Suchergebnisse

The origin of the state, long at the center of political science, can be greatly illuminated by the contemporary approach in evolutionary biology known as "inclusive fitness theory." Natural selection is now analyzed using cost-benefit models akin to rational actor models in economics, game theory, and collective choice theory. The utility of integrating these approaches is illustrated by using the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Tragedy of the Commons to outline a general model for the evolution of political and legal institutions. This perspective also shows how traditional political philosophers explored "archetypical" problems that are easily translated into scientific terminology. It is thus possible to link biology to the study of human behavior in a nonreductionist manner, thereby generating new empirical hypotheses concerning the environmental correlates of social norms. Ultimately, such a unification of the natural and social sciences points to a return to the classical view that law and justice are not matters of pure convention, but rather are grounded on what is right "according to nature."

The measure of political mobility (PM) among French citizens which has emerged from the statistics of successive elections makes possible an estimate of the permanent instability of the French multi-party system. That which is called 'the rate of mobility' is calculated as follows: an estimate is made of the % of votes for each list of electors in the elections under consideration & of the % of abstentions; the diff between the %'s in each election is then calculated & these diff's totaled up. A comparison between the 'rate of mobility' in France on the one hand & Switzerland & the US on the other indicates that the rate is much higher in France. 3 other features of French PM are further evident in such studies: (1) the shifts in opinion are due to pol'al conversion rather than to the periodic mobilization of non-voters (as is the case in the US during presidential elections); (2) PM in France is cumulative; there is no stable structure here, as in Switzerland, which would allow the pendulum to swing back (a redistribution of power among a pre-determined number of party members); & (3) the number of parties increases this tendency toward PM in France, though such mobility is not inevitably the result of such a multiplicity of parties. Tr by J. A. Broussard from IPSA.