Suchergebnisse

Nobody, least of all anyone intending to allude to sociology and stay respectable, should nowadays dare employ a generalization from a single instance. Nonetheless (since this is an introductory paragraph, and therefore only rhetoric), 1 I shall permit myself to do so and excuse the lapse by calling it an illustration. A professor of my acquaintance recently observed that reading an essay on Montesquieu (by one of my better students) had almost persuaded him to go himself and read Esprit des lois. In this country, I suspect, Montesquieu is less read than merely acknowledged as 'a precursor of sociology' or even as one of the 'great theorists' of sociology in general and political sociology in particular. One of the contributions that I hope this article will make is to persuade others, not merely historians of ideas, that Montesquieu should actually be read, because his ideas and his difficulties are important, interesting and instructive.

On one point my careless phrasing has led Charvet, and perhaps others, to misunderstand me. I want to remedy that and to comment on 'state of nature' theorizing and on formulating principles.

John Charvet, in a recent article, charges various 'attempts to make of equality a substantive principle of society' with being 'incoherent and self contradictory' (p. 13). The unifying theme of Charvet's article is that certain contenders for equality do so in a manner that logically presupposes the assuming away of those elements of social life which entitle us to talk about individuals as 'human beings at all, i.e. as beings possessing the attributes of humanity' (p. 2). I wish to show how little justified these charges are.