Suchergebnisse

A study of the history of Japanese involvement and investment in Europe from the early part of this century to the present day. The main focus of the analysis centres on the auto industry consumer electronics and banking, whilst the different reactions to Japanese investment in Europe and the United States is also considered.

Preliminary Material -- Introduction -- The Outer Gates, Origins to 1899 -- The Door Ajar, 1899–1930 -- The Sliding Door, 1930–1940 -- The Closed Door, 1940–1950 -- The Screen Door, 1950–1970 -- The Inner Door, 1970–1980 -- Conclusions -- The United States-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911 (excerpts) -- The Automobile Manufacturing Industry Law of 1936 (excerpts) -- The United States-Japanese Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1953 (excerpts) -- The Foreign Investment Law of 1950 (excerpts) -- The Capital Liberalization Program -- The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law of 1980 (excerpts) -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- Harvard East Asian Monographs.

Sample-Größen sind in qualitativen Forschungsarbeiten von verschiedenen Einflüssen abhängig. Das Leitprinzip sollte jedoch immer die Sättigung, bezogen auf das jeweilige Forschungsthema sein. Diese Frage, mit der sich viele Autor/innen beschäftigt haben, wird weiter heiß diskutiert und – so einige – kaum hinreichend verstanden.
Für eine eigene Untersuchung habe ich ein Sample von PhD-Studien, in denen qualitative Interviews als Erhebungsmethode genutzt wurde, aus theses.com gezogen und mit Blick auf die genutzten Sample-Größen inhaltsanalytisch ausgewertet. Insgesamt wurden 560 Studien als der Stichprobe zugehörig identifiziert. Die Ergebnisse zeigen eine mittlere Sample-Größe von 31 Interviews mit einem signifikanten Anteil von Studien mit zehn Interviews oder einer Vielfachen von zehn. Diese Ergebnisse werden mit Blick auf die Frage der Sättigung diskutiert. So scheinen für die Sample-Größen eher forschungsexterne Gründe als Prinzipien qualitativer Forschung leitend zu sein.

AbstractThe dramatic overseas expansion of Japanese banks during the 1980s provoked major policy debates within the European Community. Fears that Japanese firms in the banking industry might replicate earlier successes in other industries, together with charges that Japan did not grant reciprocal access to European banks, raised important questions for EC member states committed to the implementation of common banking policies. Adoption of the crucially important Second Banking Coordination Directive and other public measures enabled the Community flexibly to impose strong controls on Japanese banks in the region. The nature of these public measures toward Japanese firms in the Community's banking industry, together with related EC policies toward local Japanese competition in other industries, suggested the emergence of a more general EC policy model for confronting the vaunted 'Japanese challenge.'

Major policy debates in the European Community (EC) followed the dramatic overseas expansion of Japanese banks during the 1980s. Adoption of the Second Banking Coordination directive & other public measures gave the EC the flexibly to impose strong controls on Japanese banks in the region. The nature of these public measures toward Japanese firms in the EC's banking industry, together with related EC policies toward local Japanese competition in other industries, suggest the emergence of a more general EC policy model for confronting the vaunted "Japanese challenge.". 3 Tables, 72 References. Adapted from the source document.

The end of the last millennium was marked by rapid technological advances and deep changes in many aspects of human activity, often taken together as indicative of a shift into a 'knowledge era'. Such changes have stimulated much discussion about the role and processes of education, and about the role of information and communication technology (ICT) in teaching and learning in this new era. Many policy documents relating to these themes have been published by international and regional organizations such as the European Commission, the European Roundtable of Industrialists, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), UNESCO and the World Bank. Numerous blueprints on education reform and on ICT in education have also been set out by various governments since the mid-1990s. These policy initiatives brought with them a variety of strategic implementation priorities that differ from country to country, depending on the socio-economic and political context. Such educational strategies may involve, amongst others, changes in curriculum and/or assessment at the system level, provision for ICT infrastructure, teacher professional development, and/or technical and pedagogical support for teachers. Given the deep technological, economic and policy changes that have taken place over the last decade, are there indications that pedagogical practices are changing as well? What impact is the pedagogical use of ICT making in schools around the world? What is the impact of the implementation of these policies on pedagogy and ICT use in classrooms? These are the questions that this book addresses through an analysis of the findings from SITES 2006, an international comparative study of pedagogy and ICT use conducted under the auspices of the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA).

This article discusses some of the pragmatics and politics of academic journal publishing within the context of the contemporary higher education and publishing political economy. The case of the International Journal of Educational Development(IJED) is considered, and some implications drawn for the Southern African Review of Education (SARE), given that the latter shares a focus on educational development with the former. The authors, who are editors and board members of both journals, conclude that SARE would probably benefit in many ways by seekinga partnership, such as IJED has, with an established and highly regarded international academic publishing house.

Compared with Japan, no other industrialized country has so adamantly denied foreign investors direct access to its domestic markets. Japan continued to deny such market access until domestic constituencies finally championed foreign demands and successfully pressured a reluctant state for concessions. The initiative for these concessions came neither from Japan's principal government negotiators in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) nor from public policymakers in America. Rather, it came from American and other multinational corporations (MNCs) seeking to exploit imperfect markets for the technology and related assets which they alone controlled and which a few Japanese oligopolists demanded. These local oligopolists served as manipulative intermediaries between MNCs and the nationstate and in that position determined both the timing and the substance of their country's long march toward capital liberalization. Between the legislation of capital controls in 1950 and the de jure elimination of those controls in 1980, what began as an extension of limited concessions to individual MNCs, eventually aided by small regulatory loopholes, gradually encompassed all foreigners supplying broad product groups. During the intervening thirty years, the MNCs examined in this article— including Coca-Cola, IBM, Texas Instruments, and the "big three" U.S. automakers —finally gained limited access to the Japanese market. For them, the formal liberalizations of the late 1960s and early 1970s proved significant, but not always decisive, as Japanese oligopolists moved both to replace public regulations with private restrictions and to mesh their ongoing political influence domestically with their emerging economic power internationally. Thus, de facto liberalization proceeded slowly and unevenly, at least through 1980, and foreign direct investment in Japan continued to languish. What capital liberalization did occur had little to do with the pressures exerted on MITI and the Japanese state by the U.S. government and the international organizations that America then controlled. Rather, American diplomacy proved successful in forcing concessions from Japan only when it was backed up both by the economic power of American MNCs and by the active support of Japanese business.