Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- Identity politics and social movements -- Background : muslim political mobilizations in britain -- The anti- war movement : new alliances, old challenges? -- Opposing movements : contesting muslim identity in the guardian comment is free -- Talking back to the gendered war on terror -- Towards an oppositional consciousness? -- Conclusion

Research on social movements shows a bias towards movements that oppose the status quo. Consequently, state–movement relations are primarily characterised as antagonistic. Where cooperative relationships are considered, the focus is on co-option and institutionalisation of movements. By contrast, this article focuses on social movements that support the status quo and how in their collaborations with governmental actors, they act as para-statal agencies. Drawing on findings from a multi-site ethnography examining the implementation of the UK Prevent counter-terrorism programme, I show how neoconservative think tanks and counter-extremism civil society organisations help to enact and extend Prevent as a distinct form of political repression. As such, this article gives close attention to the otherwise neglected role that non-state actors play in non-violent political repression. My argument builds on and extends emerging work analysing social movement activity beyond the prism of the 'challengers versus authorities' paradigm.

This article develops a submerged aspect of James C Scott's work on 'hidden transcripts'. Whereas Scott focused predominantly on the hidden transcripts of the powerless, here we propose a research agenda based upon studying hidden transcripts of the powerful. First, we define our terms. Second, we map existing literature, observing that although plenty of research exists into the public transcripts of dominant and subordinate groups, and that Scott initiated a productive research agenda into the hidden transcripts of powerless groups, research into hidden transcripts of powerful actors is lacking. We identify an assumption within this literature that because existing social institutions are already structured in such a way as to reflect and advance the interests of dominant groups, there is no need for separate spaces to foster the consciousness, cohesivness, and mobilisation of the powerful. Third, we ask how social scientists might study the hidden transcripts of the powerful, and what methodological challenges and opportunities such a research programme might present, identifying in particular the promising avenue of studying what we have chosen to call 'transcripts hidden in plain sight'. Fourth, and finally, we question the epistemological status of these hidden transcripts, focusing on whether they can be used by social researchers as a reliable indicator of the 'true' consciousness of the social group that expresses them.

This article calls for more understanding of the ethical challenges and dilemmas that arise as a result of state involvement in academic research on 'terrorism' and 'extremism'. It suggests that researchers and research institutions need to be more attentive to the possibilities of co-option, compromise, conflict of interests and other ethical issues. The paper empirically examines the relationship between academic researchers and the security state. It highlights three key ways in which ethical and professional standards in social scientific research can be compromised: (1) Interference with the evidence base (through a lack of transparency on data and conflicts of interest); (2) Collaboration on research supporting deception by the state which undermines the ability of citizens to participate in democratic processes; and (3) Collaboration on research legitimating human rights abuses, and other coercive state practices. These issues are widespread, but neglected, across: literature on 'terrorism' and 'extremism'; literature on research ethics; and, in practical ethical safeguards and procedures within research institutions. In order to address these issues more effectively, we propose that any assessment of research ethics must consider the broader power relations that shape knowledge production as well as the societal impact of research. In focusing on the centrality of states – the most powerful actors in the field of 'terrorism' and 'extremism' – our approach moves beyond the rather narrow procedural approaches that currently predominate. We argue more attention to the power of the state in research ethics will not only help to make visible, and combat, ethically problematic issues, but will also help to protect the evidence base from contamination. We conclude by proposing a series of practical measures to address the problems highlighted.

In this article, we propose a sociological model for the assessment of ethics in research on conflict and terrorism. We move beyond the rather narrow, procedural approaches that currently dominate contemporary discussion, seeking to broaden ethical considerations to include questions of social power, academic freedom, and the politics of knowledge production, as well as a consideration of the public function of the university. We argue that social scientists have both a professional responsibility to protect the integrity of scientific knowledge, and public responsibilities to the wider societies of which they are part. Navigating ethical questions, we suggest, therefore requires a reflexive engagement with the social conditions of knowledge production; a careful consideration of the social impact of research; and a dialogue with a variety of 'publics', not merely policy actors. The main body of the paper reviews the range of writing on the ethics of 'terrorism studies', engages with the question of institutional oversight and then examines the ethics of the current 'impact agenda' in UK universities. We conclude by drawing on our empirical findings and applying them to our proposed model to argue for: a significant revision to ethical policies and guidelines (and better means of enforcement) so as to better protect vulnerable research subjects; offer greater protections to researchers from (especially) powerful interests which attempt to smear, constrain or undermine independent research; make unethical research (which we argue is widespread) more visible, with the intent that it be managed down.

