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Disputants might resolve their disagreements in a piecemeal fashion, addressing a subset of the issues at a time. How viable is such a strategy? I argue that partial settlements signal the desire to resolve disagreements and can lay the foundation for additional cooperation by building trust and/or demonstrating the benefits of dispute resolution. As a result, partial settlements should be associated with the resolution of remaining disagreements. Yet, scholars have questioned whether pursuing a piecemeal approach may be more harmful than helpful, and a systematic empirical test of these competing predictions is necessary. Using data from worldwide territorial claims between 1919 and 2001, I find a strong positive correlation between partial settlements and comprehensive dispute resolution. In the shorter run, partial settlements are also associated with an increased likelihood for peaceful negotiations, but there is only limited evidence that they reduce conflict before all aspects of the claim are resolved.

Disputants might resolve their disagreements in a piecemeal fashion, addressing a subset of the issues at a time. How viable is such a strategy? I argue that partial settlements signal the desire to resolve disagreements and can lay the foundation for additional cooperation by building trust and/or demonstrating the benefits of dispute resolution. As a result, partial settlements should be associated with the resolution of remaining disagreements. Yet, scholars have questioned whether pursuing a piecemeal approach may be more harmful than helpful, and a systematic empirical test of these competing predictions is necessary. Using data from worldwide territorial claims between 1919 and 2001, I find a strong positive correlation between partial settlements and comprehensive dispute resolution. In the shorter run, partial settlements are also associated with an increased likelihood for peaceful negotiations, but there is only limited evidence that they reduce conflict before all aspects of the claim are resolved.

AbstractThere is significant variation in the design of military alliances but scholars currently do not have a good understanding of when members choose one design over another. This article argues that alliance design is motivated, at least in part, by reliability considerations. If concerns about opportunism are high—when prospective members have a history of alliance violation—the signatories should be more willing to implement costly reliability-enhancing provisions such as greater precision in when alliance obligations apply, issue linkage, and increased institutionalization. However, this should be more likely in symmetric alliances where members of similar power levels rely on the support of their partners and thus sensitivity to opportunism is high. In asymmetric alliances, major powers may not find reliability-enhancing provisions necessary and minor powers, who do worry about the reliability of their partners, are unable to force more costly alliance designs given their limited bargaining power. The theoretical expectations are tested using data on bilateral alliances between 1919 and 2001 and the results are generally supportive of the hypotheses.

AbstractGiven frequent leadership turnover and leaders' need to appeal to voters, democracies should face difficulties in maintaining their alliance commitments. Yet the empirical evidence predominantly shows that they do make reliable allies. Democratic governments can increase reliability by binding future administrations through the choice of alliance commitment. While defense pacts precommit future leaders to close military cooperation with an ally, consultation pacts leave more room for discretion. This research note examines when precommitment through a defense pact is likely to occur. A government should be more likely to conclude a defense pact if potential successors have different preferences regarding the alliance, if the government believes that it will lose power soon, and if the costs of precommitment are not too high. I test the theoretical expectations using the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data between 1945 and 2003. The findings support the argument and suggest an answer to the puzzle of why states sometimes conclude whole-hearted commitments and other times seemingly half-hearted ones.

Scholarly work on the impact of domestic politics on international cooperation has grown significantly over time. Unfortunately, there is a democratic bias to much of this literature as scholars typically focus on the relative advantage of democracies at cooperation. Our paper seeks to shed more light on the cooperation potential of autocracies by distinguishing different types of autocratic regimes. We argue that autocracies that more closely resemble democracies in the institutional characteristics that have been found to be important for cooperation (that is, greater leader accountability, limited policy flexibility, and greater transparency) should be more successful at cooperation and thus more likely to cooperate with one another and with democracies. Specifically, we expect single-party and military regimes to be advantaged at international cooperation compared to personalist systems. We test our theoretical expectations using the 10 Million International Dyadic Events data (1990-2004) and find support for our theoretical argument. Adapted from the source document.

Civil war is usually examined from the perspective of commitment problems. This approach provides considerable insight regarding which civil war agreement provisions reduce the chance of renewed fighting. Yet, additional insight can be gained by examining information asymmetries as a potential cause of civil war recurrence. We argue that significant uncertainty regarding military capabilities may persist after fighting ends and that this uncertainty may lead to the breakdown of peace. However, carefully designed peace agreements can guard against renewed civil war by calling for international monitoring, making the belligerents submit military information to third parties, and providing for verification of this information. Our empirical analysis of 51 civil war settlements between 1945 and 2005 shows that these provisions significantly reduce the risk of new civil war. Encouraging the adoption of these provisions may be a useful policy in the international community's effort to establish peace in civil‐war‐torn societies.