Suchergebnisse

This book examines the development of identity politics amongst the Alevis in Europe and Turkey, which simultaneously provided the movement access to different resources and challenged its unity of action. While some argue that Aleviness is a religious phenomenon, and others claim it is a cultural or a political trend, this book analyzes the various strategies of claim-making and reconstructions of Aleviness as well as responses to the movement by various Turkish and German actors. Drawing on intensive fieldwork, Elise Massicard suggests that because of activists' many different definitions of.

Article du numéro 52 (octobre-décembre 2021) de Moyen-Orient ; International audience ; Les élections municipales du 31 mars 2019 en Turquie, avec notamment la « bataille d'Istanbul », ont remis sur le devant de la scène l'importance politique du local dans un pays pourtant centralisé. S'accumulaient depuis quelques années des signes forts de fermeture : répression suivant la tentative de putsch de juillet 2016, état d'urgence entre l'été 2016 et l'été 2018, changement de Constitution en avril 2017 instaurant un régime présidentiel… Ces signaux indiquent une concentration des pouvoirs sans précédent dans les mains de l'exécutif, ainsi que l'érosion des contre-pouvoirs. Dès lors, existe-t-il encore des espaces où peuvent se structurer de potentielles oppositions ?

Article du numéro 52 (octobre-décembre 2021) de Moyen-Orient ; International audience ; Les élections municipales du 31 mars 2019 en Turquie, avec notamment la « bataille d'Istanbul », ont remis sur le devant de la scène l'importance politique du local dans un pays pourtant centralisé. S'accumulaient depuis quelques années des signes forts de fermeture : répression suivant la tentative de putsch de juillet 2016, état d'urgence entre l'été 2016 et l'été 2018, changement de Constitution en avril 2017 instaurant un régime présidentiel… Ces signaux indiquent une concentration des pouvoirs sans précédent dans les mains de l'exécutif, ainsi que l'érosion des contre-pouvoirs. Dès lors, existe-t-il encore des espaces où peuvent se structurer de potentielles oppositions ?

La République de Turquie présente des modes de gouvernement du religieux spécifique. Le principe constitutionnel de laïcité équivaut à un contrôle par l'État du religieux. Une forme d'islam quasi-officiel est promue par les institutions publiques, prétendant monopoliser le champ religieux, aux détriments d'autres options religieuses. Cependant, ce dispositif n'est jamais parvenu à neutraliser le potentiel politique de la religion. La politisation des questions religieuses, en fait l'un des principaux objets de débat et de lutte politique. L'arrivée au pouvoir de gouvernements dominés par des partis issus de l'islam politique a-t-elle modifié le gouvernement du religieux? Les promesses de libéralisation n'ont pas donné lieu à une plus grande neutralité de l'État par rapport aux interprétations religieuses, malgré les condamnations de la Turquie par la CEDH pour discrimination religieuse. En revanche, les gouvernements du Parti de la Justice et du Développement ont renforcé l'appareil religieux d'État et promu la visibilité de l'islam dans l'espace public. On assiste donc au renforcement des usages de la religion à des fins politiques.

In an increasingly authoritarian Turkish context that precludes any serious chance of making tangible political gains, challenging common conception of 'the political' may expand our understanding of power dynamics. Attempting to track power relations outside the most official, legitimate, conventional and formalised forms of politics provides alternative and sharper insights into how the political is being reframed and how actors retain, uphold, perpetuate or transform their capacity for agency. In an interdisciplinary perspective, but drawing mainly on anthropological literature and methodology, the issue addresses four questions – both empirically in the Turkish case and more conceptually: politicisation, visibility, social stratification and domination.

In an increasingly authoritarian Turkish context that precludes any serious chance of making tangible political gains, challenging common conception of 'the political' may expand our understanding of power dynamics. Attempting to track power relations outside the most official, legitimate, conventional and formalised forms of politics provides alternative and sharper insights into how the political is being reframed and how actors retain, uphold, perpetuate or transform their capacity for agency. In an interdisciplinary perspective, but drawing mainly on anthropological literature and methodology, the issue addresses four questions – both empirically in the Turkish case and more conceptually: politicisation, visibility, social stratification and domination.

The Justice and Development Party (JDP) has been in power in Turkey since 2002, consolidating its electoral support among an array of social groups ranging from broad appeal among the popular classes to business leaders and a growing middle class. The success of the JDP is a consequence of the manner in which the party inserted itself into certain economic and social sectors. While the party has internalized the principles of reducing the public sphere and outsourcing to the private sector, it has not restricted the reach of government intervention. On the contrary, it has become increasingly involved in certain sectors, including social policy and housing. It has managed this through an indirect approach that relies on intermediaries and private allies such as the businesses and associations that is has encouraged. In this way, the JDP has developed and systematized modes of redistribution that involve the participation of conservative businessmen who benefit from their proximity to the decision-makers, charitable organizations, and underprivileged social groups. These public policies have reconfigured different social sectors in a way that has strengthened the Party's influence.

