Suchergebnisse

Cover Page -- Half-title Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication Page -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- Note on Transliteration -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- Part I: Safavid Period -- Chapter 1: General Overview: Iran between 1500 and 1900 -- Chapter 2: Wine in Safavid Iran I: Between Excess and Abstention -- Chapter 3: Wine in Safavid Iran II: Ambivalence and Prohibition -- Chapter 4: Opium in Safavid Iran: The Assimilated Drug -- Chapter 5: Tobacco in Safavid Iran: Pleasure and Proscription -- Chapter 6: Coffee in Safavid Iran: Commerce and Consumption -- Part II: Qajar Period -- Chapter 7: Wine in Qajar Iran: From Flouting the Religious Law to Flaunting Unbelief -- Chapter 8: Opium and Tobacco in Qajar Iran: From Pleasure to Crash Crop and Emblem of the Nation -- Chapter 9: From Coffee to Tea: Shifting Patterns of Consumption in Qajar Iran -- Chapter 10: Drinking Tea in the Qahvah-khanah: The Politics of Consumption in Qajar Iran -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.

Capitalism used to be a singular term, but, like many keywords in English, now is often presented and discussed as a plural: capitalisms. Whereas capitalism formerly stood for what today is called industrial capitalism, scholars currently talk about varieties of capitalism: commercial capitalism, industrial capitalism, financial capitalism, and neoliberal capitalism, to name but the most prominent historical variants. Given this proliferation, and the inherent difficulty of defining capitalism, singular, it is important to be clear about the meaning and function of our object of inquiry. After all, "different definitions lead to different conclusions and may make for very different histories."

This essay parts with the compartmentalized way in which scholarship tends to view Iran's military predicament in the Safavid era by examining the perennial threat the Ottomans posed to the country largely in isolation from the recurring conflict between the Safavids and their other main adversaries, the Mughals and Uzbeks, respectively. The security dilemma facing Safavid Iran, it is argued here, was acute as well as multifaceted, and should be approached as such. All three of its direct neighbors were Sunni and two, the Ottomans and the Mughals, were capable of mobilizing far greater military resources than Iran. The main strategic concern of the Safavids was to prevent these neighbors from joining forces and engaging them in a two-front war. This study examines balancing the strategies employed by the three most consequential Safavid shahs, Esma'il I (1501‒24), Tahmasb (1524‒76), and 'Abbas I (1587‒1629), to avoid becoming the target of a simultaneous or combined assault by their neighbors. This analysis provides the backdrop to the rational decision the Safavids made in 1639—to end the threat of a two-front war by concluding a lasting peace accord with their most formidable enemies, the Ottomans.