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What does it mean to be in love while at war? This Element demonstrates that whether rebel groups commit themselves to marriage, bar it entirely, or reinterpret the ceremonies and practices associated with marriage, their decision has important implications for both the rebel organization and individual members. This Element contributes to the literature on gender and politics by demonstrating that rebel marriages are an under-appreciated driver of gendered conflict and post-conflict dynamics. This Element introduces frameworks for understanding how rebel groups approach the issue of marriage, suggesting that variation between and within rebel groups over time is related to not only the rebels' political project, but also the anticipated effect of marriage on cohesion and retention, and the rebels' logistical concerns. Furthermore, the Element unpacks how wartime rebel marriages can complicate or improve women's prospects for post-conflict reintegration by shaping whether rebel wives are depoliticized, distrusted, or reclaimed.

Nigeria's return to democracy has been a tumultuous era; the Fourth Republic has been characterized by insurgencies and violence throughout the country. Though seemingly disparate movements, the violence of the Fourth Republic has its roots in the country's constitution. Three aspects of the 1999 Nigerian constitution stand out as particularly problematic: the centralization of the police at the federal level with limited sub-national oversight, the ambiguous concept of indigeneity, and the overlapping, often contradictory land tenure systems endorsed. All of these allude to the precariousness of Nigerian federalism under the current constitution; ultimately, the police centralization primes the country for violence, while the indigeneity rules and land tenure system make it more difficult to negotiate stable post-conflict settlements. The country's recent experience with Boko Haram will be used to illustrate how these constitutional tenets facilitate instability.

This article introduces the Women's Activities in Armed Rebellion (WAAR) project, a multi-methods project that includes a cross-sectional dataset of women's participation in more than 370 organizations fighting in civil conflicts between 1946 and 2015. The dataset features 22 measures of women's participation in rebel organizations: it includes prevalence and presence measures of women's participation in combat, non-combat and leadership roles; details on all-female units within groups (and their primary focus – combat or support activities); and presence measures for types of support work (disaggregated into clandestine work, outreach to civilian populations and logistical support) and types of leadership activities (military or non-military) that women contribute. The WAAR project also includes a detailed, qualitative assessment of women's involvement in each organization, comprising an approximately 360-page handbook of female rebel participation in the post-WWII period. This article describes the WAAR project and suggests avenues for future research leveraging these data.

Abstract
Approximately seventy-five percent of the world's population lives in countries where asset exchange upon marriage is obligatory. Rising brideprice—money or gifts provided to a woman's family by the groom and his family as part of marriage arrangements—is a common if overlooked catalyst of violent conflict. In patrilineal (and some matrilineal) societies where brideprice is practiced, a man's social status is directly connected to his marital status. Brideprice acts as a flat tax that is prone to sudden and swift increases. As a result, rising brideprice can create serious marriage market distortions that prevent young men, especially those who are poor or otherwise marginalized, from marrying. This phenomenon is especially evident in polygamous societies, where wealthy men can afford more than one bride. These distortions incentivize extra-legal asset accumulation, whether through ad hoc raiding or organized violence. In such situations, rebel and terror groups may offer to pay brideprice—or even provide brides—to recruit new members. Descriptive case studies of Boko Haram in Nigeria and various armed groups in South Sudan demonstrate these linkages, while an examination of Saudi Arabia's cap on brideprice and its efforts to arrange low-cost mass weddings illustrates the ways in which governments can intervene in marriage markets to help prevent brideprice-related instability. The trajectory of brideprice is an important but neglected early indicator of societal instability and violent conflict, underscoring that the situation and security of women tangibly affect national security.