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AbstractCanada has taken part in six wars since 1945, all of which have been conducted under US leadership. Despite such military interventionism, there have been no systematic comparative analyses of Canada's decisions to take part in US-led wars. The objective of this article is to develop and test a theoretical framework about why Canada goes to war. More specifically, it seeks to account for variations in Canada's provision of combat forces to multinational interventions led by the United States. It assesses leading theoretical explanations by examining five post–Cold War cases: the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya; the war against ISIS; and the refusal to take part in the invasion of Iraq. The article concludes that Canada's willingness to go to war is shaped primarily by a desire to maintain transatlantic alliance unity and enhance Canada's alliance credibility. Threats to national security, the legitimacy of the intervention, government ideology and public opinion are not found to consistently or meaningfully shape Canadian decisions to take part in US-led wars.

This article provides a comprehensive assessment of Canada's prolonged and sizable military engagement in the war in Afghanistan in light of confounding expectations set by realism. It argues, from the perspective of neoclassical realism, that United States unipolarity, domestic elite consensus on an Atlanticist security policy, and executive autonomy vis-à-vis public dissent best account for Canada's evolving Afghanistan policy. These necessary conditions can be generalized to apply to past and future allied coalitions of the willing to help make sense of Canada's alliance burden-sharing.

Résumé.Cet article propose, grâce à la notion de culture stratégique, une articulation du lien entre identité et politique étrangère. Il met plus particulièrement l'accent sur les effets des identités ethnoculturelles (anglophone et francophone) sur la politique de sécurité internationale du Canada, et soutient l'hypothèse qu'il en résulte une culture stratégique atlantiste et biculturelle, laquelle accorde une importance particulière à la France (de même qu'à la Grande-Bretagne et aux États-Unis). Il ressort de l'analyse historique de celle-ci que la centralité des identités ethnoculturelles canadiennes permet de mieux comprendre l'importance particulière dont jouit la France sur les limites normatives du multilatéralisme et de la légitimité de recourir à la force militaire par le Canada.Abstract.This article seeks to provide a constructivist account of Canadian foreign policy, linking identity and policy, through the concept of strategic culture. It focuses on Canada's dual ethnocultural identities (Anglophone and Francophone) and the bicultural and Atlanticist strategic culture that stems from it. It argues that this strategic culture helps explain France's significant importance (together with the United Kingdom and the United States) in defining the normative boundaries of Canada's multilateralism and legitimacy to use of military force abroad.

This article seeks to provide a constructivist account of Canadian foreign policy, linking identity and policy, through the concept of strategic culture. It focuses on Canada's dual ethnocultural identities (Anglophone and Francophone) and the bicultural and Atlanticist strategic culture that stems from it. It argues that this strategic culture helps explain France's significant importance (together with the United Kingdom and the United States) in defining the normative boundaries of Canada's multilateralism and legitimacy to use of military force abroad. Adapted from the source document.

Le Canada a appuyé chacune des initiatives majeures de l'otandepuis sa création. La transformation actuelle de l'Alliance, dont la réintégration de la France dans ses structures, devrait donc avoir une incidence sur l'avenir de la politique de sécurité internationale du Canada. Afin d'en évaluer la teneur, l'article souligne la convergence récente des politiques atlantistes du Canada et de la France, qu'il qualifie de stratégies d'équilibrage institutionnel inclusif. Devant le dilemme entre uneotanexpéditionnaire globale et une alliance défensive et européenne, l'article conclut que le Canada peut dépasser la prétendue dichotomie de ses choix en mettant en avant une politique axée sur l'appropriation nationale et régionale de la résolution des conflits.