The Justice and Development Party (JDP) has been in power in Turkey since 2002, consolidating its electoral support among an array of social groups ranging from broad appeal among the popular classes to business leaders and a growing middle class. The success of the JDP is a consequence of the manner in which the party inserted itself into certain economic and social sectors. While the party has internalized the principles of reducing the public sphere and outsourcing to the private sector, it has not restricted the reach of government intervention. On the contrary, it has become increasingly involved in certain sectors, including social policy and housing. It has managed this through an indirect approach that relies on intermediaries and private allies such as the businesses and associations that is has encouraged. In this way, the JDP has developed and systematized modes of redistribution that involve the participation of conservative businessmen who benefit from their proximity to the decision-makers, charitable organizations, and underprivileged social groups. These public policies have reconfigured different social sectors in a way that has strengthened the Party's influence.

The Justice and Development Party (JDP) has been in power in Turkey since 2002, consolidating its electoral support among an array of social groups ranging from broad appeal among the popular classes to business leaders and a growing middle class. The success of the JDP is a consequence of the manner in which the party inserted itself into certain economic and social sectors. While the party has internalized the principles of reducing the public sphere and outsourcing to the private sector, it has not restricted the reach of government intervention. On the contrary, it has become increasingly involved in certain sectors, including social policy and housing. It has managed this through an indirect approach that relies on intermediaries and private allies such as the businesses and associations that is has encouraged. In this way, the JDP has developed and systematized modes of redistribution that involve the participation of conservative businessmen who benefit from their proximity to the decision-makers, charitable organizations, and underprivileged social groups. These public policies have reconfigured different social sectors in a way that has strengthened the Party's influence.

Les élections locales du 30 mars 2014 ont été largement considérées comme un scrutin national. En effet, d'importants enjeux nationaux y ont été projetés à la fois par la majorité des observateurs et par de nombreux acteurs politiques : il s'agissait de la première consultation électorale depuis trois ans – ce qui constitue une longue période sans scrutin pour la temporalité politique turque. Surtout, il s'agissait de la première consultation électorale depuis deux épisodes politiques majeurs qui ont fortement ébranlé la popularité de l'AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, Parti de la Justice et du Développement) au pouvoir depuis 2002 : d'une part, la contestation de Gezi née au printemps 2013 ; d'autre part, les scandales de corruption rythmés par « fuites » régulières d'enregistrements sonores à partir de décembre 2013 sur les réseaux sociaux, compromettants pour le Premier ministre Recep Tayyip Erdoğan et son entourage, les accusant de corruption, de marchés publics truqués, de pressions exercées sur la justice ou sur les médias.

The local elections of March 30, 2014 were widely regarded as a national ballot. Indeed, major national issues were projected are both by the majority of observers and by numerous politicians: he was the first electoral consultation for three years - which is a long period without a vote for Turkish political temporality. Mostly it was the first electoral consultation for two major political episodes that have greatly undermined the popularity of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, Party of Justice and Development) party since 2002: first, contesting Gezi born in spring 2013; on the other, the corruption scandals rhythms by 'leaks' regular sound recordings from December 2013 on social networks, compromising for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his entourage, accusing them of corruption, public procurement rigged to exercised pressure on the judiciary or the media. These 'leaks' have sealed the end of the alliance between the ruling party and the neo-Fethullah Gulen brotherhood movement that had until then seconded and showed a significant presence in the judiciary, police and education. These two episodes have hit the headlines and widely influenced the readings of the Turkish political life; however, their impact in electoral terms was very difficult to evaluate. Adapted from the source document.

The judicialization of the Alevi issue in three judicial spaces - Turkey, Germany where numerous Alevis have settled, and the ECHR - shows that there is no judicial globalization, defined as a standardization of doctrines, case law, and networks of actors on an international scale. In each context, courts are mobilized by various actors and for different reasons, and lead to various decisions. However, there are circulations and a complex play of cross references between those levels. This, in turn, impacts the way state-religion relationships are negotiated: the normative framework and case law linked to the transnational field of human rights but also to rights obtained in other national contexts provide opportunities for demands by religious minorities, while also shaping the way they can be claimed for in the judicial field. Adapted from the source document.