Suchergebnisse

Dissertation (Ph.D.)--University of Kansas, Public Administration, 2007. ; One of the most popular and controversial economic development strategies in state government is the availability of statutory provisions that allow corporations to reduce their tax obligations when they invest in various business development activities. The popularity of those so-called statutory-tax incentives is based, in part, on widely-held assumptions that greatly limit the expected role of management and organizations in their implementation. The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of management and organization on the implementation of statutory tax incentives. This study is based on models of administrative behavior in classic organization theory and proposes that statutory-tax incentives often do not function according to their rational designs because of corporate and governmental administrator pursuit of various organizational and subunit objectives and their resistance to policy features that require a change in established administrative practices. This study uses multiple sources to examine whether organizations and management affect the implementation of statutory-tax incentives. The results are primarily based on interviews with eighteen corporate managers and six governmental administrators who manage various elements of statutory-tax incentive programs. The interview results are supplemented, where appropriate, with an analysis of corporate tax return data and various governmental reports and documents. In contrast to the popular perception of tax incentives, this study finds that management and organizations matter in the implementation of tax incentives. Tax incentive benefits rarely play a substantive role in corporate cost-benefit analysis prior to investment decisions. Instead, corporate managers claim tax incentives in response to the salience of their corporate tax liability. In addition, corporate managers are as likely to be influenced by the costs of tax incentive programs as the projected ...

In recent years, significant attention has been given to measuring the financial condition of local governments, predicting when those governments will experience fiscal distress, and understanding how public managers navigate financial shortfalls. Researchers have given less focus, however, to understanding how financial condition affects other financial management practices—such as the administrative systems used to ensure financial accountability. This study uses a 19‐year panel of county‐level data from New York State to examine whether financial condition affects the likelihood of internal control deficiencies. The findings indicate that the incidence and severity of internal control deficiencies increase as financial condition deteriorates.

There are significant concerns about the financial condition of public pensions in U.S. state and local governments. To date, studies of public pensions have given limited attention to the effect of actuarial inputs on the valuation of pension liabilities and contribution requirements. This paper uses a simulated public pension system to examine the sensitivity of actuarial input changes on funding ratios and contribution requirements. We examine instantaneous and lagged effects, marginal and interactive effects, and effects under different funding conditions and demographic profiles. The findings emphasize the difficulty of conducting cross‐sectional analysis of public pension systems and point to several important considerations for future research.