The current focus in ethical discourse is mostly on protecting research subjects from potential harm arising directly from participation in research (Hammersley & Traianou, 2012). Researching conflict and 'terrorism' poses particular challenges around accessing research subjects and meeting standard requirements for informed consent. But there are also distinct and broader ethical questions that arise around potential harm to research subjects, and indeed to other actors, including researchers themselves. Fieldwork may pose considerable risks to researchers, both physical and psychological, whilst the politically sensitive nature of research may also carry reputational and professional risks. Harm to research subjects, meanwhile, may arise not only from the research process itself, but more broadly and more significantly from powerful actors – often parties to the conflicts under investigation – seeking to access, make use of, or influence/manipulate either research findings, or how research is received, understood and used. The former aspects bring particular challenges when it comes to confidentiality and the security of data, whilst the latter requires that the societal impact of research be carefully considered. In either case, an understanding of social power, and the power of the state in particular, is crucial. The power of corporations is, of course, also of relevance in such discussions (Alvesalo-Kuusi and Whyte, 2018), although it is not the focus of this article.

In this article, we propose a sociological model for the assessment of ethics in research on conflict and terrorism. We move beyond the rather narrow, procedural approaches that currently dominate contemporary discussion, seeking to broaden ethical considerations to include questions of social power, academic freedom, and the politics of knowledge production, as well as a consideration of the public function of the university. We argue that social scientists have both a professional responsibility to protect the integrity of scientific knowledge, and public responsibilities to the wider societies of which they are part. Navigating ethical questions, we suggest, therefore requires a reflexive engagement with the social conditions of knowledge production; a careful consideration of the social impact of research; and a dialogue with a variety of 'publics', not merely policy actors. The main body of the paper reviews the range of writing on the ethics of 'terrorism studies', engages with the question of institutional oversight and then examines the ethics of the current 'impact agenda' in UK universities. We conclude by drawing on our empirical findings and applying them to our proposed model to argue for: a significant revision to ethical policies and guidelines (and better means of enforcement) so as to better protect vulnerable research subjects; offer greater protections to researchers from (especially) powerful interests which attempt to smear, constrain or undermine independent research; make unethical research (which we argue is widespread) more visible, with the intent that it be managed down.

