Suchergebnisse

A dispute resolution mechanism called Adjusted Winner (AW), developed by Brams and Taylor, is used to propose a plausible solution to the final status issues between Israel and the Palestinians. Unlike conventional negotiating procedures, AW possesses desirable qualities including equitability, efficiency, and envy freeness. Based on data from an original survey, results show that when the issues of security and borders are kept separate, Israel is likely to have its demands met on the issues of security, East Jerusalem, normalization of relations, and water. The Palestinians will win on the issues of sovereignty, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, Israeli settlements in Gaza, and Palestinian refugees. Both sides will need to compromise on the issue of boundaries. If security and borders are lumped together as one issue, Israel and the Palestinians will share on the issue of East Jerusalem.

Empirical analysis of behaviour of countries during 20 interstate wars. Initiator of events and winner, concession rate, and war as an effective tool of foreign policy.

War termination, a critical aspect of war, is central to understanding the war process as a whole. Yet, this field of study, which is concerned with how wars can be brought to an end once they have started, remains neglected. Research on this topic, much of which dates back to the 1960s, has included diverse theoretical approaches - from the general to specific. The general approach addresses the forms and consequences of war outcomes, whereas the specific approach is more concerned with particular variables that explain why wars end. This article examines the contributions researchers have made to this field and structures a discussion around three critical, common factors: military dimension; costs; and terms of settlement. The findings show that although there exists no one theory or consensus on why and when wars end, researchers have successfully identified a group of causes. However, the significance of each cause is likely to vary depending on the specific conditions of each war. The article concludes by calling for more research on this topic in the areas of description, explanation, and testing of hypotheses.

This paper examines how protests spread across countries in the 2011 Arab Spring. Based on the diffusion literature, we form hypotheses about the factors that influence the transmission of protests across borders. To test the hypotheses, we use an events data set measuring media reports of protests, government reforms, and acts of repression on a daily basis by country. We show that the strength of the protest movement in one country is significantly affected by protest activities in other countries over the previous 1 or 2 weeks and that protests were more likely to spread between countries that had high levels of bilateral trade. When we examine periods longer than 2 weeks, we find that protests spread across borders only when they were successful in pressuring Arab governments into enacting reforms and when the protests did not lead to government reprisals. In all our models, government repression in one country significantly stifled protests in other countries. Each country was thus significantly affected by the choices that governments in other Arab League nations made, and this interdependence meant that governments had incentives to cooperate with each other in their responses to the Arab Spring protests.

This article examines the relationship between economic openness and internal conflict. The article first discusses different theoretical perspectives on how openness affects a country's internal stability and how internal conflict affects openness. Next, empirical estimates of the relationship between conflict and openness are presented, where conflict is measured with both a civil war dummy variable and an events dataset. The correlation between openness and conflict in the data is negative: more open countries have less internal conflict by some measures. However, internal conflict affects the level of openness, which suggests that openness should be treated as an endogenous variable. When the effect of openness on conflict is estimated using instrumental variables or full information maximum likelihood to control for endogeneity, openness does not significantly reduce internal conflict. There is robust evidence, on the other hand, that conflict within a country reduces its international trade. Together, these results suggest that the negative correlation between openness and conflict emerges because stability facilitates international trade rather than because trade flows reduce internal conflict.