Response to Noam Lupu's review of The Inevitable Party: Why Attempts to Kill the Party System Fail and How They Weaken Democracy
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 15, Heft 3, S. 837-838
ISSN: 1541-0986
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In: Perspectives on politics, Band 15, Heft 3, S. 837-838
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 15, Heft 3, S. 838-839
ISSN: 1541-0986
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Working paper
In: State politics & policy quarterly: the official journal of the State Politics and Policy section of the American Political Science Association, Band 11, Heft 2, S. 123-147
ISSN: 1946-1607
AbstractContrary to media reports, California's 2003 recall election was anything but a circus. Despite the presence of 135 candidates, just 3 managed to split 94% of the vote, and the winner came close to achieving a majority. In this article, the author uses elite interviews and a social network analysis of campaign donations to study how the Republican Party sought to impose order on the potentially chaotic political environment. The author finds that a network of Republican donors, activists, and officeholders coordinated their efforts to advantage Arnold Schwarzenegger and pressure other Republicans out of the race.
In: The Forum: a journal of applied research in contemporary politics, Band 8, Heft 3
ISSN: 1540-8884
Relative to other social scientists, political scientists seem disengaged from the political world outside the academy. In this article, I suggest that this is regrettable, arguing that such service is beneficial both for scholarship and for society at large. I examine two such forms of outside service: writing for a blog and working in a political party. I examine the potential pitfalls and benefits from such service.
In: Forum: A Journal of Applied Research in Contemporary Politics, Band 8, Heft 3
Relative to other social scientists, political scientists seem disengaged from the political world outside the academy. In this article, I suggest that this is regrettable, arguing that such service is beneficial both for scholarship and for society at large. I examine two such forms of outside service: writing for a blog and working in a political party. I examine the potential pitfalls and benefits from such service. Adapted from the source document.
In: American Journal of Political Science, Band 51, Heft 3, S. 482-497
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In: The public opinion quarterly: POQ, Band 73, Heft 5, S. 1023-1039
ISSN: 1537-5331
In: Quarterly journal of political science: QJPS, Band 3, Heft 3, S. 301-311
ISSN: 1554-0634
In: Quarterly journal of political science, Band 3, Heft 3, S. 301-311
ISSN: 1554-0626
This article builds on Matthews and Stimsons (1975) study of legislative cue taking, analyzing the extent to which legislators sitting next to each other influence each others voting behavior. Data come from three decades of roll call votes in the California Assembly, a chamber in which each member is paired with a deskmate. By comparing deskmate pairs with nondeskmate pairs, I find that legislators vote identically to their deskmates on a sizeable subset of roll calls. This deskmate effect appears to remain strong even as a rival influence, legislative partisanship, increases in strength. Adapted from the source document.
In: Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Band 3, S. 301-311
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In: American journal of political science, Band 51, Heft 3, S. 482-497
ISSN: 1540-5907
Why are American politicians "single‐minded seekers of reelection" in some decades and fierce ideological warriors in others? This article argues that the key to understanding the behavior of members inside a legislative chamber is to follow the actions of key figures outside the chamber. These outsiders—activists, interest groups, and party bosses—use their control over party nominations, conditioned on institutional rules, to ensure ideological behavior among officeholders. To understand how vital these outsiders are to legislative partisanship, this article takes advantage of a particular natural experiment: the state of California's experience with cross‐filing (1914–59), under which institutional rules prevented outsiders from influencing party nominations. Under cross‐filing, legislative partisanship collapsed, demonstrating that incumbents tend to prefer nonpartisanship or fake partisanship to actual ideological combat. Partisanship quickly returned once these outsiders could again dominate nominations. Several other historical examples reveal extralegislative actors exerting considerably greater influence over members' voting behavior than intralegislative party institutions did. These results suggest that candidates and legislators are the agents of activists and others who coordinate at the community level to control party nominations.
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 51, Heft 3, S. 482-497
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: State Politics & Policy Quarterly (Forthcoming)
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In: APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper
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Working paper