Britain's counter-terrorism policies do not work. They do not work for the British people, who wish to live free of terrorism. They do not work for the various communities in the UK whose experience of counter-terrorism has been one of stigmatisation and criminalisation. And they do not work for the people of the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, whose human rights have been systematically violated in the War on Terror. Just over two decades ago, the Irish and UK governments signed the Good Friday Agreement, the culmination of a negotiated peace process involving Republican and Loyalist armed groups in Northern Ireland. Principles of human rights, community consent and peace were key to achieving a dramatic reduction in lives lost to political violence. Indeed, by that measure, the Good Friday Agreement was the most successful instrument of counter-terrorism policy-making in recent history. But the lessons of this success were not registered. The year after the Agreement was signed, Tony Blair's government introduced the first of the fifteen new Terrorism Acts that have been passed since then in what has become a near-annual parliamentary ritual. Each Act ratcheted up the powers available to the police and intelligence agencies, creating a shadow criminal justice system in which legal principles applicable in other spheres were dispensed with. Alongside this legislative agenda, norms shifted in other ways: the use of surveillance and propaganda was expanded and deepened; military force and extra-judicial killing as counter-terrorist methods became routine; and complicity with torturers was normalised. Intelligence agencies, police forces and the military doubled or tripled their counter-terrorism budgets and held onto this funding even as other sectors were ravaged by austerity measures. The logic of counter-terrorism was spread into every sphere of public life in Britain as workers across government services were expected to become the eyes and ears of national security surveillance. The definition of the threat was itself transformed: no longer simply a matter of individual acts of violence but a much broader danger, understood in terms of clashes of culture, ideology and values, and informed by the Islamophobic principle that Muslim political organisation and dissent should be cast as forms of extremism. Concerns for human rights, for avoiding the stigmatising and criminalising of communities, or for basing policy on clear statements of goals and evidence of effectiveness were ignored. The number of civilian lives lost in ostenisbly fighting "jihadist" terrorism were many times greater than those that have ever been lost or could have been lost due to "jihadist" terrorism itself. Even on the narrowest measure of success – the reduction of terrorism – the record of UK counter- terrorism over the last twenty years is a poor one. The relentless expansion and proliferation of this War on Terror apparatus was underpinned by a consensus across the political class from the late 1990s. Central to that consensus were the claims that the UK faced an exceptional threat from "jihadist" terrorism, that this threat was the expression of an ideological rejection of British values among a generation of young Muslims and that, in response, the normal principles of domestic and international law should be suspended. Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn's Chatham House speech on the War on Terror in the 2017 general election campaign was the first sign of a crack in that consensus. In the days after the killing of twenty-two concert-goers at the Manchester Arena, Corbyn argued that "the war on terror is simply not working" and opinion polls suggested a majority agreed.1 This report offers an account of the failures of current counter-terrorism policies, an analysis of the reasons why they do not work and an outline of a progressive alternative that we hope will be the basis for a future Labour government's approach. We recognise the difficulty and complexity of the issue of terrorism and the various barriers that stand in the way of a different approach. But we believe the time is right to critically assess the legacy of the last twenty years and change course. At the heart of our argument is a question of democracy. Counter-terrorism policy-making has failed because its development is unmoored from any substantial process of democratic accountability. Instead, the aims and means of current counter-terrorism policy have been set by a security establishment according to its own interests and values. This security establishment has not sought to provide a consistent and precise definition of terrorism or to seek to counter terrorism in an evidence-based way, based on academic studies of how terrorism comes into existence. It has not sought to ground security policy in the actual problems of political violence that communities in the UK face. And it has repeatedly placed loyalty to elite interests above the need to uphold human rights, especially with respect to Muslim populations, both within the UK and abroad. The Labour Party has a particular responsibility to address the harms resulting from counter- terrorism as it was the Labour government led by Tony Blair that incorporated the War on Terror into British policy-making and his successor Gordon Brown who continued and extended the paradigm. Labour's 2017 manifesto already contained policies that align with our argument and can be built upon, such as the call to review Prevent, to address civil liberties concerns with the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act and to hold public inquiries on past injustices. However, counter-terrorism policy has been one of the least discussed topics within the Labour Party, despite its deep impact on the lives of the over two million Muslims in the UK. We hope this report will help to initiate a more vigorous discussion. Clearly, any left-wing Labour government will be attacked by its opponents as weak on national security. The temptation will be to not rock the boat and allow counter-terrorism policy to remain unchanged, the better to secure political victories in the core economic policy areas Labour Party supporters are more focused on. We believe this would be a mistake. It would mean a Labour government failing to uphold principles of human rights and racial and religious equality. But as a political strategy, it would also likely be counter-productive. Conceding ground on security policy will not minimise the attacks from right-wing media organisations or Conservative politicians; and a Labour government would be left defending itself reactively and inconsistently within a policy framework not of its own choosing. In this way, a failure to develop a progressive approach to security could end up undermining the credibility of a Labour government's broader policy agenda. A better strategy, we believe, is to adopt from the outset a coherent, explicitly stated, progressive policy that can be defended consistently and confidently.

This chapter explores some of the dilemmas that arise in using uncertainty as a lens to interpret societal problems and issues. Using several cases to open up discussion we argue that it is vitally important to understand the historical, political and cultural context in which debates about risk, uncertainty and (in)security materialise. Arguing for a re-specified, context-specific account, we seek to unravel dominant understandings of uncertainty in three domains: cyber security, counter-radicalisation strategy and mechanisms for coping in the aftermath of structural violence. While acknowledging the value of uncertainty as an heuristic device, we argue that established units of sociological analysis – such as power and ideology – remain important explanatory concepts in understanding institutional actions and policy drivers.

This chapter explores some of the dilemmas that arise in using uncertainty as a lens to interpret societal problems and issues. Using several cases to open up discussion we argue that it is vitally important to understand the historical, political and cultural context in which debates about risk, uncertainty and (in)security materialise. Arguing for a re-specified, context-specific account, we seek to unravel dominant understandings of uncertainty in three domains: cyber security, counter-radicalisation strategy and mechanisms for coping in the aftermath of structural violence. While acknowledging the value of uncertainty as an heuristic device, we argue that established units of sociological analysis – such as power and ideology – remain important explanatory concepts in understanding institutional actions and policy drivers.