the president's joint roles as commander in chief of the armed forces and as head of the executive branch. One of its legacies is that the rule of law is an unsettled matter, both intellectually and practically. While constitutional reform to provide a framework for law‐based governance under emergency conditions may be required, it is unlikely to occur. Analysis should consider how to improve the design and operation of microstructures within the executive branch. This article surveys options for instituting design changes but concludes that no such option is compelling, given the requirements of good lawyering about contentious issues within the executive branch. It recommends systematic deliberation about "best practices" in executive branch lawyering—with the ambition of articulating a practical theory on the due processes of governance that encompasses the special circumstances of emergency conditions.