Suchergebnisse

Economic losses caused by hydrological extremes – floods and droughts – have been on the rise. Hydrological extremes jeopardize human security and impact on societal livelihood and welfare. Security can be generally understood as freedom from threat and the ability of societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change. Several dimensions of security are reviewed in the context of hydrological extremes. The traditional interpretation of security, focused on the state military capabilities, has been replaced by a wider understanding, including economic, societal and environmental aspects that get increasing attention. Floods and droughts pose a burden and serious challenges to the state that is responsible for sustaining economic development, and societal and environmental security. The latter can be regarded as the maintenance of ecosystem services, on which a society depends. An important part of it is water security, which can be defined as the availability of an adequate quantity and quality of water for health, livelihoods, ecosystems and production, coupled with an acceptable level of water-related risks to people, environments and economies. Security concerns arise because, over large areas, hydrological extremes − floods and droughts − are becoming more frequent and more severe. In terms of dealing with water-related risks, climate change can increase uncertainties, which makes the state's task to deliver security more difficult and more expensive. However, changes in population size and development, and level of protection, drive exposure to hydrological hazards.

Economic losses caused by hydrological extremes – floods and droughts – have been on the rise. Hydrological extremes jeopardize human security and impact on societal livelihood and welfare. Security can be generally understood as freedom from threat and the ability of societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change. Several dimensions of security are reviewed in the context of hydrological extremes. The traditional interpretation of security, focused on the state military capabilities, has been replaced by a wider understanding, including economic, societal and environmental aspects that get increasing attention. Floods and droughts pose a burden and serious challenges to the state that is responsible for sustaining economic development, and societal and environmental security. The latter can be regarded as the maintenance of ecosystem services, on which a society depends. An important part of it is water security, which can be defined as the availability of an adequate quantity and quality of water for health, livelihoods, ecosystems and production, coupled with an acceptable level of water-related risks to people, environments and economies. Security concerns arise because, over large areas, hydrological extremes − floods and droughts − are becoming more frequent and more severe. In terms of dealing with water-related risks, climate change can increase uncertainties, which makes the state's task to deliver security more difficult and more expensive. However, changes in population size and development, and level of protection, drive exposure to hydrological hazards.

This paper presents how the approaches to flood risk in Poland have evolved over the last 25 years. The reliance on structural defence and on the state as the key responsible actor was challenged by four triggering events: two large floods; the collapse of the communist system; and the European Union accession. The paper reveals that (1) the radical transformation of the political system did not lead to significant changes in flood risk governance; (2) changes in response to disastrous floods are incremental. Despite the pressures, the Polish flood risk governance preserved its core functional characteristics. Until the 1997 flood, it exhibited the exhaustion mode of institutional dynamics, with issue marginalisation and poor financing, while after this flood, the layering‐type mode prevailed, where innovative ideas were accommodated by the established system. The analysis of the Polish flood risk governance dynamics suggests that changes cannot be taken for granted, even facing significant pressures and windows of opportunities.

We argue that differences in the perception and governance of adaptation to climate change and extreme weather events are related to sets of beliefs and concepts through which people understand the environment and which are used to solve the problems they face (mental models). Using data gathered in 31 in-depth interviews with adaptation experts in Europe, we identify five basic stakeholder groups whose divergent aims and logic can be related to different mental models they use: advocacy groups, administration, politicians, researchers, and media and the public. Each of these groups uses specific interpretations of climate change and specifies how to deal with climate change impacts. We suggest that a deeper understanding and follow-up of the identified mental models might be useful for the design of any stakeholder involvement in future climate impact research processes. It might also foster consensus building about adequate adaptation measures against climate threats in a society.

Floods continue to hit many countries, both less developed and industrialized, bringing human suffering and immense economic damage (see floodobservatory.colorado.edu/). Hurricane Florence and Typhoon Mangkhut were just the most recent reminders of the disruption that flooding can bring. Hence, striving to improve the flood-risk governance system has broad relevance. Yet, the reduction of flood risk, understood globally as a combination of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability, is a rather distant goal (Fig. 1).Fig. 1. In January 2018, the Seine flooded in Paris. When it comes to flood policies around the world, both social and engineering factors must be further explored and scrutinized—as should notions of justice as they relate to flooding impacts and responses. Image courtesy of Shutterstock.com/Ekaterina Pokrovsky.Several weaknesses of flood-risk management in the United States, recognized in a recent PNAS Opinion (1), generally apply to many European countries as well, despite all the political, economic, and social differences between the United States and Europe. From our European perspective, this panoply of approaches suggests that both social and engineering factors must be further explored and scrutinized across the globe—as should notions of justice related to flooding impacts and responses.The European Union (EU) has dedicated legislation, called Directive 2007/60/EC, on the assessment and management of flood risks (2). This "Floods Directive" aims to reduce and manage the risks that floods pose to human health, economic activity, the environment, and cultural heritage. The Directive requires all 28 EU Member States to identify areas at risk of flooding, to map the flood extent as well as assets and humans at risk in these areas, and to take adequate measures to reduce this flood risk. The Directive takes a procedural approach and allows EU Member States policy discretion in designing flood-risk management. The Directive, as well as national obligations related to it, … ↵1To whom correspondence ...

