Suchergebnisse

When the debt crisis erupted in late 2009 in the European Union it was addressed with a fundamental reform of the EU's system of economic governance. These reforms pushed an agenda of fiscal austerity and more integration by putting national budgets under strict European supervision. Situating itself in the wider academic debate on the EU's democratic nature, this article determines the extent to which the reforms have affected the EU's democratic legitimacy by analysing them in the light of four vectors of legitimation (indirect, parliamentary, technocratic and procedural legitimacy). It will show that having had a considerable impact on the substance of the legislation, the European Parliament has strengthened the technocratic aspects of the reforms, but has compromised both the EU's procedural and indirect legitimacy. By consequence, national parliaments who are most affected by the reforms are left on their own to catch up with the ever running train of European integration. The new reforms may have brought about a more robust and efficient Stability and Growth Pact; this article shows it scores low in terms of procedural, indirect and parliamentary legitimacy.

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has become an official institution of the European Union (EU). According to the Treaty, it should provide the Union with 'impetus' and 'general political directions and priorities'. The explicit exclusion of any legislative functions seems to demarcate its role clearly from that of the European Commission, which retains the formal monopoly over legislative initiative. However, Treaty provisions have not prevented the European Council and its President from informally setting the agenda in a detailed way, often creating tension with the Commission. By looking into three high profile cases -- the energy climate package, economic governance reform and Schengen reform -- through the prism of two theoretical approaches -- the principal agent model and 'joint agenda setting' approach -- this article explores patterns of interactions between the two institutions in legislative agenda setting and shows that the relationship can be best defined in terms of 'competitive cooperation'. Adapted from the source document.