How do Europeans engage in military strategy? Throughdetailed comparisons of operational planning and exploring the framework of the EU,NATO and the UN, this book sheds light on the instrumental nature of military force,the health of civil-military relations in Europe and the difficulty of makingeffective strategy in a multinational environment
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Strategy promises to turn the use of force into an instrument of policy. This book explores how military operations undertaken by European armed forces are intended to deliver political effects. Drawing on the work of Carl von Clausewitz it argues that strategy is the product of an iterative politico-military dialogue. While strategic-level planning endows operations with a rational intent, friction between political leaders and military commanders risks derailing the promise of strategy. Three case studies -- the EU in Chad, the UN in Lebanon and NATO in Afghanistan -- illustrate that the strategic template for European crisis response operations relies on deterrence and local capacity building. Building on over 120 interviews with diplomatic officials, military planners and operation commanders, this book sheds light on the instrumental nature of military force, the health of civil-military relations in Europe and the difficulty of making effective strategy in a multinational environment.
This article puts forward the contrarian argument that the EU's 'comprehensive approach' does not exist as far as crisis response planning is concerned. This practical inexistence is the result of internal EU politics. The notion of a comprehensive approach is fundamentally driven by a functional need for effectiveness in crisis management, but this frequently clashes with the logic of intergovernmental decision-making prevalent amongst the Member States. The argument builds on an analysis of how EU crisis response planning arrangements have evolved over time and zooms in on topical ongoing debates such as the review of the EU's Crisis Management Procedures, the Comprehensive Approach Communication and the development of operational planning tools. The search for coordination mechanisms cannot be a merely technical quest for efficiency: as strategic coordination must follow a particular policy agenda it represents a battle for political influence. This runs against the EU's culture of dispersed authority and omnipresent checks and balances. The lack of policy coherence is therefore politically understandable and not necessarily 'bad'. Yet the current debate on the comprehensive approach ignores the dynamics of European politics and draws attention away from the bigger trends in European security.
This article puts forward the contrarian argument that the EU's 'comprehensive approach' does not exist as far as crisis response planning is concerned. This practical inexistence is the result of internal EU politics. The notion of a comprehensive approach is fundamentally driven by a functional need for effectiveness in crisis management, but this frequently clashes with the logic of intergovernmental decision-making prevalent amongst the Member States. The argument builds on an analysis of how EU crisis response planning arrangements have evolved over time anti zooms in on topical ongoing debates such as the review of the EU's Crisis Management Procedures, the Comprehensive Approach Communication and the development of operational planning tools. The search for coordination mechanisms cannot be a merely technical quest for efficiency: as strategic coordination must follow a particular policy agenda it represents a battle for political influence. This runs against the EU's culture of dispersed authority and omnipresent checks and balances. The lack f policy coherence is therefore politically understandable and not necessarily 'bad'. Yet the current debate on the comprehensive approach ignores the dynamics of European politics and draws attention away from the bigger trends in European security. Adapted from the source document.
Despite the doom and gloom about the Afghanistan campaign, in political and military terms NATO may yet emerge as a leaner and more effective organisation. (Survival / SWP)