European countries face increasing flood risks because of urbanization, increase of exposure and damage potential, and the effects of climate change. In literature and in practice, it is argued that a diversification of strategies for flood risk management (FRM), including flood risk prevention (through proactive spatial planning), flood defense, flood risk mitigation, flood preparation, and flood recovery, makes countries more flood resilient. Although this thesis is plausible, it should still be empirically scrutinized. We aim to do this. Drawing on existing literature we operationalize the notion of "flood resilience" into three capacities: capacity to resist; capacity to absorb and recover; and capacity to transform and adapt. Based on findings from the EU FP7 project STAR-FLOOD, we explore the degree of diversification of FRM strategies and related flood risk governance arrangements at the national level in Belgium, England, France, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden, as well as these countries' achievement in terms of the three capacities. We found that the Netherlands and to a lesser extent Belgium have a strong capacity to resist, France a strong capacity to absorb and recover, and especially England a high capacity to transform and adapt. Having a diverse portfolio of FRM strategies in place may be conducive to high achievements related to the capacities to absorb/recover and to transform and adapt. Hence, we conclude that diversification of FRM strategies contributes to resilience. However, the diversification thesis should be nuanced in the sense that there are different ways to be resilient. First, the three capacities imply different rationales and normative starting points for flood risk governance, the choice between which is inherently political. Second, we found trade-offs between the three capacities, e.g., being resistant seems to lower the possibility to be absorbent. Third, to explain countries' achievements in terms of resilience, the strategies' feasibility in specific physical circumstances and their fit in existing institutional contexts (appropriateness), as well as the establishment of links between strategies, through bridging mechanisms, have also been shown to be crucial factors. We provide much needed reflection on the implications of this diagnosis for governments, private parties, and citizens who want to increase flood resilience.

The European Union (EU) Water Framework Directive (WFD) requires EU member states to produce and implement river basin management plans, which are to be designed and updated via participatory processes that inform, consult with, and actively involve all interested stakeholders. The assumption of the European Commission is that stakeholder participation, and institutional adaptation and procedural innovation to facilitate it, are essential to the effectiveness of river basin planning and, ultimately, the environmental impact of the Directive. We analyzed official documents and the WFD literature to compare implementation of the Directive in EU member states in the initial WFD planning phase (2000-2009). Examining the development of participatory approaches to river basin management planning, we consider the extent of transformation in EU water governance over the period. Employing a mixed quantitative and qualitative approach, we map the implementation "trajectories" of 13 member states, and then provide a detailed examination of shifts in river basin planning and participation in four member states (Germany, Sweden, Poland and France) to illustrate the diversity of institutional approaches observed. We identify a general tendency towards increased, yet circumscribed, stakeholder participation in river basin management in the member states examined, alongside clear continuities in terms of their respective pre-WFD institutional and procedural arrangements. Overall, the WFD has driven a highly uneven shift to river basin-level planning among the member states, and instigated a range of efforts to institutionalize stakeholder involvement-often through the establishment of advisory groups to bring organized stakeholders into the planning process.

Flood risk is dynamic and influenced by many processes related to hazard, exposure and vulnerability. Flood damage increased significantly over the past decades, however, resulting overall economic loss per event is an aggregated indicator and it is difficult to attribute causes to this increasing trend. Much has been learned about damaging processes during floods at the micro-scale, e.g. building level. However, little is known about the main factors determining the amount of flood damage on event level. Thus, we analyse and compare paired flood events, i.e. consecutive, similar damaging floods that occurred in the same area. In analogy to 'Paired catchment studies' - a well-established method in hydrology to understand how changes in land use affect streamflow – we will investigate how and why resulting flood damage in a region differed between the first and second consecutive flood events. One example are the 2002 and 2013 floods in the Elbe and Danube catchments in Germany. The 2002 flood caused the highest economic damage (EUR 11600 million) due to a natural hazard event in Germany. Damage was so high due to extreme flood hazard triggered by extreme precipitation and a high number of resulting dyke breaches. Additionally, exposure hotspots like the city of Dresden at the Elbe river as well as some smaller municipalities at the river Mulde (e.g. Grimma, Eilenburg, Bitterfeld, Dessau) were severely impacted. However, affected parties and authorities learned from the extreme flood in 2002, and many governmental flood risk programs and initiatives were launched. Considerable improvements since 2002 occurred on many levels that deal with flood risk reduction and disaster response, in particular in 1) increased flood prevention by improved spatial planning, 2) an increased number of property-level mitigation measures, 3) more effective early warning and improved coordination of disaster response and 4) a more targeted maintenance of flood defence systems and their deliberate relocation. Thus, despite higher hydrological severity damage due to the 2013 flood was significantly lower than in 2002. In our international comparative paired event study we investigate under which circumstances similar or contrasting processes occurred and hope to identify common key processes which determine flood damage on event level.